Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Saturday, July 5, 2008

Problems in Lubanga Resolved?
According to the ICC President and Prosecutor, Lubanga's trial can now continue, because the UN has agreed to turn over the disputed evidence to the Trial Chamber and the defense:
"The obstacles have been lifted," chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo told journalists on the sidelines of a ceremony in The Hague to mark the 10th anniversary of the Rome Treaty that led to the court's creation.

Lubanga's trial would be the ICC's first.

Court president Philippe Kirsch said the main point of contention, over the prosecution's alleged abuse of a confidentiality allowances, should be resolved "shortly".

On June 13, judges imposed an indefinite stay on proceedings, due to have started last Monday, after finding that prosecutors had wrongly withheld evidence, notably from the United Nations, from Lubanga's lawyers.

This "misuse" inhibited Lubanga's ability to prepare a proper defence, they said.

Lubanga subsequently applied for release, and on Wednesday the ICC ordered him to be freed from detention. But the prosecution lodged an immediate appeal that suspended Lubanga's release.

"The UN has sent a letter authorising the other parties to have access to the documents," Moreno-Ocampo said Thursday, reiterating that he was confident the trial would kick off by autumn.
If true, this is good news indeed. It would have been very unfortunate if the ICC's first trial had been derailed by the Prosecutor's overbroad use of confidentiality agreements. But at the same time, a Gitmo-style show trial involving secret evidence would have done lasting damage to the Court's legitimacy. The Trial Chamber's decision to stay the trial was thus the right move, because it forced the UN, which is obviously deeply invested in the success of the ICC, to do the right thing and release the evidence.

The judges of the Trial Chamber deserve praise for their willingness to defend the integrity of the system at all costs. I can only imagine the political pressure that was being exerted on them behind the scenes to permit Lubanga's trial to continue. Their bravery led to the only satisfactory resolution of the problem — and helps establishes the critical judicial independence of the Court.

Wednesday, July 2, 2008

Lubanga Released -- In Theory
As I anticipated a few days ago following the UN's refusal to provide the judges with meaningful access to the disputed evidence, Trial Chamber I has ordered Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's unconditional and immediate release:
30. As just set out, the Chamber's Decision stayed the proceedings sine die because of the present impossibility of trying the accused fairly. It follows that the detention of the accused cannot be justified in order to ensure his appearance at trial or to safeguard the investigation, because the trial (which was the result of the investigation) has been stayed. Furthermore, in the absence of the prospect of a trial, the accused cannot be held in custody or subjected to provisional release as purely preventative measures to deter him from committing further crimes.
The Trial Chamber's decision, however, does not mean that Lubanga will walk out of the Hague anytime soon. First, despite releasing him "unconditionally" and "immediately," the Court stayed his actual release pending appeal of its order by the Prosecutor:
35. Trial Chamber I orders the release of the accused, but since by Rule 154 of the Rules an appeal may be filed no later than 5 days from the date upon which the party filing the appeal is notified of the decision, this order shall not be enforced until the expiry of the 5 day time limit, and, furthermore, if an appeal is filed within the 5 day time-limit against the order granting release and if a request is made in the appeal for suspensive effect, the accused shall not leave detention until the Appeals Chamber has resolved whether or not the effect of the order granting release is to be suspended.
The Prosecutor will no doubt ask the Appeals Chamber to suspend the release order, which means that Lubanga will remain in detention until the Chamber resolves the appeal, however long that takes.

Second — and I doubt this aspect of the order will receive much media attention — the Trial Chamber indicated that Lubanga will be released only if a State is willing to take him:
36. It is to be noted, finally, that by Rule 185 of the Rules, an order releasing the accused shall only be put into effect after arrangements have been made for his transfer to a State that is obliged to receive him. It follows that these arrangements should not be implemented until the 5 day time-limit, set out above, has expired.
That requirement could be a serious problem for Lubanga. I predicted in my forthcoming article "What Happens to the Acquitted?" that ICC acquittees will find it no less difficult to find new homes than ICTR acquittees like Ntagerura and Rwamakuba, and I am confident — sadly — that Lubanga's "release" will prove me right. There is no way the DRC will take him; he is, after all, a rebel. And it is very unlikely that any other State will be enthusiastic about having an accused war criminal walking free on its territory. So I fear that Lubanga may end up sharing the same fate as Ntagerura and Rwamakuba: being "free" to enjoy living as a virtual prisoner in a UN safehouse.

Sunday, June 29, 2008

No Progress in the Lubanga Trial
I recently blogged about Trial Chamber I's stunning decision to stay Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's trial because of the Prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. The Court held a hearing on the 24th to determine whether, in light of its decision, Lubanga should be released. It has yet to reach a conclusion — but if the "compromise" the UN offered at the hearing is any indication, he might not be in custody too much longer:
In a correspondence from Nicolas Michel, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the United Nations proposed that the judges go to the Peace Palace in The Hague, therefore on "UN territory", to consult the documents.

They would not be allowed to take notes, or to record information during their consultation. Thereafter, they could indicate certain pieces of evidence for which the prosecutor would be invited to make a summary. The judges could then compare the summary with the original evidence and decide to reveal these summaries to the defence.

During the hearing of 24 June, Catherine Mabille, the lawyer for Lubanga, has from the start specified that "the defence will not accept summaries, which cannot be evidence".

"If you accept", she declared, that means that the prosecutor signs agreements with the United Nations, and that the UN will dictate to the judges, to justice, what it can hear, what can be said or not."
The judges seem to agree with Mabille: Justice Adrian Fulford told the Prosecutor that the court was "unlikely to approve a system that depends on its ability to memorize large quantities of information which it is unable to retain and study, and compare it with other evidence in the case so as to assess its relevance." His position is sound: the last thing the Court needs is a trial that resembles a Guantanamo military commission. This trial will create the blueprint for future trials; it is thus imperative for the Court to do everything in its power to protect the defendant's rights — even if that ultimately means letting Lubanga walk.
There Will Be Blood
The NY Times Week in Review has an article written by Graham Bowley on the effect of recent attacks by Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure and the effects of these attacks on world oil prices. The piece begins:
When armed rebels from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta attacked an enormous oil facility 75 miles off the swampy West African coast on June 19, traveling hours by speedboat under cover of darkness and kidnapping an oil worker, their brazen assault underlined the perhaps underappreciated dependence of the United States — and the world — on oil from Nigeria.

Three days afterward, Nigerian officials said at a hastily arranged global energy summit in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, that recent attacks had cut Nigeria’s oil production to its lowest level in nearly two decades, giving oil markets the jitters and helping to send prices higher…

“We always focus on the Persian Gulf but this is one of the key oil security issues in the world today,” said Daniel Yergin, one of the nation’s best-known energy experts and chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, a consulting firm. “It’s tied up with Nigerian politics, regional and national battles for power, and criminality.” When Mr. Yergin spoke to lawmakers at a hearing in Congress last week, he was asked what would most help stabilize world markets. “Helping bring peace to the Niger Delta would be a major contribution,” he responded.
The Times article continues that responding to the situation in Nigeria will need both a sound development policy and a counter-insurgency strategy:
According to J. Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, the government led by Nigeria’s new president, Umaru Yar’Adua, must break with decades of neglect and pay attention to the troubles of the southern delta region by promoting development but also cracking down on the rebels and “demonstrating that these guys cannot operate with impunity.”

He’s not very optimistic, however. “When you look at the delta, the overwhelming picture is that the situation has very little promise of being fixed,” he said.
While development policy is always a complex issue, the “operate with impunity” part is also a problem, as MEND has started attacking not just oil pipelines, but offshore oil platforms, as well. MEND even issued a press release that states, "The location for today's attack was deliberately chosen to remove any notion that off-shore oil exploration is far from our reach." Jeff Vail of The Oil Drum explains that this is especially significant as 90% of Nigeria’s oil growth is expected to be via new offshore platforms. Which now seem vulnerable to attack.

John Robb, who writes extensively on guerilla-based “fourth generation warfare” is concerned that destabilization from infrastructure attacks will worsen:
So, given production limitations and strong/concentrated demand, even small disruptions by guerrilla groups on light sweet crude production is likely to have a direct influence on global oil pricing (in contrast, disruptions aimed at heavy crude production should have little impact on global pricing). Further, there are already active groups in many of the most critical production areas.

Fortunately, from the demonstrated behavior of these groups it doesn't appear that guerrilla/terrorist groups have fully grasped their potential market power with small attacks (despite aspirational pronouncements from al Qaeda and large scale attacks in 2005/2006). Once they do, as bad as disruption is today, it could get MUCH worse.

Why? A direct connection to scalable profits...

As we saw with e-mail spam/phishing, even the faintest whiff of profits can turn a loose collection of individuals/groups into a torrential crime-fueled marketplace generated billions and attracting tens of thousands of participants. Are we about to see the same occur with oil?
For example, consider Columbia. John Robb notes that
Disruption isn't limited to Nigeria. A remote control bomb by the FARC on Occidental Petroleum's pipeline in Colombia just knocked out 100,000 barrels a day. It's also interesting to note how irrelevant the US military/national security system has become in regards to global energy security. The entire paradigm of warfare has changed but the $1 Trillion behemoth has barely budged.
While I doubt that the end is nigh, the situation is obviously serious and it won’t be solved by a combination of a dithering domestic energy policy and a foreign policy of “assisted” regime-change. So, for now, only one thing is certain…

Kristof: "If Only Mugabe Were White"
Nick Kristof asks the right questions about the lack of outrage against Robert Mugabe among the leaders of African states and discusses what may be the best solution to the horrors that have gripped Zimbabwe over these past months:
Africa’s rulers often complain, with justice, that the West’s perceptions of the continent are disproportionately shaped by buffoons and tyrants rather than by the increasing number of democratically elected presidents presiding over 6 percent growth rates. But as long as African presidents mollycoddle Mr. Mugabe, they are branding Africa with his image.

To his credit, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa has taken the lead in denouncing Mr. Mugabe’s abuses, and Nelson Mandela bluntly deplored Mr. Mugabe’s “tragic failure of leadership.” Mr. Mandela could also have been talking about [South African President] Mr. Mbeki’s own failures.

The United States doesn’t have much leverage, and Britain squandered its influence partly by focusing on the plight of dispossessed white farmers. (That’s tribalism for Anglo-Saxons.) But there is a way out.

The solution is for leaders at the African Union summit this week to give Mr. Mugabe a clear choice.

One option would be for him to “retire” honorably — “for health reasons” after some face-saving claims of heart trouble — at a lovely estate in South Africa, taking top aides with him. He would be received respectfully and awarded a $5 million bank account to assure his comfort for the remainder of his days.

The other alternative is that he could dig in his heels and cling to power. African leaders should make clear that in that case, they will back an indictment of him and his aides in the International Criminal Court. Led by the Southern African Development Community, the world will also impose sanctions against Mr. Mugabe’s circle and cut off all military supplies and spare parts. Mozambique, South Africa and Congo will also cut off the electricity they provide to Zimbabwe.

So, whatever happened to the Responsibility to Protect? Or even the less robust 1990s versions of humanitarian intervention? Surely widespread deprivation, starvation, torture and political murder -- whether or not tantamount to genocide -- qualify as the kinds of mass atrocities that should trigger international intervention. But it is precisely because of the support Mugabe has received from China and from his more powerful neighbor to the south that any robust UN action is unlikely. It is also because the baseline principle of outside intervention -- "first, do no harm" -- makes action in Zimbabwe quite tricky.

If the AU implicitly or explicitly places an ICC indictment on the table, this will be a good test of the amnesty/exile vs. prosecution debate. Given his age, I am not sure Mugabe fears a long legal process.