Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Saturday, June 28, 2008

U.S. and E.U. Near Agreement on Sharing Personal Data
This sounds complicated but important:


The United States and the European Union are nearing completion of an agreement allowing law enforcement and security agencies to obtain private information — like credit card transactions, travel histories and Internet browsing habits — about people on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.


Most of the problems in reaching an agreement have been on the European side, especially since it hasn't always been clear whether member states or the EU as a whole is authorized to make such an agreement. On the U.S. side, I am fairly confident we are talking about an executive agreement, perhaps without any congressional involvement since it is not clear it involves any changes to U.S. law.

One interesting note: there seem to be substantial areas of disagreement still, as well as lots of potential opposition from European privacy-rights advocates. Someone leaked the state of negotiations to the NYT, but in hopes of torpedoing the deal or of carrying it across the finish line? Hard to tell.




Friday, June 27, 2008

Is the ICC Overreaching in Darfur?
Well, two experts on the Darfur conflict in Sudan think so. More evidence for my argument with Kevin (and Angelina Jolie) about the downside of the ICC actions in Sudan.

Is the International Criminal Court losing its way in Darfur? We fear it is. Chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo's approach is fraught with risk -- for the victims of the atrocities in Darfur, for the prospects for peace in Sudan and for the prosecution itself.

We are worried by two aspects of Ocampo's approach, as presented to the U.N. Security Council early this month. One concerns fact: Sudan's government has committed heinous crimes, but Ocampo's comparison of it with Nazi Germany is an exaggeration. The other concerns political consequences: Indicting a senior government figure would be an immense symbolic victory for Darfurians. But Darfur residents need peace, security and deliverable justice more than they need a moment of jubilation. And with President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his men still in power, a high-level indictment would probably damage all these objectives.




Canada Quietly Seeks to Withdraw ICC Warrants in Uganda
The government of Canada, one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the ICC, is apparently quietly lobbying for a withdrawal of ICC arrest warrants against the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army leaders.

According to a diplomatic note obtained by the Star, Canada “has already indicated openness, in principle” to supporting a future request to the UN Security Council to defer charges from the criminal court in order to have Ugandan rebel leaders sign off on a peace deal that could halt the decades-long conflict.


The rationale is one I've suggested many times before on this blog. It is good to see that Canada is open to this idea as well.
Wittes' Law and the Long War: Wise Counsel for the Age of Terror (If That's What We're In)
Here's my review in the New York Obsever of Benjamin Wittes' new book, Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror. The book is a must read for foreign relations law specialists, in many ways a companion volume to Jack Goldsmith's The Terror Presidency. Where Jack gives us the inside acount, Ben's represents the think-tank perspective, longer on prescription (in highly accessible form). Both are strong proponents of congressional participation in anti-terror policy. If there's a weakness, it's that neither pays much heed to international law as a part of the answer; and both assume that we are in fact in a "long war", which I think is at least debatable.

I'll have more to say during our online roundtable on the book in July. In the meantime, I highly recommend it.
An Important Maori Land Settlement -- But Where's the Treaty Itself?
The BBC reports that the New Zealand government and seven Maori tribes have entered into an historic agreement concerning Maori ownership of a number of forests in the North Island, where I live:
The NZ$420m ($319m) agreement transfers ownership of nine forests - covering 435,000 acres (176,000 hectares) of land - in the central North Island.

Hundreds of Maori, some in traditional dress, thronged parliament to witness the signing of the accord.

"It's a historic journey we are on," Prime Minister Helen Clark said.

"We came into politics to address injustice and seek reconciliation. Thank you for walking that road with us on this historic day," she added, according to AP news agency.

The settlement - the largest single deal between the government and Maori tribes - seeks to address grievances dating back to the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi.

The treaty guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown. But land seizures and ownership breaches followed.

The forests signed over are mainly large commercial pine plantations, generating about NZ$13m a year in rents.

The settlement also hands over rents that have accumulated on the land since 1989.

Between them, the seven tribes or iwi include more than 100,000 members. They will manage the land collectively, setting up a holding company structure and forestry management structure.
The agreement, known as the "Treelords" deal — echoing the very controversial 1992 Sealords deal, which ultimately led the New Zealand Parliament to extinguish all Maori claims to commercial fishing rights — is indeed historic. I would take issue, though, with the article's claim that the Treaty of Waitangi "guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown." That interpretation is consistent with the English version of the Treaty — but not with the Maori version. (The two versions were drafted separately, and the English version is not a translation of the Maori, even though the Maori version was drafted first.)

Here is Article 1 of the Treaty in English:
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.
And here is Article 1 in Maori:
Ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu-te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.
I have bolded the operative terms. The problem is that kawanatanga does not mean "sovereignty"; it means "governance" — a much weaker term. Indeed, it is clear that the Maori did not intend to cede anything resembling sovereignty to the Queen, given that the Maori version of the Treaty does not use the Maori word for "sovereignty," kingitanga, or even the Maori word for "independence," rangatiritanga.

Just as important, the British had to have known that the Maori did not intend to cede sovereignty to the Queen. In 1835, the British and the Maori had signed the Declaration of Independence, in which the British guaranteed that the Maori chiefs would maintain sovereignty over their land. The Declaration made use of all three of the words that are at the heart of the dispute over the Treaty, with the British translating rangatiritanga as "independence," kingitanga as "sovereign power and authority," and kawanatanga as "functions of government." How then could the British have honestly believed a mere five years later — with many of the same British officials present at the signing of both documents — that Article 1's use of the term kawanatanga, as opposed to kingitanga, meant that the Maori were giving up their sovereignty?

Regardless, the question is now moot — New Zealand courts have long since given up trying to determine the "true" meaning of the Treaty. Now they — and the Waitangi Tribunal, which makes recommendations to the government concerning Maori grievances — simply apply the so-called "Treaty Principles":
The principle of government or the kawanatanga principle

Article 1 gives expression to the right of the Crown to make laws and its obligation to govern in accordance with constitutional process. This sovereignty is qualified by the promise to accord the Māori interests specified in article 2 an appropriate priority. This principle describes the balance between articles 1 and 2: the exchange of sovereignty by the Māori people for the protection of the Crown. It was emphasised in the context of this principle that ‘the Government has the right to govern and make laws’.

The principle of self-management (the rangatiratanga principle)

Article 2 guarantees to Māori hapū (tribes) the control and enjoyment of those resources and taonga that it is their wish to retain. The preservation of a resource base, restoration of tribal self-management, and the active protection of taonga, both material and cultural, are necessary elements of the Crown’s policy of recognising rangatiratanga. The Government also recognised the Court of Appeal’s description of active protection, but identified the key concept of this principle as a right for iwi to organise as iwi and, under the law, to control the resources they own.

The principle of equality

Article 3 constitutes a guarantee of legal equality between Māori and other citizens of New Zealand. This means that all New Zealand citizens are equal before the law. Furthermore, the common law system is selected by the Treaty as the basis for that equality, although human rights accepted under international law are also incorporated. Article 3 has an important social significance in the implicit assurance that social rights would be enjoyed equally by Māori with all New Zealand citizens of whatever origin. Special measures to attain that equal enjoyment of social benefits are allowed by international law.

The principle of reasonable cooperation

The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a fair basis for two peoples in one country. Duality and unity are both significant. Duality implies distinctive cultural development while unity implies common purpose and community. The relationship between community and distinctive development is governed by the requirement of cooperation, which is an obligation placed on both parties by the Treaty. Reasonable cooperation can only take place if there consultation on major issues of common concern and if good faith, balance, and common sense are shown on all sides. The outcome of reasonable cooperation will be partnership.

The principle of redress

The Crown accepts a responsibility to provide a process for the resolution of grievances arising from the Treaty. This process may involve courts, the Waitangi Tribunal, or direct negotiation. The provision of redress, where entitlement is established, must take account of its practical impact and of the need to avoid the creation of fresh injustice. If the Crown demonstrates commitment to this process of redress, it will expect reconciliation to result.
The Treaty Principles are important, and they do occasionally protect Maori interests. But their importance cannot obscure the fact that the Treaty itself still has no formal legal status in New Zealand, making Maori interests subject to the whims of Parliament. And that's no accident: taking the Treaty seriously would mean taking the Maori version of the Treaty seriously — and taking the Maori version seriously would mean that deals like Treelord would be the very tiny tip of a very large iceberg.

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Justice Breyer Rejects Pragmatic Comparativism in Heller
No surprise, the Supreme Court in the Second Amendment case of D.C. v. Heller refrains from any discussion of contemporary foreign or international laws or practices. The Court, per Justice Scalia, does discuss historical comparativism at some length (pp. 19-22), and Justice Stevens in dissent challenges this historical reading (pp. 27-31).

But the really interesting part of Heller regarding comparativism comes from Justice Breyer’s dissent. He examines one amicus brief's pragmatic arguments that look to comparative experiences to suggest tighter gun control laws lead to more murders. (See my post on those amicus briefs here). As this does not align with his desired result, he finds a rationale for rejecting these comparative experiences:


[R]espondent’s amici point to a statistical analysis that regresses murder rates against the presence or absence of strict gun laws in 20 European nations. That analysis concludes that strict gun laws are correlated with more murders, not fewer….

These empirically based arguments may have proved strong enough to convince many legislatures, as a matter of legislative policy, not to adopt total handgun bans. But the question here is whether they are strong enough to destroy judicial confidence in the reasonableness of a legislature that rejects them. And that they are not. For one thing, they can lead us more deeply into the uncertainties that surround any effort to reduce crime, but they cannot prove either that handgun possession diminishes crime or that handgun bans are ineffective. The statistics do show a soaring District crime rate. And the District’s crime rate went up after the District adopted its handgun ban. But, as students of elementary logic know, after it does not mean because of it.What would the District’s crime rate have looked like without the ban? Higher? Lower? The same? Experts differ; and we, as judges, cannot say.

What about the fact that foreign nations with strict gun laws have higher crime rates? Which is the cause and which the effect? The proposition that strict gun laws cause crime is harder to accept than the proposition that strict gun laws in part grow out of the fact that a nation already has a higher crime rate. And we are then left with the same question as before: What would have happened to crime without the gun laws-a question that respondent and his amici do not convincingly answer. (pp. 21-24).


I find Justice Breyer's rejection of pragmatic comparativism fascinating. Of all the justices that favor comparativism, he is most notable for espousing the pragmatic benefits of looking abroad. But now, when an amicus brief does just that, he finds a basis for rejecting it. He essentially is trying to argue that the experiences in other nations do not support a causal relation between higher murder rates and strict gun control laws. But he assiduously avoids any discussion of a possible correlation based on the empirical evidence from other countries. As you would expect, the amicus brief was arguing about correlations, not causation.

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

World Attitudes Toward Torture
WorldPublicOpinion.org has released an interesting survey of world attitudes toward torture. Here is the summary of their findings:
A WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 19 nations finds that in 14 of them most people favor an unequivocal rule against torture, even in the case of terrorists who have information that could save innocent lives. Four nations lean toward favoring an exception in the case of terrorists.

However, large majorities in all 19 nations favor a general prohibition against torture. In all nations polled, the number saying that the government should generally be able to use torture is less than one in five.

On average across all nations polled, 57 percent opt for unequivocal rules against torture. Thirty-five percent favor an exception when innocent lives are at risk. Just 9 percent favor the government being able to use torture in general.

The four publics that favor an exception for terrorists when innocent lives are at risk include majorities in India (59%), Nigeria (54%), and Turkey (51%), and a plurality in Thailand (44%).

Support for the unequivocal position was highest in Spain (82%), Great Britain (82%) and France (82%), followed by Mexico (73%), China (66%), the Palestinian territories (66%), Poland (62%), Indonesia (61%), and the Ukraine (59%). In five countries either modest majorities or pluralities support a ban on all torture: Azerbaijan (54%), Egypt (54%), the United States (53%), Russia (49%), and Iran (43%). South Koreans are divided.

[snip]

The survey presented respondents with an argument in favor of allowing the torture of potential terrorists who threaten civilians: "Terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use some degree of torture if it may gain information that would save innocent lives." In fourteen nations, a majority or plurality rejected this argument in favor of the unequivocal view: "Clear rules against torture should be maintained because any use of torture is immoral and will weaken international human rights standards against torture."
The executive director of the company sees the results as extremely encouraging, but I'm not so sure that his enthusiasm is warranted. Yes, the overall trends are positive. But it's still a little unsettling that nearly 4 out of 10 people world-wide are willing to countenance torture in at least some circumstances, including 44% of Americans, and that nearly 2 out of 10 think it should be generally available to the government. (Who else do they want tortured? Shoplifters?) Even worse, the number of people who accept torture is generally on the rise:
Only India had even a modest plurality favoring an exception for terrorists in 2006. In the current survey three countries (India, Nigeria, and Turkey) have a majority supporting such exceptions, Thailand has a plurality and South Korea is divided.

Four countries included in both surveys show dramatic increases in support for allowing the torture of terrorists: India (from 32% to 59%), Nigeria (39% to 54%), Turkey (24% to 51%), and South Korea (31% to 51%). Substantial increases also occurred in Egypt (25% to 46%) and the United States (36% to 44%).

At the same time there have been equally dramatic increases among those favoring a complete ban on torture. Support has grown substantially in Mexico (rising from 50% to 73%), Spain (65% to 82%), China (49% to 66%), Indonesia (51% to 61%), Britain (72% to 82%), and Russia (43% to 49%).

On average, support for an exception has gone up six points while support for an unequivocal rule has gone up two points. Thus the net increase in favor of an exception is just four points.
As the summary notes, acceptance of torture is affected — unsurprisingly — by the distribution of terrorist attacks. Since the previous poll in 2006, three of the six countries in which acceptance has increased have experienced terrorist attacks (India, Turkey, South Korea) and four of the six in which it has decreased have not (Spain, Britain, Indonesia, and Russia).
International Economic Law Interest Group Call for Papers
Susan Franck forwards the following call for papers for what looks to be an interesting and well-timed conference:
The ASIL's International Economic Law Interest Group will hold its biennial conference in Washington this year just after the U.S. Presidential election, on the timely theme of "The Politics of International Economic Law: The Next Four Years." The conference committee has just issued its Call for Papers here. Paper proposals are due by July 20. The Call supplies a wide range of suggested topics, but it is open for "politics-of" topics in any area of international economic law, not just trade. The conference will take place at George Washington University Law School in downtown Washington, on Friday and Saturday November 14-15, in a month when new vistas will open, no matter which candidate wins.
A Perfect Day for Comparativism
As Julian notes the Court in Kennedy v. Louisiana ruled that the death penalty for child rape violated the Eighth Amendment. It did so without any reference to international or comparative law or experiences. The focus of the opinion was on a national consensus and the Court's own independent judgment of what the Eighth Amendment requires. Having found such a natioanl consensus the Court had every opportunity to add a Roper gloss that "the opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions." But the Court, per Justice Kennedy and the four other so-called "internationalist justices" (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), refrained from doing so.

The other big news today came from the maritime punitive damage case of Exxon Shipping v. Baker. The decision written by Justice Souter was fractured, but in Part IV (joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas (with Alito recused)) the Court made extensive use of comparative material in its analysis of federal maritime law to bolster its holding limiting punitive damages.


Exxon raises an issue of first impression aboutpunitive damages in maritime law, which falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a common law court, subject to the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result.... The claim goes to our understanding of the place of punishment in modern civil law and reasonable standards of process in administering punitive law, subjects that call for starting with a brief account of the history behind today’s punitive damages....

As for procedure, in most American jurisdictions the amount of the punitive award is generally determined by a jury in the first instance, and that “determination is then reviewed by trial and appellate courts to ensure that it is reasonable.” Many States have gone further by imposing statutory limits on punitive awards, in the form of absolute monetary caps, a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, or, frequently, some combination of the two, The States that rely on a multiplier have adopted a variety of ratios, ranging from 5:1 to 1:1.

Despite these limitations, punitive damages overall are higher and more frequent in the United States than they are anywhere else. See, e.g., Gotanda, Punitive Damages:A Comparative Analysis, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 391, 421 (2004); 2 Schlueter §22.0. In England and Wales, punitive, or exemplary, damages are available only for oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by government servants; injuries designed by the defendant to yield a larger profit than the likely cost of compensatory damages; and conduct for which punitive damages are expressly authorized by statute. Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 1 All E. R. 367, 410–411 (H. L.). Even in the circumstances where punitive damages are allowed, they are subject to strict, judicially imposed guidelines. The Court of Appeal in Thompson v. Commissioner of Police of Metropolis, [1998] Q. B. 498, 518, said that a ratio of more than three times the amount of compensatory damages will rarely be appropriate; awards of less than £5,000 are likely unnecessary; awards of £25,000 should be exceptional; and £50,000 should be considered the top. For further contrast with American practice, Canada and Australia allow exemplary damages for outrageous conduct, but awards are considered extraordinary and rarely issue. See 2 Schlueter §§22.1(B), (D). Noncompensatory damages are not part of the civil-code tradition and thus unavailable in such countries as France, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. See id., §§22.2(A)–(C), (E). And some legal systems not only decline to recognize punitive damages themselves but refuse to enforce foreign punitive judgments as contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages: Is the Tide Changing? 45 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 507, 514, 518, 528 (2007) (noting refusals to enforce judgments by Japanese, Italian, and German courts, positing that such refusals may be on the decline, but concluding, “American parties should not anticipate smooth sailing when seeking to have a domestic punitive damages award recognized and enforced in other countries”).

Thus, the Court quite appropriately looked to comparative experiences in the maritime context and quite appropriately refrained from looking to comparative experiences in the constitutional context. A perfect day for comparativism.
The International Consensus that Didn't Bark: U.S. Supreme Court Invalidates Death Penalty for Child Rape
I don't want to step on Roger's turf here, but I can't resist a brief note on today's U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating a Louisiana law allowing the death penalty for rapists who victimize children under 13. As most of our readers know, the test for determining a violation of the Eighth Amendment turns on "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." This is usually determined by examining whether a national consensus exists on a particular type of punishment, although in recent years, the search for standards of decency has expanded to consider international values and views.

Although the Court was presented with an amicus brief arguing that state practice is moving steadily away from capital punishment for child rape, the opinion appears to be bereft of any such references or reliance. A strategic retreat for constitutional comparativists?
Should the U.S. Enact Laws Punishing Crimes Against Humanity? Sure, But It Still Won't Save Darfur
It seems like a no brainer that the U.S. should enact into domestic law punishments for "crimes against humanity." The recently created subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing yesterday to hear one-sided testimony on this question.

And really, is there any objection to enacting a statute making a crime under U.S. law to commit a crime against humanity? It goes without saying that such a criminal statute, to be truly useful, would require the U.S. to assert some pretty expansive theories of jurisdiction, maybe even universal jurisdiction. (The recent amendments to the statute punishing genocide have arguably done that). But this is probably not a real objection. If any crime supports the assertion of universal jurisdiction, I would think "crimes against humanity" would suffice.

As some of the testimony at the hearing suggested, the practical need for such a law is driven by the difficulty in proving the crime of genocide, especially the specific intent component of genocide (See Prof. Diane Orentlicher's testimony here for this argument).

Interestingly, none of the testimony (as far as I know) pointed out that while there is no criminal punishment in U.S. law for crimes against humanity, there is a civil sanction: a civil lawsuit under the Alien Tort Statute. As a longstanding critic of the ATS, I would prefer the criminal punishment, of course, but given the higher standards of proof required for a criminal prosecution, I don't really buy the claim that folks committing crimes against humanity can wander the U.S. in impunity. In other words, I highly doubt there will be any additional deterrence effect created by adding a criminal sanction to the civil sanction. To some degree, therefore, this whole hearing was grandstanding by the Senators so they could tell themselves that they are doing something about Darfur (when in fact they are pretty much doing nothing to help prevent further deaths in Sudan).

Still, I have to applaud the Senate's interest and the signs of congressional leadership on the incorporation of international law norms into U.S. law. Congress, I have argued elsewhere, is the proper institution for incorporating such norms (and not the courts) so it is nice to see Congress stepping up to its responsibilities here to develop international law, even if they aren't doing much at this point to protect international human rights in Sudan.

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Sue OPEC? Or Regulate NYMEX?
A recent op-ed published in the New York Times suggested that the states of the United States should do just that. Thomas W. Evans, who had been an adviser to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, argued that OPEC's actions violate U.S. antitrust law and artificially raises the prise of gasoline. However, he noted that the act of state doctrine may present a problem in terms of suing a foreign government:
Despite this illegal conduct, not everyone can sue OPEC and succeed. In 2002, a federal court dismissed a class-action lawsuit brought against OPEC by a gas station owner. An appeals court agreed, noting that “under the current state of our federal laws the individual member states of OPEC are afforded immunity from suit brought for damage caused by their commercial activities when they act through OPEC.”

The “current state of our federal laws” refers to the “act of state doctrine,” which was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1897 with the following words: “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”...

Fortunately, there is another way to sue OPEC. Even if actions by individual citizens fail, a seldom-used provision of Article III of the Constitution grants original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over lawsuits brought by states against “foreign states” and, as expanded by the United States Code, over “aliens.”

The attorneys general of the various states should sue OPEC as an alien or, pleading alternatively, as a foreign state.
He then argued that:
The states should contend that Article III of the Constitution outweighs the act of state doctrine. Respect for the sovereignty of a foreign government for acts “done within its own territory” does not, even if very liberally construed, protect decisions reached by a cartel based in Austria that directs 13 nations to sell their product at inflated prices to customers outside their boundaries.
Really? Because it seems like courts have been holding the other way. (He does suggest, however, presidential letters of support to make it more likely for courts to take jurisdicition.) I was under the impression that someone who was a Reagan and Bush adviser would be wary of asking courts to toss out accepted legal precedent so that they could then step into a poltical dispute between our country and one or more foreign countries. But then again, I guess we are addicted to oil and addicts can go to great lengths to get a fix...

Anyway, for a rejoinder to Evans' op-ed, see this post by Matt Stone at the Global Buzz explaining six reasons why suing OPEC is a bad idea. I will quote one reason:
As Thomas Walde, a professor at the University of Dundee, [has explained], OPEC is not a "cartel" in the legal sense of the word because it is a collection of governments, not private companies. A plausible defense could be that OPEC actions constitute a "joint resource conservation effort" and not market manipulation per se.
And, I would also add that if we want to focus on regulatory efforts, perhaps instead of diving into the contentious judicial power/ foriegn policy debate, we should start closer to home and look at smarter regulation of the (possible) effects of oil speculation in the New York Mercantile Exchange. The effects of oil speculation are still debated. However, to give a sense of their possible effects, I rememember back in the good old days when oil was just hitting $100 per barrel (what was that, April?), one research firm estimated that about a 20% of the price was due to speculation in oil-denominated securities by investment banks, hedge funds, and pension funds, not by foreign governments as Evans implied. But see also this piece, which is skeptical of whether increased oversight of the futures market would actually affect the price of oil.

I doubt the "sue OPEC" idea has much traction (or much of a chance of success). The market regulation angle seems to be getting at least some support from both sides of the aisle and from both candidates. But it remains to be seen if this would actually affect oil prices. Stay tuned (and off the roads...).




Council of Europe Criticizes Italy; Italy Continues to Persecute Roma
I have blogged recently about the EU's encouraging -- if insufficient -- criticism of Italy's shameful persecution of its Roma population. On Friday, the Council of Europe added its two cents:
Europe's top rights body, the Council of Europe, on Friday voiced "deep concern" at a series of recent attacks against the Roma gypsies and immigrants and their treatment in Italy.

The attacks, the worst of which involved the torching by a local mob last month of a gypsy camp outside Naples have already drawn criticism from the European Union and from rights groups. Copycat attacks followed in other cities.

Police arrested several hundred 'undocumented' immigrants last month in a controversial series of raids on shanty towns across Italy.

"Roma and immigrants have been the subject of violent racist attacks and entire communities have been held responsible for criminal acts committed, or allegedly committed, by individuals from these communities," the Council of Europe's racism and xenophobia monitoring body (ECRI) said in a statement.

"In the context, ECRI particularly regrets the persistent racist and xenophobic discourse by some Italian politicians, even at the highest levels, and in the media," the statement continued.
It is difficult to overstate just how disgusting Italy's actions have become. The most recent plan is to kick Roma out of the country unless they can prove they have homes and jobs:
The new conservative government in Italy, led by prime minister Silvio Berlusconi vowed to clamp down on illegal immigration. Special Roma Gypsy commissioners have been appointed in several of the country's major cities.

Under a planned government decree, EU citizens - which would include Romanian Gypsies - must have adequate housing and regular incomes to stay in Italy for more than three months.

The decree would also make it easier to expel illegal immigrants.

"The Italian authorities are taking measure whose conformity with national and international human rights standards is questionable," said ECRI.

A survey earlier this month by Italian research institute Demos-Coop, showed eight out of ten Italians want Roma Gypsy camps dismantled.

A poll last month by Italian daily La Repubblica found that 68 percent of Italians want to deal with the "Roma Gypsy problem" by expelling all of them.
A few weeks ago, a Romanian Euro MP described Italy's actions as "clearly fascist." I bristled at the use of the word "fascist" at the time, but with each passing day the description becomes more accurate. The "Roma Gypsy problem"? "Special Roma Gypsy Commissioners"? Remind you of anything?

The planned decree is particularly perverse, of course, because Italian politicians are doing everything they can to ensure that the Roma don't have the adequate housing they would need to remain in the country. One example:
Local activists in the northeastern Italian city of Mestre and politicians from the anti-immigrant Northern League are protesting the construction of a settlement for Sinti Gypsies.

Northern League parliamentarian Corrado Callegari and local party councillor Alberto Mazzonetto have blocked access to the camp, preventing building from getting underway.

The protest began more than three weeks ago, when a small group of protesters started gathering daily at the entrance to the building site.

The protesters are demanding a plebiscite on the planned Sinti Gypsy settlement which will include houses and a caravan park. They have also staged protests at local Gypsy camps.

The local council intends to accommodate some 40 Sinti Gypsy families at the site, which will cost 2.8 million euros to build.

The Northern League claims the money should be spent on shelter for homeless Italian citizens from the Mestre-Veneto area who have asked the local council for help. The Sinti Gypsies should not get preferential treatment and must wait their turn to be housed, the Northern League argues.

Bowing to pressure, the mayor of Venice, Massimo Cacciari had halted building work at the planned Sinti Gypsy settlement, but has promised this will soon re-start.
"Preferential treatment"? Are they kidding? Were that it were so!

NOTE: Media descriptions of the Roma's plight in Italy continues to astound and depress me. The final article mentioned above contains this little gem: "The origins of the Sinti Gypsies are uncertain, but they may have come from Pakistan's southeastern Sindh province." So what? What does that have to do with the story, given that the article itself notes that nearly half of Italy's Roma are Italian citizens? Is the point simply to make the Roma seem more Other -- and more dangerous, given that Pakistan is in the scary Middle East?
Belgium "Investigating" Bagambiki at Rwanda's Request
No, Virginia, being unanimously acquitted by an international tribunal's trial and appeals chambers doesn't mean very much:
Belgium has confirmed that it was investigating Emmanuel Bagambiki, former Governor of Cyangugu during the 1994 genocide, who was acquitted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and who is sought by Rwanda, reports Hirondelle Agency .

"The federal prosecutor is looking at the [Bagambiki's] extradition request and that there is an arrest warrant issued against him [by Rwanda]','said Lieve Pellens spokesperson of the prosecutor.

However, he hinted that Belgium and Rwanda, for the time being, do not have an extradition agreement, but affirmed that Investigations were underway against the former Rwandan official, who is living in Belgium with his family.

Following his final acquittal by the ICTR appeals court, on 8 February 2006, for crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, Rwanda decided to prosecute the former Governor for rape, for which he was not tried by the UN tribunal.

On 10 October 2007, the Court of First Instance of Rusizi, his native region, sentenced Bagambiki in absentia to life in prison for rape and incitement to commit rape.

A source told Hirondelle that the federal prosecutor, Phillippe Meire, had recently travelled to Rwanda to follow up on the judgement.

If extradition was rejected, Belgium could decide to prosecute Bagambiki itself if there was any convincing evidence.
Rwanda's attempt to get their hands on Bagambiki is unlikely to succeed, given that the European Convention on Extradition prohibits extradition when the request is based on a conviction obtained in absentia. It is also unlikely that Belgium would prosecute Bagambiki for the rapes itself, because -- as I have explained elsewhere -- the rape charges are based on the same modes of participation (direct participation and command responsibility) that the ICTR unanimously rejected. Why, then, is Belgium continuing this legal charade? There seems to be only one answer: it is trying to punish Bagambiki for seeking aslyum -- and ultimately receiving it by court order, over government protests -- in Belgium.

Charades like this make a mockery of international criminal justice -- William Haynes writ large: "We can't have acquittals. We've been holding these guys for years. How can we explain acquittals? We have to have convictions."
Obama's Global Appeal
The folks at Pew Research have just released a poll highlighting just how popular Barack Obama is in the rest of the world.


People around the world who have been paying attention to the American election express more confidence in Barack Obama than in John McCain to do the right thing regarding world affairs. McCain is rated lower than Obama in every country surveyed, except for the United States where his rating matches Obama's, as well as in Jordan and Pakistan where few people have confidence in either candidate.

Obama's advantage over McCain is overwhelming in the Western European countries surveyed: Fully 84% of the French who have been following the election say they have confidence in Obama to do the right thing regarding world affairs, compared with 33% who say that about McCain. The differences in ratings for Obama and McCain are about as large in Spain and Germany, and are only somewhat narrower in Great Britain.

These are fascinating results. But will either candidate make use of Obama's global appeal in the general election? I doubt it. McCain has no incentive to highlight the global gap in confidence. And somehow I rather doubt that a campaign slogan that the "Europeans Like Me!" is in the offing for Obama. Obama might try to highlight how our global standing in the world has fallen dramatically in recent years and that he could help restore our image abroad. That might have resonance with voters. Time will tell whether improving our global image will become a campaign issue.

The other interesting piece of news is that regardless of who wins, large majorities abroad think that America will change for the better.


The survey also finds a widespread belief that U.S. foreign policy "will change for the better" after the inauguration of a new American president next year. Among people who have been following the election, large majorities in France (68%), Spain (67%) and Germany (64%) say that they believe that U.S. foreign policy will improve after the election. This sentiment is also common in the African countries included in the survey - Nigeria (67%), South Africa (66%) and Tanzania (65%).

Monday, June 23, 2008

Independence Day Quiz
Courtesy of Toast.com, the quiz consists of 30 questions -- 20 drawn from the U.S. citizenship test and 10 harder "curveballs." 24 is considered the minimum passing score; I scored, much to my delight, a 26. Can you do better?

Hat-Tip: Americablog.
Three Narratives of Medellin v. Texas
I have a guest post up over at IntLawGrrls, discussing my recent symposium essay on Medellin. The post is here (with thanks to Diane Amann) and the essay is up on SSRN here. Here's the precis:

Analysis of Medellín is likely to fall into one of the three narratives to have emerged from the arguments of the parties, the briefs of amici, and outside commentary: (1) Internal/Constitutionalist: Draws on the U.S. Constitution as the final word on applicable law and modes of judicial interpretation in the case; (2) External/Internationalist: Looks to the tenets of public international law to identify first order principles for understanding the case and appropriate judicial outcomes; and (3) Transnational/Intersystemic: Seeks to explain Medellín through the phenomenon of multiple, interactive systems of law through which changes in normative behavior occur. While the first two narratives dominated the parties' submissions to the Court and form the space within which much of the academic debate has taken place, it is the third narrative that provides a more complete story of how a death penalty case in Texas came to be litigated before both the ICJ and the Supreme Court.

Medellín is thus an excellent case study for process-oriented theories of how international human rights norms move across national borders and between and among local, national and transnational actors and provides important detail about the domestic and international mechanisms that promote norm integration and, significantly, can serve as barriers to norm integration. For human rights activists, Medellín illustrates the complexity of an increasingly legalized international system that permits multiple legal portals - local, national, regional and international - through which to contest individual rights, but one in which politics and the legal constructs of statehood and nationality continue to play a central role.

As always, comments are welcome.
Putting a Face on Those Bureaucrats in Geneva
Okay, in Rome. Following in Duncan's footsteps, I've been teaching here for the month in a Temple Law summer program. On Friday, we had an interesting visit to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, which is headquartered here, with presentations by several lawyers in the agency's legal service.

It was interesting stuff. FAO has its hands in a broad range of policy, including things like forestry and land ownership regimes. Of necessity, it takes the road of persuasion and expert assistance rather than trying to exercise muscle that it probably doesn't have. Probably a nice example of government networks at work, this time through agriculture ministries (here's a "framework agreement" between the FAO and the USDA). This was all news to me — being an international legal academic these days is about as meaningful as being an "American law scholar" — there's just way too much to get your hands around. The lawyers, including our host, American Jessica Vapnek, came across as thoughtful and highly knowledgeable.

But the kicker was a short appearance at the end by Deputy Director-General James G. Butler. He is straight out of central casting to play the cattle commissioner of the state of Texas, right down to the cowboy boots and a drawl to match, and here he is, doing the good work of the United Nations. Butler gave a short talk to our students exhorting a life in public service, including, by implication of context, a life in international public service.

I have no idea how Butler came to be number two at FAO (although I assume the Bush Administration had something to do with it), and I have no idea how he really fits into the international bureaucracy (although it doesn't appear to be in a John Bolton/fox-in-the-henhouse kind of way). This is not the kind of person that gives the anti-internationalists much of a target, for whom the bureaucrats in Geneva have long supplied a punchline. Not only is he not a foreigner, he's got none of the traits of the chattering classes that might make him look like one, the citizenship notwithstanding. If this is the new face of global governance, sovereigntism hasn't got a chance.
Can Afghanistan Invoke the "Hot Pursuit" Doctrine to Enter Pakistan?
I doubt it, but this article suggests Afghanistan is considering it as a justification for incursions to chase down Taliban forces. But it is an interesting and "hotly" developing area of international law (See, e.g., Colombia in Ecuador, Turkey into Kurdish Iraq, the U.S. into Syria and Iran, etc.). Interestingly, the doctrine appears to have its most formal articulation in Article 111 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. But the most interesting and controversial uses are no doubt ones used on land. Perhaps President Obama can use this doctrine to justify his planned incursions into Pakistan?

Sunday, June 22, 2008

Thanks to Haider Hamoudi
We at Opinio Juris want to thank once again Haider Hamoudi for guest-blogging with us this past week. For more on the issues he has raised, be sure to visit his blog, Islamic Law in Our Times and read his memoir, Howling in Mesopotamia.

We hope he will soon join us again for another guest-blogging stint.
D.C. Circuit Allows Chabad Case Against Russia to Go Forward
The D.C. Circuit has ruled that the Chabad case against Russia can go forward notwithstanding various FSIA, act of state, and forum non conveniens defenses raised by Russia. It is a very complicated case, but here are the essential facts and holding:



Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States is a non-profit Jewish organization incorporated in New York. It serves as the policy-making and umbrella organization for Chabad-Lubavitch-generally known as “Chabad”-a worldwide Chasidic spiritual movement, philosophy, and organization founded in Russia in the late 18th century. (Chabad's name is a Hebrew acronym standing for three kinds of intellectual faculties: Chachmah, Binah, and Da‘at, meaning wisdom, comprehension, and knowledge.) In every generation since the organization's founding, it has been led by a Rebbe-a rabbi recognized by the community for exceptional spiritual qualities. Agudas Chasidei Chabad stakes claim to thousands of religious books, manuscripts, and documents (the “Collection”) that were assembled by the Rebbes over the course of Chabad's history and comprise the textual basis for the group's core teachings and traditions. The religious and historical importance of the Collection to Chabad, which is extensively reviewed in the district court opinion, can hardly be overstated. Agudas Chasidei Chabad says that the Collection was taken by the Soviet Union-or its successor, the Russian Federation-in violation of international law.

According to the plaintiff's allegations ..., Russia's Bolshevik government seized one portion of the Collection (known as the “Library”) during the October Revolution of 1917, taking it from a private warehouse in Moscow, where the Fifth Rebbe had sent it for safekeeping as he fled the German forces invading Russia. Although the Soviet government initially acted with some hesitancy, by 1925 it appears to have finally rejected pleas for return of the Library by the Fifth Rebbe and the Sixth (who succeeded the Fifth in 1920). The regime stored the materials at its Lenin Library, which later became the Russian State Library (“RSL,” a term we use to include its predecessor).

After arresting the Sixth Rebbe for “counter revolutionary activities” (namely establishing Jewish schools), the Soviets beat him and sentenced him to death by firing squad, but then commuted the sentence to exile. The Sixth Rebbe resettled in Latvia in 1927 and became a citizen there, bringing with him another set of religious manuscripts and books known as the “Archive.” In 1933 he moved to Poland, bringing the Archive along. On September 1, 1939, Nazi German forces invaded Poland, forcing the Rebbe to flee yet again. Nazi forces seized the Archive and transferred it to a Gestapo-controlled castle at Wölfelsdorf, a village about fourteen miles south of Glatz (now Klodzko) in Lower Silesia. Soviet military forces commandeered the Archive in September 1945, calling its contents “trophy documents” and carrying them away to Moscow. The Archive is now held by the Russian State Military Archive....

With the assistance of the U.S. government, the Sixth Rebbe escaped Nazi Europe and came to New York, where Agudas Chasidei Chabad was incorporated in 1940. The plaintiff and its predecessor made various efforts to recover the Collection for nearly 70 years. It enjoyed brief successes regarding the Library in 1991-1992, amid a flurry of Soviet and then Russian judicial, executive, and legislative pronouncements, but various governmental actions ultimately thwarted the group's efforts to secure possession of the Library, actions that it describes as a further expropriation.

To regain possession of both the Library and the Archive, the plaintiff brought suit against the Russian Federation as well as its Ministry of Culture and Mass Communication, the RSL, and the RSMA (all collectively referred to as “Russia” except as needed to distinguish among them). Russia moved to dismiss the claims on grounds of foreign sovereign immunity, forum non conveniens, and the act of state doctrine. Before the district court, Russia scored a partial victory; the court dismissed all claims as to the Library, finding for them no exception to Russia's sovereign immunity, but it denied Russia's motion as to the Archive. Both sides appeal.

We affirm the district court's order in part and reverse it in part. First, on our reading of the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), plaintiffs must demonstrate certain jurisdictional prerequisites by a preponderance of the evidence before the case goes forward, whereas they can satisfy others simply by presenting substantial and non-frivolous claims. On this reading, we hold that Agudas Chasidei Chabad satisfied the FSIA's jurisdictional requirements as to both the Library and the Archive. Second, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the application of forum non conveniens. Finally, we affirm the district court's rejection of Russia's motion to dismiss as to the Archive on act of state grounds, and we vacate its apparent ruling that the act of state doctrine operates as an alternative ground for dismissal of Chabad's claims as to the Library.

How to Set Up Your Own Country
How did I miss this story?

In a declaration on his Web site, Stuart Hill, who owns the 2.5 acre island of Forvik in the Shetland Islands in the North Sea, said he no longer recognised the authority of the government or the European Union, and cited a centuries-old royal marriage dowry deal as the basis for his claim.

"Forvik owes no allegiance to any United Kingdom government, central or local, and is not bound by any of its statutes," Hill wrote.


The website with Hill's declaration is, of course, a blog site. There are, of course, all sorts of legal questions raised by Hill's declaration, many of which relate to the complexities, but some might also pertain to the definition of a state under international law. The basic argument, as I understand it, is that the island was transferred to the King of Scotland temporarily until the King of Norway (its original owner) could come up with cash for a wedding dowry. No payment was ever made and the King of Scotland retained the island in trust, but without the authority to incorporate it into his realm. It thus remains a crown dependency, owing allegience to the King of Scotland's successor, the Queen, but otherwise independent.

I obviously do not opine on any question of UK or Scottish law, but under international law, there are a variety of requirements to achieve status as a state, if that is what a crown dependency is. Forvik doesn't seem qualify, but whether that matters remains to be seen. In any event, Hill seems to have a semi-serious claim here. And he has invited immigrants to his new nation, which has drawn inquiries from round the world, apparently.