Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Friday, June 27, 2008

An Important Maori Land Settlement -- But Where's the Treaty Itself?
The BBC reports that the New Zealand government and seven Maori tribes have entered into an historic agreement concerning Maori ownership of a number of forests in the North Island, where I live:
The NZ$420m ($319m) agreement transfers ownership of nine forests - covering 435,000 acres (176,000 hectares) of land - in the central North Island.

Hundreds of Maori, some in traditional dress, thronged parliament to witness the signing of the accord.

"It's a historic journey we are on," Prime Minister Helen Clark said.

"We came into politics to address injustice and seek reconciliation. Thank you for walking that road with us on this historic day," she added, according to AP news agency.

The settlement - the largest single deal between the government and Maori tribes - seeks to address grievances dating back to the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi.

The treaty guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown. But land seizures and ownership breaches followed.

The forests signed over are mainly large commercial pine plantations, generating about NZ$13m a year in rents.

The settlement also hands over rents that have accumulated on the land since 1989.

Between them, the seven tribes or iwi include more than 100,000 members. They will manage the land collectively, setting up a holding company structure and forestry management structure.
The agreement, known as the "Treelords" deal — echoing the very controversial 1992 Sealords deal, which ultimately led the New Zealand Parliament to extinguish all Maori claims to commercial fishing rights — is indeed historic. I would take issue, though, with the article's claim that the Treaty of Waitangi "guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown." That interpretation is consistent with the English version of the Treaty — but not with the Maori version. (The two versions were drafted separately, and the English version is not a translation of the Maori, even though the Maori version was drafted first.)

Here is Article 1 of the Treaty in English:
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.
And here is Article 1 in Maori:
Ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu-te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.
I have bolded the operative terms. The problem is that kawanatanga does not mean "sovereignty"; it means "governance" — a much weaker term. Indeed, it is clear that the Maori did not intend to cede anything resembling sovereignty to the Queen, given that the Maori version of the Treaty does not use the Maori word for "sovereignty," kingitanga, or even the Maori word for "independence," rangatiritanga.

Just as important, the British had to have known that the Maori did not intend to cede sovereignty to the Queen. In 1835, the British and the Maori had signed the Declaration of Independence, in which the British guaranteed that the Maori chiefs would maintain sovereignty over their land. The Declaration made use of all three of the words that are at the heart of the dispute over the Treaty, with the British translating rangatiritanga as "independence," kingitanga as "sovereign power and authority," and kawanatanga as "functions of government." How then could the British have honestly believed a mere five years later — with many of the same British officials present at the signing of both documents — that Article 1's use of the term kawanatanga, as opposed to kingitanga, meant that the Maori were giving up their sovereignty?

Regardless, the question is now moot — New Zealand courts have long since given up trying to determine the "true" meaning of the Treaty. Now they — and the Waitangi Tribunal, which makes recommendations to the government concerning Maori grievances — simply apply the so-called "Treaty Principles":
The principle of government or the kawanatanga principle

Article 1 gives expression to the right of the Crown to make laws and its obligation to govern in accordance with constitutional process. This sovereignty is qualified by the promise to accord the Māori interests specified in article 2 an appropriate priority. This principle describes the balance between articles 1 and 2: the exchange of sovereignty by the Māori people for the protection of the Crown. It was emphasised in the context of this principle that ‘the Government has the right to govern and make laws’.

The principle of self-management (the rangatiratanga principle)

Article 2 guarantees to Māori hapū (tribes) the control and enjoyment of those resources and taonga that it is their wish to retain. The preservation of a resource base, restoration of tribal self-management, and the active protection of taonga, both material and cultural, are necessary elements of the Crown’s policy of recognising rangatiratanga. The Government also recognised the Court of Appeal’s description of active protection, but identified the key concept of this principle as a right for iwi to organise as iwi and, under the law, to control the resources they own.

The principle of equality

Article 3 constitutes a guarantee of legal equality between Māori and other citizens of New Zealand. This means that all New Zealand citizens are equal before the law. Furthermore, the common law system is selected by the Treaty as the basis for that equality, although human rights accepted under international law are also incorporated. Article 3 has an important social significance in the implicit assurance that social rights would be enjoyed equally by Māori with all New Zealand citizens of whatever origin. Special measures to attain that equal enjoyment of social benefits are allowed by international law.

The principle of reasonable cooperation

The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a fair basis for two peoples in one country. Duality and unity are both significant. Duality implies distinctive cultural development while unity implies common purpose and community. The relationship between community and distinctive development is governed by the requirement of cooperation, which is an obligation placed on both parties by the Treaty. Reasonable cooperation can only take place if there consultation on major issues of common concern and if good faith, balance, and common sense are shown on all sides. The outcome of reasonable cooperation will be partnership.

The principle of redress

The Crown accepts a responsibility to provide a process for the resolution of grievances arising from the Treaty. This process may involve courts, the Waitangi Tribunal, or direct negotiation. The provision of redress, where entitlement is established, must take account of its practical impact and of the need to avoid the creation of fresh injustice. If the Crown demonstrates commitment to this process of redress, it will expect reconciliation to result.
The Treaty Principles are important, and they do occasionally protect Maori interests. But their importance cannot obscure the fact that the Treaty itself still has no formal legal status in New Zealand, making Maori interests subject to the whims of Parliament. And that's no accident: taking the Treaty seriously would mean taking the Maori version of the Treaty seriously — and taking the Maori version seriously would mean that deals like Treelord would be the very tiny tip of a very large iceberg.

Wednesday, June 18, 2008

China and Japan Agree (Sort of) to Jointly Develop Disputed East China Sea
There is a lot of diplomatic-speak here, and agreements to agree to work at some point in the future and how there is no prejudice to their legal positions, etc. but this non-agreement-agreement is a promising sign for resolving various territorial disputes between China and Japan. Another reminder of how useful non-binding international agreements can be.


China and Japan, through consultations on an equal footing, reached principled consensus on the East China Sea issue, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu made the announcement here Wednesday.

The announcement included the following three parts:

I. Cooperation Between China and Japan in the East China Sea

In order to make the East China Sea, of which the delimitation between China and Japan is yet to be made, a "sea of peace, cooperation and friendship", China and Japan have, in keeping with the common understanding reached by leaders of the two countries in April 2007 and their new common understanding reached in December 2007, agreed through serious consultations that the two sides will conduct cooperation in the transitional period prior to delimitation without prejudicing their respective legal positions. The two sides have taken the first step to this end and will continue to conduct consultations in the future.


Tuesday, May 27, 2008

ICJ Issues Judgment in Malaysia/Singapore Case
On Friday, the ICJ issued its judgment in Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore). A summary sent by the ICJ stated that
it had found by 12 votes to four that Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh, a granite island in the Straits of Singapore on which a lighthouse stands, belongs to Singapore and has done so since at least 1980, when the dispute between the two countries crystallized.

In the case of Middle Rocks, which consist of a group of rocks that are permanently above water, the ICJ … ruled 15 to one that it belongs to Malaysia.

The court also noted that South Ledge, a nearby low-tide elevation, falls within the apparently overlapping territorial waters generated by Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh and by Middle Rocks. Given that the two countries have not asked the court to draw the line of delimitation, the judges said, by 15 to one, that sovereignty belongs to the State in the territorial waters of which it is located.
The press release, including a detailed summary of the opinion, is here and the full opinion available here.

Thursday, May 15, 2008

John Boonstra on R2P and Burma
I had contemplated weighing in on commentators' unfortunate tendency to equate the Responsibility to Protect doctrine with humanitarian invasion, but John Boonstra at UN Dispatch beat me to it. Here's a snippet:
First, by and large, the R2P doctrine has been misunderstood or misrepresented in calls to "invade" Burma. R2P is often implied to boil down to a simple equation: if a government is unable or unwilling to adequately protect its citizens, then the international community has a right to forcibly intervene to protect these people. The first part of this conditional is accurate, but the second is a gross oversimplification. R2P does not prescribe invasion any more than the Constitution of the United States mandates impeachment. Military intervention is only one component of the R2P framework, and one of last resort, at that; it is only to be undertaken when a series of specific conditions are met, ensuring that intervention is justified, well-intentioned, practical, authorized by the proper authority (i.e., the UN Security Council), and will not cause more harm than good.

Wielding R2P as a Trojan horse for invasion and regime change, as Robert Kaplan seems to desire, is harmful to the integrity and future viability of the concept, as well as to the more pressing concern of alleviating the Burmese people's suffering.
The whole post is well worth a read. It's here.

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Is It Time to Invade Burma? (Is It Time to Invade Georgia?)
The first part of this post's title is also the title of a new article at Time.com. (Note: on CNN.com, they title the article "Time to Invade Myanmar?")

And so begins the latest iteration of the humanitarian intervention debate. After a recap of the situation in Myanmar, the article notes:
...it's hard to imagine a regime this insular and paranoid accepting robust aid from the US military, let alone agreeing to the presence of US Marines on Burmese soil — as Thailand and Indonesia did after the tsunami. The trouble is that the Burmese haven't shown the ability or willingness to deploy the kind of assets needed to deal with a calamity of this scale — and the longer Burma resists offers of help, the more likely it is that the disaster will devolve beyond anyone's control. "We're in 2008, not 1908," says Jan Egeland, the former U.N. emergency relief coordinator. "A lot is at stake here. If we let them get away with murder we may set a very dangerous precedent."

That's why it's time to consider a more serious option: invading Burma. Some observers, including former USAID director Andrew Natsios, have called on the US to unilaterally begin air drops to the Burmese people regardless of what the junta says. The Bush Administration has so far rejected the idea — "I can't imagine us going in without the permission of the Myanmar government," Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday — but it's not without precedent: as Natsios pointed out to the Wall Street Journal, the US has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid without the host government's consent in places like Bosnia and Sudan.
The article concludes that, if current attempts at assistance fail,
"It's important for the rulers to know the world has other options," [Jan Egeland, a former UN emergency reloief coordinator] says. "If there were, say, the threat of a cholera epidemic that could claim hundreds of thousands of lives and the government was incapable of preventing it, then maybe yes — you would intervene unilaterally." But by then, it could be too late. The cold truth is that states rarely undertake military action unless their national interests are at stake; and the world has yet to reach a consensus about when, and under what circumstances, coercive interventions in the name of averting humanitarian disasters are permissible. As the response to the 2004 tsunami proved, the world's capacity for mercy is limitless. But we still haven't figured out when to give war a chance.
I am of two minds when it comes to humanitarian intervention. Cases such as Myanmar may be the less difficult cases--situations where there is a threat of widepread disease or famine (let alone the physical injuries and other forms of suffering caused by the storm) and a government is either incapable or uninterested in actually doing what needs to happen to save its own citizens. I'm not saying that that is an easy case for humanitarian intervention, just that it is not as hard as other examples that are more politically ambiguous, such as intervening because of civil strife or sectarian violence.

Turning such a political decision into a legal rule is fraught with dangers. What do we do if the Russian intervene militarily in Georgia, on the pretext that they are protecting Russian passport holders? What of Turkey's intervention in Northern Cyprus in the 1970's on the argument that it was protecting Turkish Cypriots from violence? As I've written regarding Kosovo, the law of unintended consequences is a mighty force to reckon with.

The people of Myanmar desperately need help and they need it now. Perhaps intervening without the consent of their government will be the necessary and moral thing to do. I don't know enough about the facts on the ground to judge that. But, even if various states do undertake such an action, they should think very carefully about proclaiming the existence of a legal principle favoring humanitarian intervention.




Friday, April 25, 2008

Map Art
Here is a sample of some of the wonderful map art of Susan Stockwell:

Fleece England...



Rubber Africa...



Coffee Filter South America...



Tea bag China...


Monday, April 14, 2008

Free Speech at the Olympics
Free speech at the Beijing Olympics is becoming a hot topic. IOC President Jacques Rogge held a press conference last week taking a firm line restricting all political speech anywhere at an Olympic site.


Rule 51.3 of the Olympic Charter provides that “no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or areas," a principle that has been in the Olympic Charter for more than 50 years in order to preserve the universality of the Games. "The application of this regulation is common sense," explained Rogge, adding that without this rule, Olympic competitions and ceremonies could be used as a stage for all different kinds of political statements about armed conflicts, regional differences of all kind, religious disputes and many others.

"If athletes genuinely want to express their opinion, that's fine," Rogge continued. "But let's not forget, there is also the right not to express an opinion. Athletes should feel no moral obligation to speak out. They deserve the right to focus on their preparations and should not be made to feel obliged to express themselves if they do not wish to. The IOC and the National Olympic Committees have the duty to protect them from any kind of pressure. In any case, I do not expect there will be many incidents (of breach of rule 51). Athletes are mature and intelligent people. They will know what they can say or not say. If they have doubts, the IOC and the NOCs are here to guide them."

I have mixed feelings about this issue. I would strongly oppose any boycott of the Olympic games, but I am troubled by the prospect of a prior restraint on political speech at any Olympic venue or site. What qualifies as a “demonstration” or “political propaganda”? Can an athlete walk around the Olympic village with a yellow ribbon attached to his shirt to symbolize his support for a Free Tibet? Can athletes discuss with reporters (or publish blog posts from their Olympic village apartments) about anything political, such as China’s human rights record, the great firewall of China, Darfur, or its lax intellectual property record? And if free speech is restricted in the Olympic areas, will there be free speech zones somewhere at or near the Olympics, as was the case at the 2002 Olympics in Utah?

Thursday, March 13, 2008

O What a Rogue and Peasant State Am I!
[This was cross-posted over at Huffington Post]

Now I am alone. O what a rogue and peasant slave am I! Is it not monstrous that this player here, But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, Could force his soul so to his own conceit, That from her working all his visage wann'd, Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect, A broken voice, and his whole function suiting, With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!... Yet I, a dull and mudd-mettled rascal, peak... Am I a coward? Who calls me villain?... Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain! O, vengenance! Why, what an ass am I!

Hamlet, Act 2, Scene 2


In the famous second soliloquy of Hamlet, Hamlet is overwhelmed by a feeling of worthlessness and self-pity. He stands alone, grieving his inaction. He wallows and rambles in mindless self-doubt, remonstrating against his own failure. In his mind, he is a pitiful and weak rogue, lacking the gall to live up to his commitment to avenge his father's murder. He makes plans to test whether his revenge is justified, but his actions do not help him achieve his desired end. He finds himself a miserable, melancholy knave.

This scene from Hamlet came to mind yesterday when I attended a fascinating conference at UCLA on the topic of "rogue states." After listening to the discussion, I could not help but pity (and fear) the poor rogue state. They are full to the brim with self-pity, and self-doubt, utterly consumed by their weakness.

Exhibit One was North Korea. The former Thai Foreign Minister, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, presented a wonderful series of vignettes of his visits to North Korea that underscore the pitiful position of poor Pyongyang. The North Koreans display a room full of gifts to the deceased Kim Il-sung to show foreign dignitaries that a nation without friends has so many friends. It is poor and desperately isolated. It treats every issue as an insult, and every diplomatic overture is a potential provocation. If one focused on this abiding sense of insecurity, it is clear that labeling it a member of the "axis of evil" was a profound mistake. It only fortified their sense of weakness and vulnerability. For North Korea, the lesson of Iraq is "We are next, unless we appear strong." Nuclear weapons mollified their insecurities.

Exhibit Two was Iran. Dalia Kaye of RAND emphasized that Iran does not pose a significant conventional military threat to its neighbors, although its assymetric capabilities (such as ballistic missile development) are a concern. Iran is not the former Soviet Union. It is a weak nation attempting to exert political and ideological influence in the region. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration eliminated two of Iran's greatest enemies with its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. And yet Iran still has precious few allies abroad and remains hugely unpopular at home. Therefore, we should move away from the rhetoric of regime change and unilaterally tone down our rhetoric on Iran. After all, democracy promotion is not the same thing as regime change. Our goals should be to promote democratic ideals and the rule of law from within.

Pakistan, by all accounts, is a special case. Former Pakistan Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan described his country as a deeply troubled one. National survival has been at the core of its mission for its entire existence. It may not be a rogue state, but it is a distrusted and sanctioned ally. It is not an enemy, but an enigmatic and disenchanted ally. When Pakistan cracks down on democracy and liberalism, it feels it must do so because it thinks the very survival of the state is at issue. It generally acts out of weakness and fear. It cannot be both popular and tough, so it opts for the latter when expediency so requires, and garners worldwide condemnation. Frequent terrorist attacks and disputed borders only add to its sense of insecurity.

What was the take-away message for the next administration? Don't feed the insecurities of rogue states. Stop calling them names. The label "rogue state" mistakes the essence of the state for its actions. These nations are in a troubled and precarious state of mind. They are full of self-doubt, prone to rash action, and easily insulted.

If there is one thing worse than a rogue state, it is a failed state. We know how the tragedy of Hamlet ended. When the mad Hamlet's doubts were eventually confirmed, he achieved his revenge and died in the process. Our goal should be to change the ending.

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Consular Relations With Filipino Dancers
Who could have thought a tax case could be so ... exotic? On remand from the Supreme Court in the case of New York City v. Permanent Mission of India, Judge Rakoff was required to rule on whether New York City could recover property taxes from the Philippines, India, and Mongolia on portions of buildings used for non-consular purposes. But in order to do so the court had to distinguish between consular and non-consular purposes.

In the case of the Philippines, some of the property was leased by the Philippines government to a Philippine restaurant, Philippine bank (PNB), and Philippine airline (PAL). The question was whether any of those entities were performing consular functions within the meaning of the VCCR. The court ruled that the restaurant, but not the bank, was performing consular functions. The court was also quite emphatic that they did not have consular relations with that airline, PAL.

As the court noted, Article 5 of the VCCR "defines the purposes of a consular post broadly, by reference to its functions, i.e., 'furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending State and the receiving State', 'protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals', 'ascertaining ... conditions and developments in the commercial, economic, cultural and scientific life of the receiving state, reporting thereon to the Government of the sending state', and 'helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the sending State.'"

In assessing whether the restaurant performed such functions, the Court noted that from 1974 to 1982 the Philippine Center leased property to the Maharlika Restaurant, which "served authentic Filipino cuisine, employed Filipinos only, and was staffed with a Filipino dance troupe and musicians who performed a show during dinner. Through its culinary offerings and the evening performance, Maharlika showcased Philippine culture, folk art, ethnic music and dance to guests of the Mission and the Consulate General."

That was good enough for the court to find that the restaurant fell within the definition of consular relations. The purpose of the restaurant was to showcase Filipino culture, not to earn a profit. It did so by hiring only Filipino employees, presenting long Filipino dinner shows, and hosting official Philippine functions. "Maharlika was thus used exclusively for a consular purpose, and so is exempt under the VCCR."

I love it. As long as there is Filipino dancing you fall within Article 5's definition of "furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending State and the receiving State." As for the lease with the Philippine bank and Philippine airline, no that just won't do. Far too much focus on Filipino commercial and economic relations, and not nearly enough emphasis on Filipino culture.

Now if the bank tellers had just doubled as Filipino dancers while serving customers, well, ... who knows, perhaps Filipino "teller and dancing" would suffice. Based on this YouTube video of the well-known Bayanihan Philippine Dance Company, it looks like they could multi-task.




Sunday, February 17, 2008

Bloggers and Courage
It takes little courage to be a blogger in the United States. Perhaps professional reputation is at risk if things go badly, but there is little more to fear than that. Sure, every intellectual community has its village idiot, and the blogosphere is one of the easiest places to find people who crave attention and lack discretion. But the rashness of a buffoon hardly qualifies as courage. I suppose it takes some courage to do serious academic blogging, which has been described as "scholarship without a safety net." But that doesn't feel like courage, at least not to me. Like almost every other type of speech in this country, intellectual discourse on the Internet is both priceless and free.

Things are not so simple in other parts of the world. Reporters Without Borders just issued its annual report and it is a sobering read. The annual report highlights that most cases of censorship in the world today involve the Internet. Here are a few examples of bloggers facing persecution in 2007 for displaying courage:


Afghanistan: “Journalism student, Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh, 23, who was arrested in October in Mazar-i-Sharif, was sentenced to death on 22 January 2008 after a closed doors trial at which he had no lawyer to defend him. He was convicted of “disseminating defamatory remarks about Islam”, for printing and distributing to friends an article he downloaded from the Internet that analyzes what the Koran says about the role of women.” (p. 70).

Bahrain: “Bahrain stepped up its censorship of online publications, especially those concerning human rights. A score of websites dealing with religion or politics were blocked by the authorities in 2007 on the excuse that they mentioned the Bandargate scandal. Bloggers are often arrested, showing that the rules are confused. More than a dozen journalists, bloggers and webmasters were prosecuted between April and October 2007 under articles 365 of the criminal law and article 47 of the press law. Since 2005, websites about Bahrain have to register with the information ministry, making it easier to control them.” (p. 156).

Bangladesh: “Tasneem Khalil, journalist and blogger (tasneemkhalil.com), was detained and tortured in May after openly criticising the army for the spread of extra-judicial killings.” (p. 74).

China: “Police began arresting dissidents and bloggers calling for improved human rights ahead of the staging of the Olympics. The best known of these “Olympics’ prisoners” is rights activist, Hu Jia, who was arrested at his Beijing home on 27 December. Police produced an arrest warrant accusing him of “inciting subversion of state power”. (p. 80) “100 or so journalists, Internet users and bloggers remain in the country’s prisons.” (p. 8)

Egypt: “Blogger Abdel Nabil Suleiman (“Kareem Amer”) was sentenced to four years in prison in February for “incitement to hatred of Islam” on his blog and for insulting Mubarak. He became the symbol of online repression for the country’s bloggers. Another blogger, Abdul Moneim-Mahmud, spent two months in prison accused of belonging to an “illegal organisation,” the Muslim Brotherhood. But his imprisonment was probably because he had posted text and photos online exposing torture by the security services.” (p. 154).

Iran: “Journalists not already in prison are summoned by judges who remind them they are only free conditionally. The most outspoken and critical Internet websites are closing one after another because of official censorship.” (p. 3)

Malaysia: “In the face of mounting criticism, the government of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi reacted with a crackdown. The internal security ministry, under the pretext of fighting incitement to racial hatred or insulting the king, set out to intimidate dissident voices, in particular bloggers. One minister threatened imprisonment against cyber-activists who opened up an unprecedented area of freedom.” (91)

Thailand: “Blogger Praya Pichaï spent two weeks in custody under Section 14 of the law against cyber-criminality for “defamation” and “harming national security”, accused of “criticising the monarchy” in an article posted on his blog (prachathai.com).The authorities then lifted the charges against him for lack of evidence, but he will be under surveillance for ten years and faces prison if he posts any new political comment on a website.” (p. 114).



Courage on the Internet. It is on full display throughout the world, but it is nowhere more apparent than in those countries where the stakes of free expression are so high. Anytime an academic blogger or commenter thinks he or she has courage, just ask the question, "Would I have the courage of these bloggers and be willing to face prison time just to defend my right to offend the state?"

Saturday, February 9, 2008

Mapping the Evolution of States and Empires
The bloggers at Coming Anarchy have put together an informative series of posts about the shifting borders of states and empires. There’s a time-lapse animation of the expansion and contraction of Rome and Byzantium, a series of maps for each of Ethiopia, Poland, Armenia , Persia, and Russia. Also, there’s a series of comparative maps on state borders in modern Europe.

Along similar lines (and in light of current events), I would also recommend Catholicgauze's post on the ethnic geography of Kosovo.

Since a picture is worth a thousand words, I am in favor of the "geographic turn" in international law, in which we as lawyers become more sensitive to issues of space and place, and how our represenations of them affect the rules that we make. And vice versa. Reflecting on his travels through the Caucasus, Northern Iraq, and West Africa, journalist Robert Kaplan noted in his book The Coming Anarchy (from where the blog got its name) that he “develop[ed] a healthy skepticism toward maps, which, I began to realize, create a conceptual barrier that prevents us from comprehending the political crack-up just beginning to occur worldwide.”

For some examples of recent scholarship in law and geography, see, for example, the articles of Hari Osofsky and Tim Zick. Hari blogged about law and geography here. I also have a forthcoming piece in the Oregon Review of International Law on how geographic and cartographic concepts have affected our understanding of self-determination and secession. More on that in another post.

For now, check out the maps!

Hat tip: Catholicgauze

Related Posts (on one page):

  1. Mapping the Future of the Middle East
  2. Mapping the Evolution of States and Empires

Tuesday, February 5, 2008

The Other Half of the Picture
Like Roger, and the rest of the Opinio Juris bloggers, I want to thank Walter Russell Mead for joining us this week. I found God and Gold to be provocative and to contain wonderful insights, particularly concerning why the Anglo-Saxon powers have done remarkably well in conflicts over the last 300 years.

But my first comment in this discussion will be less about what Mead did analyze in the opening two sections of the book (discussing the “clash of civilizations” and what may be called the Anglo-Saxon diplomatic and warfighting methods), then about what he did not cover. By this, I mean that Mead has built a fascinating but largely Eurocentric (if I could include the U.S.) narrative. I question this not out of some misguided “political correctness” but rather because I think that to understand properly the Anglo-Saxon encounter with the rest of the world, and particularly to understand why some people push back, it is vital to give due weight to the beliefs, goals, and concerns of those people. Otherwise, one gets only half the picture; and a picture which is somewhat rose-tinted, to boot.

Mead describes what he calls (tongue-in-cheek, I think) “Waspophobia” and concludes, “[w]hatever we call it, the hatred and fear of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants and of all their doings is one of the motors driving the world.” (p.58, my emphasis.) A history which gave serious weight to the actual desires and fears of those in the periphery of this story (that is, the rest of the world besides Western Europe and North America) may find that, perhaps, hatred of the powerful WASPs is not as important an engine as it may seem. Maybe, instead, the people of the periphery were not just reacting against Britain or the U.S. but were acting upon their own affirmative visions of what they wanted to build. If that is the case, then understanding those plans and goals generated in the periphery--and why the U.K. and the U.S. chose to react against them, is a key part of the story of how Britain and America "made" the modern world.

If one focused equally on the encounter as it was experienced in the countries facing Anglo-Saxon power, then one would not consider the issue of “How They Hate Us” (the title of Chapter 3) without even mentioning Mossadegh or Allende. Or the U.S. backing of the Shah, Pinochet, and Duvalier, to give a few examples. It would also be less likely that post-World War II history would receive a gloss such as “America supported independence drives in the former colonies, and then allowed new states to enter the global economic system the U.S. was building.” (p. 112) To quote a Haitian folk saying: “He who is hit always remembers. He who hits always forgets.” I think the narrative in the opening sections of God and Gold has forgotten the other half of the picture.

It is by forgetting—or by only briefly considering—the various examples of bad faith or bad acts by the great powers that we come to oversimplify the interaction the U.K, the U.S., and the rest of the world. Mead summarizes:
Rich and free but also cold and inhuman: this is how the West looks from the East…

It is what Occidentalists look at when they hate and fear the West; it is what Waspophobes are talking about when they decry the global power and influence of Britain and the United States today.
(p. 175)
No, they are probbly talking about more than that. And this is missed in Mead’s analysis because the opening two sections of God and Gold present an essentially a metropolitan history of international politics. As Mead puts it:
To the degree that the story of world power politics in the last few centuries has a single overarching plot, that plot is the long and continuing rise of the maritime system as its center shifted from the United Provinces to the United Kingdom to the United States. (p.173)
I agree with that, as a general matter and, as I stated in the opening, I think Mead has much of great insight to say on the geopolitical style of the U.K and the U.S. But this story only goes so far; it is one in which great powers were trying to outmaneuver each other on the chessboard that is the rest of the world. The board, and the chessmen on it, are barely described. And, at least the way the first two sections of this book read, the board and the gamepieces are acted upon, they are not actors in this story.

Giving serious attention not just to the power politics and economic and social proclivities of the U.K. and the U.S., but also to those of states on the periphery, can lead to further insights as to the role of Anglo-Saxon power in the world, besides those that Mead has presented.

Sunday, January 20, 2008

When Are Sovereigns Immune and Indispensable?
In case you missed it, in addition to Medellin and Boumediene, there is one other significant international case before the Supreme Court this term. Although the case is a sleeper, it has important ramifications for any attempts by successful claimants to attach assets of government officials who violate human rights when the sovereign also has a legitimate claim to those assets. More specifically, what happens to litigation when the foreign sovereign is immune from suit and potentially an indispensable party?

You can find details and documents about Philippines v. Pimental at SCOTUSWiki here, but essentially it relates to efforts by human rights victims to execute judgment against assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in Hawaii. The victims are seeking some $35 million in execution of their $2 billion judgment against Ferdinand Marcos in the case of Hilao v. Estate of Marcos. Meanwhile, the Philippine government argues that under Philippine law, any ill-gotten gains obtained by government officials belongs to the Philippine government.

The holder of the account, Merrill Lynch, brought an interpleader action to resolve the competing claims to the assets. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the Philippines enjoys sovereign immunity but is not an indispensable party. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 3, 2007. The questions presented are:


1. Whether a foreign government that is a “necessary” party to a lawsuit under Rule 19(a) and has successfully asserted sovereign immunity is, under Rule 19(b), an “indispensable” party to an action brought in the courts of the United States to settle ownership of assets claimed by that government.

2. Whether the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and its Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), having been dismissed from the interpleader action based on their successful assertion of sovereign immunity, had the right to appeal the district court’s determination that they were not indispensable parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b); and whether the Republic and its PCGG have the right to seek this Court’s review of the court of appeals’s opinion affirming the district court.

The United States has filed an amicus brief in support of the Philippines. Oral argument is not yet scheduled.

Saturday, January 12, 2008

The Spiritual Capital of Successful Countries
Paul Marshall has an interesting op-ed in the Washington Post on the spiritual capital of successful countries. I know Marshall well and his analysis seems exactly right to me.

In the piece he discusses a fascinating World Values Survey, which includes a cultural map of the world, pictured at left (click to enlarge). That map divides the world according to two major dimensions: the Traditional/Secular-rational dimension and the Survival/Self-Expression dimension.

Although Marshall doesn't mention international law, I think it follows from his discussion that scholars should be much more open to the study of the impact of religion on international law and international relations. Here is an excerpt:


Religion does not exist in isolation. It concerns and shapes our fundamental view of the nature of human life and how it is and should be lived. This realization has come home in politics, especially international politics. Obviously, when we are under attack by people whose ideology we cannot understand unless we delve into the history of Islamic law and theology, we must learn to take their religious doctrines seriously.

The future is likely to bring many more debates on how religion shapes not only politics but economics.... Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary of Harvard University have used the results of World Values Surveys to study the relation between religion and economic attitudes. They found that many religious beliefs concerning cooperation, government, working women, legal rules, thriftiness and the market economy are conducive to higher per-capita income and growth. Religion appears to have an effect on economic growth and development by fostering thrift, a work ethic, honesty and openness to strangers. This has lead to the notion of "spiritual capital," analogous to human capital, which focuses on knowledge and behavior stemming from transcendent concepts and ultimate concerns.

Their model stresses the importance of freedom, not only in economics per se, but in religion itself. Religion most often has positive effects when it is free. This model is reinforced by the results of our recently concluded survey of international religious freedom. The countries with the worst religious freedom records, including Burma, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have, unless they have oil, terrible economic records. Similar relations hold for those in the middle and for those with high levels of freedom: The highest 30 countries in rankings of economic freedom all scored highly on religious freedom.

Barro and McCleary's work suggests that this is more than a mere correlation: There is good reason to think that religious freedom leads to good economic outcomes. The current evidence indicates that closed religious systems hamper economic development. Hence, if we want economic growth and development, we need to permit religious groups and people to follow their beliefs. In this case, economists should join political scientists in examining religion more seriously.

Whether we like it or not, religion is likely to remain central to politics, and even economics. This means that in the future, politicians, Democrats as well as Republicans, are likely to expand their talk of religion on the campaign trail. We should not dismiss this as if religion were a mere irrational prejudice or interest-group totem. We should instead demand that politicians address these fundamental issues in a serious, coherent and empirically grounded way. If they do not do so, they (and we) will misunderstand our all-too-religious world.

Monday, December 17, 2007

Chinese Internet Filtering WTO Challenge Gaining Momentum
This story from The Guardian is a wonderful development:


A California free speech group whose board of directors includes Google and Yahoo said on Monday it had asked U.S. trade officials to challenge China's Internet restrictions as a violation of global trade rules. The issue threatens to further strain U.S.-China trade relations if the U.S. Trade Representative's office decides to take on the case. With China already the world's second-largest Internet market with over 162 million Web users, the commercial stakes are huge. "China's censorship of the Internet, while fundamentally an issue of free speech and individual liberty, is also a significant barrier to U.S.-China commerce, and therefore, very much a trade issue," Peter Scheer, executive director of the California First Amendment Coalition, said in a statement that came as top U.S. officials were in Beijing for economic talks. In infringing the rights of its 1.2 billion citizens, China is also infringing the rights of American companies to sell goods and services to consumers in China, via the Internet," he said. Internet giants Google and Yahoo have seats on the coalition's board of directors, but the bulk of the public interest group's members are West Coast newspapers and other traditional media companies, Scheer said in an interview.... The case relies on a legal theory developed by Columbia University Law Professor Timothy Wu, who argued in a law review article last year that WTO agreements on goods and services could be used to challenge government censorship of the Internet.

You can read Tim Wu's article here. Congrats to Wu for his brilliant idea, which I have written about before here. As I said then, "I hope this draws the attention of USTR, as it is an interesting way to think about challenging the practice of Internet filtering." Now that business interests and First Amendment advocates have joined forces, the chances that USTR will force the issue with China, potentially with WTO litigation, should increase dramatically.

Who would have thought that the WTO could be used as such a potent vehicle to challenge human rights abuses? The typical debate about international trade normally puts trade on one side of the ledger and human rights on the other. But this case uses international trade rules to promote civil liberties. Any Internet restrictions on religious, political, or commercial speech that serve as a barrier to the sale of goods and services in China have the potential to violate WTO obligations.

Thursday, December 13, 2007

Is Helping Terrorists Always Unlawful?
That essentially was the question raised in the recent Ninth Circuit case of Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey. The answer to the question is no.

The Plaintiffs were hoping to train members of one terrorist group, PKK, by helping them (1) to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes; (2) to engage in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey, and (3) to teach PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief. With respect to the other terrorist organization, LTTE, the plaintiffs wanted (1) to train members of LTTE to present claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators and international bodies, (2) to offer their legal expertise in negotiating peace agreements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, and (3) to engage in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.

The statute in question prohibits knowingly providing material support or resources to foreign terrorist organizations. The term “material support or resources” includes: "any property, … or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel … and transportation, except medicine or religious materials."

The Ninth Circuit ruled that certain provisions of the statute were unconstitutionally vague. The key questions were whether the terms “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel” were unconstitutionally vague. The Ninth Circuit held that the first three terms were vague but the fourth was not. Here is an excerpt:


Saturday, December 8, 2007

Using Wiki to Draft Laws
Now this story from the New York Times Magazine is what I call an innovative idea for lawmaking:


When the New Zealand police force said they were open to suggestions about how to rewrite national policing laws, they meant it. In September, they posted the 1958 Police Act online and invited Kiwis and non-Kiwis alike to visit the site and type in their own revisions to the law — extending the concept of “Wiki”-style collaborative writing from encyclopedias to democracy.

“The idea was to take something that’s inherently dry and intellectual” like law reform, explains Superintendent Hamish McCardle, who is in charge of the review, “and transfer it to something that’s cool and innovative” — like Web 2.0.

By making the Wiki open to anyone who cared to participate, the police force hoped to make it easy for international law and policing experts to weigh in, as well as those one million or so New Zealand citizens living abroad. Of course, all of that interactivity yielded its share of unconventional ideas. McCardle’s favorite is one submitted by a user who requested that the name of the police force be changed to “The New Zealand Yum-Yum Teddy Bear Strike Force Z.” That particular suggestion was quickly edited out. Other bold ideas made it into the final Wiki document, like a suggestion to increase the minimum police recruitment age to 25, since the human brain is not fully developed until then.

Despite the novelty of the Wiki process, McCardle is quick to point out that plenty of old-fashioned checks and balances are in place. The Wiki follows a traditional review process and will culminate in a document that will advise, rather than mandate, Parliament in its decisions regarding the Police Act.

If you want to see the final product, it is available at the New Zealand Wiki Police website here and here.

I wonder whether this approach could be used in drafting treaties?

Wednesday, November 28, 2007

National Antipathy and Judicial Bias at the WTO
The WTO Appellate Body has four new members: Ms Lilia R. Bautista of the Philippines and Ms Jennifer Hillman of the United States for four years commencing on 11 December 2007; and Mr Shotaro Oshima of Japan and Ms Yuejiao Zhang of China for four years commencing on 1 June 2008.

The most interesting part of the appointment process was the Taiwenese diplomatic manuevers with respect to the Chinese candidate. Simon Lester over at the International Economic Law and Policy Blog has been covering the issue closely. (See here, here, here, and here).

I must say that I think Taiwan has a point in challenging the appointment of a Chinese Appellate Body member. When we discuss impartiality and independence of international judges or arbitrators we typically focus on bias in favor of a particular party. International arbitration rules quite frequently prohibit an arbitrator of the same nationality as one of the parties from serving on the panel. There is a presumption of bias based on nationality. That may be part of Taiwan's concerns: Will a Chinese judge be willing to rule against China?

But the Taiwenese concerns extend beyond that. They also fear national antipathy toward another WTO Member State. Can a judge from China have the requisite impartiality and independence such that he would not automatically rule against Taiwan in any dispute pending before the WTO? A Taiwan spokesman stated that Taiwan "has reservations about WTO's planned appointment of Zhang Yuejiao because in China the judicial system takes orders from the Chinese government.... We know this too well because we have had many unpleasant experiences of being unfairly treated by China in international organizations, so we must protect our interests." The Taiwanese delegate reportedly said that "we have deep concerns on the question of impartiality and qualification of one of the recommended candidates." It's a fair question.

I have seen similar concerns raised before. When I worked at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal I watched the Iranian judges display quite open and obvious bias toward Iran and against the United States. In fact, when I was there in the early 1990s one of the American judges surveyed the rulings of the Iranian judges and found that in the entire history of the tribunal no Iranian judge had ever ruled against an Iranian party or ruled in favor of an American party. (Needless to say the converse could not be said of the American judges).

Will the Chinese Appellate Body member have the requisite judicial freedom and independence to rule in favor of Taiwan or against China in forthcoming WTO disputes? Time will tell.


Monday, November 26, 2007

Australia to Apologize to the Aborigines
As has been widely reported, new Australian PM Kevin Rudd has promised to sign the Kyoto Protocol and remove the country's 550 troops from Iraq. Good news on both fronts — as is a third promise that has received less media attention: a formal apology to Australia's aboriginal population for the many historic injustices they have suffered:
Mr Rudd's pledge to say sorry to Aborigines was a radical departure from his predecessor John Howard, who during 11 years in power argued that contemporary Australians bore no responsibility for past wrongs.

It would be the first time that an Australian federal government had apologized to the country's 450,000 Aborigines, who after 220 years of white settlement suffer low life expectancy, poor health and high rates of joblessness and incarceration.

Mr Howard, whose humiliating defeat in Saturday's election signaled the end of a political era, regarded a formal apology as symptomatic of what he called the left-leaning, "black arm band" version of history.

But Labour leader Mr Rudd announced that he was determined to say sorry early on in his term of office. "We will frame it in a consultative fashion with communities and that may take some time," he said.

[snip]

Surveys show most Australians support the idea of an apology, which Aboriginal leaders regard more as a symbolic gesture than as a basis for launching huge compensation claims.
No word on whether, as part of the apology, Rudd's government will reverse Australia's refusal to sign the UN's Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. If it is serious about promoting the rights of his country's aborigines, it should.

Wednesday, November 21, 2007

Coroner Concludes Balibo 5 Were Murdered
In June, I blogged about evidence presented at a New South Wales Coroner's Court indicating that, contrary to the longstanding position of the Indonesian and Australian governments, Indonesian troops murdered five journalists in Balibo on October 16, 1975, the first full day of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor.

Last week, the deputy coroner in New South Wales officially concluded that the killings were deliberate — and suggested, in what is certain to set off a firestorm of controversy, that the killers should be prosecuted for war crimes:
A coroner investigating the deaths of five Australia-based journalists in East Timor in 1975 concluded Friday that Indonesian troops deliberately shot or stabbed the men to death to hide Indonesia's invasion of the territory.

The finding is likely to stoke a long-running controversy surrounding the case by contradicting the Indonesian and Australian governments' official version of events: that the journalists were killed accidentally in crossfire between Indonesian troops and East Timorese defenders in the town of Balibo. It could also strain Australia-Indonesia diplomatic ties because it names three former senior officers of Indonesia's special military forces as likely having ordered the killings, and suggests they should face possible war crimes charges.

[snip]

New South Wales state deputy coroner Dorelle Pinch, who heard evidence from witnesses and viewed secret intelligence documents during a six-week inquest, rejected Indonesia's insistence for decades that the men were accidental victims of its attacking troops on Oct. 16, 1975. "The journalists were not incidental casualties in the fighting: they were captured then deliberately killed despite protesting their status," Ms. Pinch said.

Technically, Ms. Pinch only investigated the death of Brian Raymond Peters, a British-born cameraman who was among crews from two Australian television networks who went to Balibo to cover the anticipated Indonesian invasion of East Timor as it descended toward civil war following the end of Portuguese colonial rule. But she said it was impossible to investigate the death of one of the journalists without probing the others, and that her findings applied equally to all of them.

Ms. Pinch found that Mr. Peters was "shot and/or stabbed deliberately, and not in the heat of battle, by members of the Indonesian Special Forces ... to prevent him from revealing that Indonesian Special Forces had participated in the attack on Balibo." She said the journalists were killed on the orders of Yunus Yosfiah, who was then an Indonesian military captain and later a government minister. He has denied it.

There is "strong circumstantial evidence" that Mr. Yosfiah's orders to kill the journalists came down the chain of command from the then-head of Indonesian Special Forces, Maj. Gen. Benny Murdani, Ms. Pinch said. She said she believed the evidence supported possible war crimes charges, and that she would refer the case to the government to decide whether to pursue them. In Australia, a coroner does not have the power to file charges.

Attorney General Phillip Ruddock said he would forward Ms. Pinch's recommendations to police and prosecutors who have responsibility for investigating and compiling war crimes charges.

Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Kristiarto Legowo rejected Ms. Pinch's findings. "The verdict will not change our assertion on what happened in Balibo at the time, namely that those five journalists were killed in crossfire," Mr. Legowo said in Jakarta. "It is a closed case."

[snip]

Prime Minister John Howard said he would seek advice on what was an appropriate next step. Opposition leader Kevin Rudd, who opinion polls say is favored to become prime minister at elections next week, indicated he would follow up on the war crimes recommendation. "I believe this has to be taken through to its logical conclusion," he said. "I also believe that those responsible should be held to account."
As I noted in my earlier post, the killers of the Balibo 5 could be prosecuted in Australia for war crimes pursuant to the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, which criminalizes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions even when committed outside of Australia or one of its territories.