Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Wednesday, July 9, 2008

How to Buy a Child in 10 Hours
This deeply unsettling experiment starts on a typical Monday morning on Manhattan's leafy Upper West Side, where commuters stroll by Starbucks and Central Park.

At 7:10 a.m., I'm off to see how long it takes to buy a child slave.
So begins a report by ABC's Nightline. By 5:00 pm the journalist is in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and he has made a deal to purchase an 11 year-old girl for $150.

The report shows not only the ease with which children are bought and sold but also explains the phenomenon of very poor families giving children away to be servants for slightly better-off families in the hope that they would at least be fed and clothed. But the reality includes beatings and all sorts of abuse.

To appreciate the scope of this crisis, note that UNICEF estimates that there are 300,000 child slaves in Haiti. And this is just a small part of modern-day slavery.

Read the transcript of the Nightline report here.

I'll close with an excerpt (with some boldface I have added for emphasis), in which, after making the deal for $150, the journalist meets with a second trafficker at a hotel...
This second trafficker is asking a much steeper price for an 11-year-old girl: $10,000.

"It's something definitive," explains our translator. "After the sale, he doesn't mind what happens to the kid."

"So for $10,000, I can have the child and do anything I want to do is what he's saying?" I ask.

"Yeah, definitely."

As further enticement, the trafficker says he can even get me fake papers that would allow me to take this child back to the U.S. with me. Both traffickers say they have experience providing children to Americans. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, officials have no idea how often this sort of transaction transpires. As the slightly menacing slave trafficker describes this girl he's promising to provide, I hear him use the French word "belle." French, along with Creole, is one of Haiti's official languages.

Did he use the word 'belle'? Like, pretty girl?" I ask the translator.

"Yeah."

"So he's saying this would be a pretty child?"

"Yeah."

"Do you think he's hinting that the child would be a partner of some sort?"

"Yeah, it's up to you because that kid is yours."

Once again, I can't believe I'm having this conversation -- sitting in the sunshine so casually transacting such diabolical business. Just to make sure I fully understand the offer on the table, I ask, "If I pay $10,000 I essentially own this child?"

"Yeah, it's yours. You do whatever you want."

I've heard enough. I conclude the meeting, once again making sure the trafficker doesn't actually act on my request.

But now comes the craziest part of this wildly disturbing day.

Two waiters sitting nearby call me over. They say they've heard my conversations. At first I think they're going to yell at me or something. I'm bracing for shame. Instead, the waiters offer to sell me a child.



Saturday, July 5, 2008

Problems in Lubanga Resolved?
According to the ICC President and Prosecutor, Lubanga's trial can now continue, because the UN has agreed to turn over the disputed evidence to the Trial Chamber and the defense:
"The obstacles have been lifted," chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo told journalists on the sidelines of a ceremony in The Hague to mark the 10th anniversary of the Rome Treaty that led to the court's creation.

Lubanga's trial would be the ICC's first.

Court president Philippe Kirsch said the main point of contention, over the prosecution's alleged abuse of a confidentiality allowances, should be resolved "shortly".

On June 13, judges imposed an indefinite stay on proceedings, due to have started last Monday, after finding that prosecutors had wrongly withheld evidence, notably from the United Nations, from Lubanga's lawyers.

This "misuse" inhibited Lubanga's ability to prepare a proper defence, they said.

Lubanga subsequently applied for release, and on Wednesday the ICC ordered him to be freed from detention. But the prosecution lodged an immediate appeal that suspended Lubanga's release.

"The UN has sent a letter authorising the other parties to have access to the documents," Moreno-Ocampo said Thursday, reiterating that he was confident the trial would kick off by autumn.
If true, this is good news indeed. It would have been very unfortunate if the ICC's first trial had been derailed by the Prosecutor's overbroad use of confidentiality agreements. But at the same time, a Gitmo-style show trial involving secret evidence would have done lasting damage to the Court's legitimacy. The Trial Chamber's decision to stay the trial was thus the right move, because it forced the UN, which is obviously deeply invested in the success of the ICC, to do the right thing and release the evidence.

The judges of the Trial Chamber deserve praise for their willingness to defend the integrity of the system at all costs. I can only imagine the political pressure that was being exerted on them behind the scenes to permit Lubanga's trial to continue. Their bravery led to the only satisfactory resolution of the problem — and helps establishes the critical judicial independence of the Court.

Thursday, July 3, 2008

ECHR Decision on Confessions Under the Threat of Torture
Antoine Buyse at the ECHR Blog has posted an analysis of Gafgen v. Germany, a decision handed down by the ECHR on Monday concerning the admissibility of evidence resulting from statements made under the threat of torture. Here's the background:
In 2003, the applicant, Magnus Gäfgen, was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of J., the eleven year old son, of a rich bankers family from Frankfurt am Main. Gäfgen had lured the boy into his home and subsequently killed him. That same day he dropped the corpse of the boy into a pond. He had then demanded a ransom of one million euros from the family, without disclosing that J. was already dead. Shortly after picking up the ransom, Gäfgen was arrested.

The case centres on what occurred next: thinking that the boy was still alive but in grave danger, the police officers questioning Gäfgen threatened him with considerable pain if he did not reveal where the child was. As a result, Gäfgen disclosed where the corpse could be found. At the start of the trial, Gäfgen complained that his confession had been made under the threat of torture.
Buyse explains that:
The Court first concluded that the threat, would it have been carried out, would have amounted to torture and that a threat of torture amounted to inhuman treatment. The threat itself, however, was not torture.
The opinion then states:
the Court finds that the treatment the applicant was threatened with would, if carried out, amount to torture. However, the questioning lasted for some ten minutes only and, as was established in the criminal proceedings against the police officers (...), took place in an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions owing to the fact that the police officers, who were completely exhausted and under extreme pressure, believed that they had only a few hours to save J.'s life, elements which can be regarded as mitigating factors...
Buyse's post considers this issue of mitigation (which he finds "somewhat puzzling" in light of the absolute prohibition on torture) and the balancing test that the ECHR seems to use in deciding whether or not torture has taken place. For a full explanation of these issues, as well as how this affects evidentiary and fair trial issues under the European Convention, see his full post.

Wednesday, July 2, 2008

Lubanga Released -- In Theory
As I anticipated a few days ago following the UN's refusal to provide the judges with meaningful access to the disputed evidence, Trial Chamber I has ordered Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's unconditional and immediate release:
30. As just set out, the Chamber's Decision stayed the proceedings sine die because of the present impossibility of trying the accused fairly. It follows that the detention of the accused cannot be justified in order to ensure his appearance at trial or to safeguard the investigation, because the trial (which was the result of the investigation) has been stayed. Furthermore, in the absence of the prospect of a trial, the accused cannot be held in custody or subjected to provisional release as purely preventative measures to deter him from committing further crimes.
The Trial Chamber's decision, however, does not mean that Lubanga will walk out of the Hague anytime soon. First, despite releasing him "unconditionally" and "immediately," the Court stayed his actual release pending appeal of its order by the Prosecutor:
35. Trial Chamber I orders the release of the accused, but since by Rule 154 of the Rules an appeal may be filed no later than 5 days from the date upon which the party filing the appeal is notified of the decision, this order shall not be enforced until the expiry of the 5 day time limit, and, furthermore, if an appeal is filed within the 5 day time-limit against the order granting release and if a request is made in the appeal for suspensive effect, the accused shall not leave detention until the Appeals Chamber has resolved whether or not the effect of the order granting release is to be suspended.
The Prosecutor will no doubt ask the Appeals Chamber to suspend the release order, which means that Lubanga will remain in detention until the Chamber resolves the appeal, however long that takes.

Second — and I doubt this aspect of the order will receive much media attention — the Trial Chamber indicated that Lubanga will be released only if a State is willing to take him:
36. It is to be noted, finally, that by Rule 185 of the Rules, an order releasing the accused shall only be put into effect after arrangements have been made for his transfer to a State that is obliged to receive him. It follows that these arrangements should not be implemented until the 5 day time-limit, set out above, has expired.
That requirement could be a serious problem for Lubanga. I predicted in my forthcoming article "What Happens to the Acquitted?" that ICC acquittees will find it no less difficult to find new homes than ICTR acquittees like Ntagerura and Rwamakuba, and I am confident — sadly — that Lubanga's "release" will prove me right. There is no way the DRC will take him; he is, after all, a rebel. And it is very unlikely that any other State will be enthusiastic about having an accused war criminal walking free on its territory. So I fear that Lubanga may end up sharing the same fate as Ntagerura and Rwamakuba: being "free" to enjoy living as a virtual prisoner in a UN safehouse.
A Response to Galit Sarfaty
Sarfaty’s reply addresses a fundamental problem with conflating norms with binding legal rights. In my article, I argue that the classification of a potential human right—like participatory development—may be seen as operating on a continuum. On one end of the continuum exists a norm. On the other end exists a rule of customary international law. As a norm “crystallizes,” it has the potential to move along the continuum toward attaining recognition as legal right. My article suggests that, while the norm/law continuum is fluid and dynamic, the current requirements of CIL mandate that an international human rights norm not be viewed as an international human rights law until states and major intergovernmental organizations like the World Bank consistently practice participatory development out of a sense of legal obligation.

Sarfaty responds by correctly noting that “it is difficult to empirically determine when a norm is being internalized out of a sense of legal obligation as opposed to moral obligation.” As Andrew Guzman and others have pointed out, one reason for this difficulty is that major international actors talk and act, but do they really “think?” If not, then we are left with studying what these actors say and do to understand whether these actions are taken out of a sense of legal obligation. With respect to participatory development, that means looking at how the World Bank and its biggest donor engage in the practice of participatory development.

The examples I provide demonstrate that the World Bank has been slowly internalizing some version of a participatory development norm. The Bank has devoted a large number of resources in an attempt to practice (or, at a minimum, to have the appearance of practicing) participatory development. Sarfaty, however, challenges my choice of internalization examples because “project-level participation is a better indicator of whether the norm of participatory development has been internalized.”

I think Sarfaty must be correct. I also think that her critique tends to support two of my points.

First, while the participatory development norm has been slowly crystallizing within the Bank, that process is neither complete nor certain to achieve full internalization. The World Bank has set up bureaucratic structures to support participation by various stakeholders, but Sarfaty points out that these structures do not guarantee that stakeholders on the ground are having a say in Bank projects that will affect their lives in a very real way. Still, if we compare the Bank’s willingness to, for example, fund projects that are “community-driven” (p. 759), shift its country directors from Washington, D.C. to the particular country (p. 760), or augment its funding of civil society partnerships (p. 760) with Bank practices prior to the mid-1980s, we see a marked difference in how the Bank practices participatory development. While participation at the project-level could certainly be more robust, greater internalization at more macro levels also suggests that the norm is in some form being crystallized.

Second, there is no generally-agreed definition for what counts as “participatory” in “participatory development” (pp. 736-39). This definitional quagmire returns us to the problems of satisfying the requirements of CIL. On the one hand, it is difficult to show that a more specific definition of participatory development—Sarfaty’s, for instance, seems to require project-level participation by affected stakeholders—has satisfied the two requirements of CIL. On the other hand, a vague definition runs the risk of being empty rhetoric that does not require the World Bank to do much of anything, let alone out of a sense of legal obligation.

Sarfaty concludes her response by asking whether one should distinguish between legal internalization and social or political internalization. My answer, both here and in the article, is an emphatic “yes,” and the current requirements of CIL provide the place for us to look to discern whether a moral norm has attained status as an international human rights law.
Unpacking the Participatory Development Norm: Galit Sarfaty Comments
[Galit A. Sarfaty is a Fellow at Harvard Law School's Program on the Legal Profession, and a Ph.D. Candidate in Anthropology at the University of Chicago]

I would like to thank Opinio Juris and Martin Totaro for the opportunity to comment on this engaging article. The piece is an excellent contribution to existing literature on norm development and international human rights law. Particularly important is his discussion of the “crystallization” process by which a norm shifts to a human right with corresponding legal obligations. This process has been largely overlooked and is very worthy of study. Totaro is correct to observe that classification of a norm as a legal right is not binary but operates on a continuum. One goal of his article is to distinguish between moral norms and legal human rights. While I agree that such a distinction is useful on a theoretical level, it is difficult to empirically determine when a norm is being internalized out of a sense of legal obligation as opposed to moral obligation. I would welcome Totaro’s thoughts on this issue and his recommendations on how scholars can distinguish the two in practice when conducting research on norm internalization.

My comments primarily focus on the second half of the article. Here, Totaro provides a case study of how the norm of participatory development is beginning to crystallize into a legal human right. Yet in attempting to demonstrate that the World Bank is slowly internalizing the participatory development norm, Totaro relies on insufficient examples that do not adequately establish his claim. Advocates often interpret the norm of participatory development as referring to participation by stakeholders in project design and/or implementation, rather than participation in country-level dialogues. Totaro’s examples are all from the latter category—e.g., the development of Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)—so they do not fully address whether the Bank has internalized the participatory development norm in its operational practice. Furthermore, he argues that Global Monitoring Reports “represent a major step forward” in the Bank’s adoption of the norm, yet his main evidence is the level of transparency and accountability in the reports rather than participation (p. 752). His only example of participation around the reports involves the Center for Global Development, a U.S.-based policy NGO that does not represent the typical stakeholder of Bank projects.

I argue that project-level participation is a better indicator of whether the norm of participatory development has been internalized. Instead of only examining participation in country dialogues by select NGOs, one should also evaluate the level of participation by community-based stakeholders that are directly or indirectly affected by development projects. This type of participation is usually mediated by the World Bank rather than the state government. In order to provide an example of project-level participation, I suggest that Totaro discuss the important debate over prior informed consent by potentially affected communities, which was a central issue during the recent revision of the Bank’s Indigenous Peoples Policy (Operational Policy 4.10). Many indigenous communities and human rights advocates have argued that there is a right to prior informed consent, while others claim that it is simply an emerging norm that is not yet recognized under customary international law. The example of prior informed consent suggests that whether the Bank is internalizing this important component of participatory development is highly contested.

Totaro’s final example of “the fluid process between moral norms and legal human rights” is former Bank President James Wolfensohn’s embracing of human rights in non-legal terms (p. 762). This section appears to conflate the right to participatory development with human rights in general. It also relies solely on Wolfensohn’s statements as an indication that the Bank is not implementing the norm out of a sense of legal obligation. But one cannot make this assessment without examining how actual Bank employees are implementing the norm and whether they are accepting it as a binding legal obligation. Totaro raises a related point a bit earlier in his piece, when he rightly observes that the Bank’s governing body and the bureaucrats working inside the institution may hold competing preferences (p. 757). Yet his discussion of “the inevitable bureaucratization of rhetoric” fails to account for the internal tensions within bureaucracies over whether and how to operationalize rhetoric (pp. 758-61). Based on my own experience ethnographically studying the organizational culture of the Bank, the bureaucratization of rhetoric is certainly not inevitable. It is important to recognize the complex decision-making process within bureaucracies that may work against norm internalization, even when those norms are supported in rhetoric.

Finally, it would be useful if Totaro outlined what he sees as the conditions for norm internalization. If Totaro is correct that it operates on a continuum, then what are the different levels before full internalization is reached? Should one distinguish between legal internalization and social or political internalization? Addressing such issues would further strengthen this article and its contribution to existing literature in international law and human rights.

Legal Positivism, Constructivism, and International Human Rights Law: The Case of Participatory Development
[Martin Totaro is an associate at Baker Botts in Washington, D.C. These views are his alone. Please find his SSRN author page here.]

Thanks to Opinio Juris for providing an outlet for VJIL authors to express their ideas to a wide audience, and thanks to VJIL for including me as one of those authors. Galit Sarfaty has graciously agreed to respond.

In my article, I attempt to make two modest contributions regarding the relationship between international law and norm internalization. First, I offer a typology that bridges the basic tenets of legal positivism and constructivism for the purpose of providing a useful framework to separate moral norms from human rights that have attained customary international law (CIL) status. Second, by using an illustrative example—the purported right to participatory development—I aim to demonstrate how the sociopolitical process of pushing toward the legalization of a moral norm can be a vibrant, robust procedure that need not prematurely accord CIL status to a norm still in the adolescent stage of rights formation under international law.

Under a commonly accepted definition of CIL, a norm only becomes a part of CIL because of general and consistent state practice taken out of a sense of legal obligation. My article focuses in part on how an international human rights norm may be internalized such that states engage in or respect the validity of a moral norm (the usage or practice prong), but states might not do so out of a sense of legal obligation (the opinio juris prong). In other words, a state may respect the moral legitimacy of a norm while simultaneously opposing the norm as a binding legal obligation.

Several scholars, including Galit Sarfaty, have focused on the dynamic process of norm-internalization at the supra-national, national, and sub-national levels. My article enters this debate by concentrating on the fluid process of norm-internalization, paying particular attention to the crystallization period but prior to a norm attaining CIL status. My analytical framework borrows from legal positivism and constructivist theory in international relations literature. As used here, at its most basic, oversimplified level, legal positivism emphasizes “the need to distinguish, firmly and with the maximum of clarity, law as it is from law as it ought to be.” H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1958). Constructivism, in contrast, refers to the process by which states and other major international actors internalize norms in a manner that has the potential to change these actors’ interests. For constructivists, a norm entrepreneur has the potential to change these actors’ interests. When combined as an analytical tool, “constructo-positivism” retains the key insights from both schools of thought—while CIL and non-CIL norms should not be conflated (i.e., distinguishing between the “is” and the “ought” in CIL), CIL can expand when a norm crystallizes to the point that major international actors engage the norm consistently and out of a sense of legal obligation. Put differently, the constructo-positivist as an explanatory matter separates moral norms from legal human rights but as a normative matter recognizes and even supports the process of legalization of certain norms.

The constructo-positivist framework provides a fresh look at the relationship between international human rights norms and legal human rights. These norms, grounded in a moral claim that a right should be viewed as binding in an international legal sense, do not attain this legal status simply because advocates push for such recognition. Rather, advocates of a particular right-claim must demonstrate that this right has become part of international law through accepted legalization conduits like treaties or CIL.

After laying out a typology of constructo-positivism, the article then applies it to the current debate over whether participatory development is a legal human right. I conclude that it is not—while major international actors like to United States and the World Bank may accept the legitimacy of participatory development as an aspirational norm, these actors do not engage in participatory development out of a sense of legal obligation.

While I argue that participatory development is not a part of the body of CIL, I then turn to how norm entrepreneurs are pressuring the Bank to internalize the right to participatory development.

These efforts have been partially successful. I examine the rhetoric and practice of the Bank with respect to participatory development, and find that, over the past twenty or so years, there has been what might be called “the inevitable bureaucratization of rhetoric.” In 1985, the World Bank discussed the virtue of participation in broad terms. Ten years later, we saw a shift toward more specific rhetoric about what participation really means. In 2005, we saw not only more complicated rhetoric, but also more structures built around this rhetoric. I focus on World Bank programs like Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Global Monitoring Reports that illustrate how, as the rhetoric itself developed, a wide array of norm entrepreneurs pressured and worked with the Bank to enact accountability structures to match the participatory rhetoric.

I conclude by suggesting that this process of norm-internalization indicates growing acceptance of the virtues of participatory development and its widespread practice by major international actors like the World Bank. The next shift for participatory development norm entrepreneurs will be to attempt to push for the internalization of the legal status of the norm rather than the legitimacy of the norm itself. While this norm has not yet been internalized to the point where the World Bank engages in participatory development out of a sense of legal obligation, it has been internalized as an aspirational norm.

Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Italy to Fingerprint Roma -- But No One Else
The persecution continues:
Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini said Monday the government would press ahead with plans to fingerprint ethnic Roma, including children - a move branded as discriminatory by European Union officials. Frattini - the EU's top justice official before he joined Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's cabinet - was commenting on remarks made Sunday by Interior Minister Roberto Maroni, who described critics of the plan as "hypocrites."

"I think Minister Maroni has done well to continue on the path he has outlined," Frattini said. "We are not talking of raids (against Roma communities) or anything of the sort, but a measure to identify those living in our country."

"These things are being done by many other countries in Europe without causing any scandal, and as such, they should also be done here," Frattini added.

The measure, according to Frattini, would serve to protect Roma children, who often live in shanty settlements and are not registered to attend school.

Maroni, who is from the anti-immigration Northern League wants to include the fingerprinting in a security package designed to crack down on illegal immigrants and child beggars, many of whom are ethnic Roma (colloquially known as gypsies).

The plan has drawn widespread criticism including from Catholic and United Nations officials, human rights groups and Italian opposition parties.

Last week a spokesman for the European Commission, the EU executive, said member states singling out an ethnic group for fingerprinting would be breaking EU rules.
Shameful. No, they're not talking about raids now -- they're talking about a way to make future raids more effective, by dramatically increasing the government's ability to identify and locate citizen and non-citizen Roma alike. What's next, making the Roma wear brown triangles?

Sunday, June 29, 2008

No Progress in the Lubanga Trial
I recently blogged about Trial Chamber I's stunning decision to stay Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's trial because of the Prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. The Court held a hearing on the 24th to determine whether, in light of its decision, Lubanga should be released. It has yet to reach a conclusion — but if the "compromise" the UN offered at the hearing is any indication, he might not be in custody too much longer:
In a correspondence from Nicolas Michel, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the United Nations proposed that the judges go to the Peace Palace in The Hague, therefore on "UN territory", to consult the documents.

They would not be allowed to take notes, or to record information during their consultation. Thereafter, they could indicate certain pieces of evidence for which the prosecutor would be invited to make a summary. The judges could then compare the summary with the original evidence and decide to reveal these summaries to the defence.

During the hearing of 24 June, Catherine Mabille, the lawyer for Lubanga, has from the start specified that "the defence will not accept summaries, which cannot be evidence".

"If you accept", she declared, that means that the prosecutor signs agreements with the United Nations, and that the UN will dictate to the judges, to justice, what it can hear, what can be said or not."
The judges seem to agree with Mabille: Justice Adrian Fulford told the Prosecutor that the court was "unlikely to approve a system that depends on its ability to memorize large quantities of information which it is unable to retain and study, and compare it with other evidence in the case so as to assess its relevance." His position is sound: the last thing the Court needs is a trial that resembles a Guantanamo military commission. This trial will create the blueprint for future trials; it is thus imperative for the Court to do everything in its power to protect the defendant's rights — even if that ultimately means letting Lubanga walk.

Friday, June 27, 2008

An Important Maori Land Settlement -- But Where's the Treaty Itself?
The BBC reports that the New Zealand government and seven Maori tribes have entered into an historic agreement concerning Maori ownership of a number of forests in the North Island, where I live:
The NZ$420m ($319m) agreement transfers ownership of nine forests - covering 435,000 acres (176,000 hectares) of land - in the central North Island.

Hundreds of Maori, some in traditional dress, thronged parliament to witness the signing of the accord.

"It's a historic journey we are on," Prime Minister Helen Clark said.

"We came into politics to address injustice and seek reconciliation. Thank you for walking that road with us on this historic day," she added, according to AP news agency.

The settlement - the largest single deal between the government and Maori tribes - seeks to address grievances dating back to the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi.

The treaty guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown. But land seizures and ownership breaches followed.

The forests signed over are mainly large commercial pine plantations, generating about NZ$13m a year in rents.

The settlement also hands over rents that have accumulated on the land since 1989.

Between them, the seven tribes or iwi include more than 100,000 members. They will manage the land collectively, setting up a holding company structure and forestry management structure.
The agreement, known as the "Treelords" deal — echoing the very controversial 1992 Sealords deal, which ultimately led the New Zealand Parliament to extinguish all Maori claims to commercial fishing rights — is indeed historic. I would take issue, though, with the article's claim that the Treaty of Waitangi "guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown." That interpretation is consistent with the English version of the Treaty — but not with the Maori version. (The two versions were drafted separately, and the English version is not a translation of the Maori, even though the Maori version was drafted first.)

Here is Article 1 of the Treaty in English:
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.
And here is Article 1 in Maori:
Ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu-te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.
I have bolded the operative terms. The problem is that kawanatanga does not mean "sovereignty"; it means "governance" — a much weaker term. Indeed, it is clear that the Maori did not intend to cede anything resembling sovereignty to the Queen, given that the Maori version of the Treaty does not use the Maori word for "sovereignty," kingitanga, or even the Maori word for "independence," rangatiritanga.

Just as important, the British had to have known that the Maori did not intend to cede sovereignty to the Queen. In 1835, the British and the Maori had signed the Declaration of Independence, in which the British guaranteed that the Maori chiefs would maintain sovereignty over their land. The Declaration made use of all three of the words that are at the heart of the dispute over the Treaty, with the British translating rangatiritanga as "independence," kingitanga as "sovereign power and authority," and kawanatanga as "functions of government." How then could the British have honestly believed a mere five years later — with many of the same British officials present at the signing of both documents — that Article 1's use of the term kawanatanga, as opposed to kingitanga, meant that the Maori were giving up their sovereignty?

Regardless, the question is now moot — New Zealand courts have long since given up trying to determine the "true" meaning of the Treaty. Now they — and the Waitangi Tribunal, which makes recommendations to the government concerning Maori grievances — simply apply the so-called "Treaty Principles":
The principle of government or the kawanatanga principle

Article 1 gives expression to the right of the Crown to make laws and its obligation to govern in accordance with constitutional process. This sovereignty is qualified by the promise to accord the Māori interests specified in article 2 an appropriate priority. This principle describes the balance between articles 1 and 2: the exchange of sovereignty by the Māori people for the protection of the Crown. It was emphasised in the context of this principle that ‘the Government has the right to govern and make laws’.

The principle of self-management (the rangatiratanga principle)

Article 2 guarantees to Māori hapū (tribes) the control and enjoyment of those resources and taonga that it is their wish to retain. The preservation of a resource base, restoration of tribal self-management, and the active protection of taonga, both material and cultural, are necessary elements of the Crown’s policy of recognising rangatiratanga. The Government also recognised the Court of Appeal’s description of active protection, but identified the key concept of this principle as a right for iwi to organise as iwi and, under the law, to control the resources they own.

The principle of equality

Article 3 constitutes a guarantee of legal equality between Māori and other citizens of New Zealand. This means that all New Zealand citizens are equal before the law. Furthermore, the common law system is selected by the Treaty as the basis for that equality, although human rights accepted under international law are also incorporated. Article 3 has an important social significance in the implicit assurance that social rights would be enjoyed equally by Māori with all New Zealand citizens of whatever origin. Special measures to attain that equal enjoyment of social benefits are allowed by international law.

The principle of reasonable cooperation

The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a fair basis for two peoples in one country. Duality and unity are both significant. Duality implies distinctive cultural development while unity implies common purpose and community. The relationship between community and distinctive development is governed by the requirement of cooperation, which is an obligation placed on both parties by the Treaty. Reasonable cooperation can only take place if there consultation on major issues of common concern and if good faith, balance, and common sense are shown on all sides. The outcome of reasonable cooperation will be partnership.

The principle of redress

The Crown accepts a responsibility to provide a process for the resolution of grievances arising from the Treaty. This process may involve courts, the Waitangi Tribunal, or direct negotiation. The provision of redress, where entitlement is established, must take account of its practical impact and of the need to avoid the creation of fresh injustice. If the Crown demonstrates commitment to this process of redress, it will expect reconciliation to result.
The Treaty Principles are important, and they do occasionally protect Maori interests. But their importance cannot obscure the fact that the Treaty itself still has no formal legal status in New Zealand, making Maori interests subject to the whims of Parliament. And that's no accident: taking the Treaty seriously would mean taking the Maori version of the Treaty seriously — and taking the Maori version seriously would mean that deals like Treelord would be the very tiny tip of a very large iceberg.

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

World Attitudes Toward Torture
WorldPublicOpinion.org has released an interesting survey of world attitudes toward torture. Here is the summary of their findings:
A WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 19 nations finds that in 14 of them most people favor an unequivocal rule against torture, even in the case of terrorists who have information that could save innocent lives. Four nations lean toward favoring an exception in the case of terrorists.

However, large majorities in all 19 nations favor a general prohibition against torture. In all nations polled, the number saying that the government should generally be able to use torture is less than one in five.

On average across all nations polled, 57 percent opt for unequivocal rules against torture. Thirty-five percent favor an exception when innocent lives are at risk. Just 9 percent favor the government being able to use torture in general.

The four publics that favor an exception for terrorists when innocent lives are at risk include majorities in India (59%), Nigeria (54%), and Turkey (51%), and a plurality in Thailand (44%).

Support for the unequivocal position was highest in Spain (82%), Great Britain (82%) and France (82%), followed by Mexico (73%), China (66%), the Palestinian territories (66%), Poland (62%), Indonesia (61%), and the Ukraine (59%). In five countries either modest majorities or pluralities support a ban on all torture: Azerbaijan (54%), Egypt (54%), the United States (53%), Russia (49%), and Iran (43%). South Koreans are divided.

[snip]

The survey presented respondents with an argument in favor of allowing the torture of potential terrorists who threaten civilians: "Terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use some degree of torture if it may gain information that would save innocent lives." In fourteen nations, a majority or plurality rejected this argument in favor of the unequivocal view: "Clear rules against torture should be maintained because any use of torture is immoral and will weaken international human rights standards against torture."
The executive director of the company sees the results as extremely encouraging, but I'm not so sure that his enthusiasm is warranted. Yes, the overall trends are positive. But it's still a little unsettling that nearly 4 out of 10 people world-wide are willing to countenance torture in at least some circumstances, including 44% of Americans, and that nearly 2 out of 10 think it should be generally available to the government. (Who else do they want tortured? Shoplifters?) Even worse, the number of people who accept torture is generally on the rise:
Only India had even a modest plurality favoring an exception for terrorists in 2006. In the current survey three countries (India, Nigeria, and Turkey) have a majority supporting such exceptions, Thailand has a plurality and South Korea is divided.

Four countries included in both surveys show dramatic increases in support for allowing the torture of terrorists: India (from 32% to 59%), Nigeria (39% to 54%), Turkey (24% to 51%), and South Korea (31% to 51%). Substantial increases also occurred in Egypt (25% to 46%) and the United States (36% to 44%).

At the same time there have been equally dramatic increases among those favoring a complete ban on torture. Support has grown substantially in Mexico (rising from 50% to 73%), Spain (65% to 82%), China (49% to 66%), Indonesia (51% to 61%), Britain (72% to 82%), and Russia (43% to 49%).

On average, support for an exception has gone up six points while support for an unequivocal rule has gone up two points. Thus the net increase in favor of an exception is just four points.
As the summary notes, acceptance of torture is affected — unsurprisingly — by the distribution of terrorist attacks. Since the previous poll in 2006, three of the six countries in which acceptance has increased have experienced terrorist attacks (India, Turkey, South Korea) and four of the six in which it has decreased have not (Spain, Britain, Indonesia, and Russia).

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Council of Europe Criticizes Italy; Italy Continues to Persecute Roma
I have blogged recently about the EU's encouraging -- if insufficient -- criticism of Italy's shameful persecution of its Roma population. On Friday, the Council of Europe added its two cents:
Europe's top rights body, the Council of Europe, on Friday voiced "deep concern" at a series of recent attacks against the Roma gypsies and immigrants and their treatment in Italy.

The attacks, the worst of which involved the torching by a local mob last month of a gypsy camp outside Naples have already drawn criticism from the European Union and from rights groups. Copycat attacks followed in other cities.

Police arrested several hundred 'undocumented' immigrants last month in a controversial series of raids on shanty towns across Italy.

"Roma and immigrants have been the subject of violent racist attacks and entire communities have been held responsible for criminal acts committed, or allegedly committed, by individuals from these communities," the Council of Europe's racism and xenophobia monitoring body (ECRI) said in a statement.

"In the context, ECRI particularly regrets the persistent racist and xenophobic discourse by some Italian politicians, even at the highest levels, and in the media," the statement continued.
It is difficult to overstate just how disgusting Italy's actions have become. The most recent plan is to kick Roma out of the country unless they can prove they have homes and jobs:
The new conservative government in Italy, led by prime minister Silvio Berlusconi vowed to clamp down on illegal immigration. Special Roma Gypsy commissioners have been appointed in several of the country's major cities.

Under a planned government decree, EU citizens - which would include Romanian Gypsies - must have adequate housing and regular incomes to stay in Italy for more than three months.

The decree would also make it easier to expel illegal immigrants.

"The Italian authorities are taking measure whose conformity with national and international human rights standards is questionable," said ECRI.

A survey earlier this month by Italian research institute Demos-Coop, showed eight out of ten Italians want Roma Gypsy camps dismantled.

A poll last month by Italian daily La Repubblica found that 68 percent of Italians want to deal with the "Roma Gypsy problem" by expelling all of them.
A few weeks ago, a Romanian Euro MP described Italy's actions as "clearly fascist." I bristled at the use of the word "fascist" at the time, but with each passing day the description becomes more accurate. The "Roma Gypsy problem"? "Special Roma Gypsy Commissioners"? Remind you of anything?

The planned decree is particularly perverse, of course, because Italian politicians are doing everything they can to ensure that the Roma don't have the adequate housing they would need to remain in the country. One example:
Local activists in the northeastern Italian city of Mestre and politicians from the anti-immigrant Northern League are protesting the construction of a settlement for Sinti Gypsies.

Northern League parliamentarian Corrado Callegari and local party councillor Alberto Mazzonetto have blocked access to the camp, preventing building from getting underway.

The protest began more than three weeks ago, when a small group of protesters started gathering daily at the entrance to the building site.

The protesters are demanding a plebiscite on the planned Sinti Gypsy settlement which will include houses and a caravan park. They have also staged protests at local Gypsy camps.

The local council intends to accommodate some 40 Sinti Gypsy families at the site, which will cost 2.8 million euros to build.

The Northern League claims the money should be spent on shelter for homeless Italian citizens from the Mestre-Veneto area who have asked the local council for help. The Sinti Gypsies should not get preferential treatment and must wait their turn to be housed, the Northern League argues.

Bowing to pressure, the mayor of Venice, Massimo Cacciari had halted building work at the planned Sinti Gypsy settlement, but has promised this will soon re-start.
"Preferential treatment"? Are they kidding? Were that it were so!

NOTE: Media descriptions of the Roma's plight in Italy continues to astound and depress me. The final article mentioned above contains this little gem: "The origins of the Sinti Gypsies are uncertain, but they may have come from Pakistan's southeastern Sindh province." So what? What does that have to do with the story, given that the article itself notes that nearly half of Italy's Roma are Italian citizens? Is the point simply to make the Roma seem more Other -- and more dangerous, given that Pakistan is in the scary Middle East?

Monday, June 16, 2008

The ICC Stays Lubanga's Prosecution -- and May Let Him Walk...
In what can only be described as a stunning development, Trial Chamber I has stayed Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's trial because of the Prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. Indeed, the decision seems to indicate that unless the Prosecutor reverses course and agrees to disclose the evidence, the Trial Chamber is prepared to dismiss the charges and allow Lubanga to go free. A hearing on that issue is scheduled for June 24.

The Trial Chamber's decision turns on the interpretation of Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute, which provides as follows:
Duties and powers of the Prosecutor with respect to investigations
[...]
3. The Prosecutor may:
[...]
(e) Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information consents.
During the early stages of his investigation, the Prosecutor entered into dozens of Article 54 agreements with various information providers, including the UN. Because of those agreements, the Prosecutor now finds himself unable to disclose more than 200 potentially-exculpatory documents not only to the defense, but even to the Trial Chamber itself:
64. The prosecution is unable to disclose any of these items of evidence to the accused, in full or in a redacted form. Furthermore, save for a limited number of documents (32) that have been supplied to the Chamber by six unidentified information-providers in redacted form, the prosecution (given the terms of the agreements) is unable to show them to the Chamber. This is because the information-providers do not consent to the judges viewing copies of the original materials (in the majority of instances the Chamber cannot be shown the documents at all), notwithstanding an undertaking which has been given by the judges to uphold the confidential status of the documents or information, unless consent is given by the information-providers for their wider distribution.
In defense of his non-disclosure, the Prosecutor argued that "[d]espite the requirements of Article 54(3)(e) that confidentiality agreements are to be used solely for the purpose of generating new evidence... evidence which it is anticipated may be used during the trial can also be obtained pursuant to Article 54(3)(e)." The Trial Chamber rejected that interpretation of Article 54 in no uncertain terms:
72. The prosecution has given Article 54(3)(e) a broad and incorrect interpretation: it has utilised the provision routinely, in inappropriate circumstances, instead of resorting to it exceptionally, when particular, restrictive circumstances apply. Indeed, the prosecution conceded in open court that agreements reached under Article 54(3) (e) have been used generally to gather information, unconnected with its springboard or lead potential.

[snip]

73. Therefore, although the Chamber does not have the information necessary to analyse the circumstances in which each of the individual documents was supplied to the prosecution, the overall picture is clear: the prosecution's general approach has been to use Article 54(3)(e) to obtain a wide range of materials under the cloak of confidentiality, in order to identify from those materials evidence to be used at trial (having obtained the information provider's consent). This is the exact opposite of the proper use of the provision, which is, exceptionally, to allow the prosecution to receive information or documents which are not for use at trial but which are instead intended to "lead" to new evidence. The prosecution's approach constitutes a wholesale and serious abuse, and a violation of an important provision which was intended to allow the prosecution to receive evidence confidentially, in very restrictive circumstances. The logic of the prosecution's position is that all of the evidence that it obtains from information-providers can be the subject of Article 54(3)(e) agreements.
The Trial Chamber was particularly aggrieved by the Prosecutor's refusal to disclose the confidential information to the bench. As the Chamber pointed out, it — not the Prosecutor — is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the defendant receives a fair trial:
88. Although the prosecution, as a first stage in this procedure, must make the initial decision as to the exculpatory value or effect of any piece of evidence under Article 67(2) ("evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence"), once this threshold is passed and it is accepted that the material has, potentially, an exculpatory effect, only the Chamber can make a decision on non-disclosure if exceptional circumstances so require. If it is proposed that evidence of this kind should be withheld, it is to be put before the judges in its original form and in its entirety. The ultimate responsibility for securing justice and ensuring fairness has been given to the Chamber (Article 64(2) of the Statute) and these responsibilities cannot be delegated by, or removed from, the judges. In this case, the Bench has been prevented from assessing for itself the impact on the fairness of these proceedings should the evidence remain undisclosed,142 and the approach of the prosecution means, inter alia, that for the purposes of Article 67(2), the Chamber could never, "in case of doubt", make a decision (because it will be unable to view the underlying material).
The Trial Chamber thus held — reluctantly, because it knows that its decision may well lead to Lubanga's release — that it had no other choice but to stay the proceedings:
91. This is an international criminal court, with the sole purpose of trying those charged with the "most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" and the judges are enjoined, in discharging this important role, to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial. If, at the outset, it is clear that the essential preconditions of a fair trial are missing and there is no sufficient indication that this will be resolved during the trial process, it is necessary - indeed, inevitable - that the proceedings should be stayed. It would be wholly wrong for a criminal court to begin, or to continue, a trial once it has become clear that the inevitable conclusion in the final judgment will be that the proceedings are vitiated because of unfairness which will not be rectified. In this instance, in its filing of 9 June 2008, the prosecution went no further than raising the possibility that the Chamber may be provided at some stage in the future with no more than incomplete and insufficient materials. There is, therefore, no prospect, on the information before the Chamber, that the present deficiencies will be corrected.
As mentioned above, a hearing on the consequences of the Prosecutor's failure to disclose the exculpatory evidence is scheduled for June 24. The Prosecutor has two choices: disclose the evidence or face the very real possibility that Lubanga will go free.

This is clearly a landmark decision. It would obviously be a tragedy if Lubanga was released — but there was no way that the Trial Chamber could approve of the Prosecutor's woefully overbroad use of Article 54, given the vast amount of exculpatory evidence that would thereby have gone undisclosed. The Prosecutor's decision to use Article 54 in that way is a mystery, as is his decision to promise the information providers that he would not even disclose the confidential information to the Trial Chamber. Given today's decision, I doubt he will make either mistake again.

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Israeli Supreme Court Upholds Unlawful Combatants Law
As our Boumediene instant symposium gets underway, I thought it might be interesting to note that the Israeli Supreme Court has just upheld the Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, which permits the indefinite detention of a person who does not qualify for POW status and "who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel or is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel." From Ha'aretz:
The Supreme Court yesterday upheld the constitutionality of the law allowing for the detention of "unlawful combatants," which Israel uses to hold Hezbollah fighters.

Supreme Court President Dorit Beinisch and Justices Edmond Levy and Ayala Procaccia rejected an appeal by two Gazan Palestinians who were detained after their involvement in terror activity on behalf of Hezbollah was proved.

The Unlawful Combatants Law authorizes the state to detain foreign nationals who belong to terror organizations or have participated directly or indirectly in hostile actions against the State of Israel.

Its goal is to prevent their continued activities.

Beinisch wrote in the verdict that although the law involves substantial harm and the suppression of personal freedom through administrative detention, the harm is proportional.

She noted that it was passed in a "harsh security reality" that justifies the violation of to personal freedom.

"The law's harm to the constitutional right to personal freedom, although substantial, is no greater than necessary," Beinisch wrote.

"Therefore, we have concluded that the law meets the criteria of the limitations ruling and there is no constitutional grounds to intervene in it."
The Unlawful Combatants Law requires a District Court to determine every six months whether a prisoner's release "will not harm State security" or whether "there are special grounds justifying his release"; the court's decision can then be appealed to a single judge of the Supreme Court for review. Scholars question, however, whether the Law's review procedures adequately protect prisoners' rights. Here is what Ron Dudai of SOAS had to say two years ago, when the Israeli Supreme Court first upheld the detention of "unlawful combatants":
Yet how powerful can this judicial review be? Not only does the Illegal Combatants law create a new category not recognized in international law, it reverses the burden of proof. Once an order is signed by the Chief of Staff, the burden of proof is on the defendant: he has to prove to the court that he is not an enemy combatant. Moreover, he is expected do this when the charge against him is based solely on classified evidence, which he is barred from examining and is therefore unable to challenge. One of the defendants told the court he was arrested in his house, for no reason, and added that if he were exposed to the evidence against him he would be able to respond. But that, of course, did not happen. After the defense lawyers argued their case, they and their clients had to exit the courtroom, leaving the security services’ representatives to reveal their secret evidence to the judge.
Food for comparative thought.

Wednesday, June 11, 2008

Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission Comes to the United States
For the first time, a truth and reconciliation commission has picked up stakes and moved to a foreign country to take public testimony: The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission began its first extraterritorial session in St. Paul Minnesota this week.

The Star Tribune has the full story here. One remarkable aspect of the story is the size of the Liberian expat community in the twin cities, and what it says about how the international becomes local -- and vice versa:

Minnesota is home to about 30,000 Liberians. It is one of the largest Liberian communities in the nation, and most have never told their stories publicly, said Jennifer Presthold, deputy director of the Minneapolis-based Advocates for Human Rights. The organization, which does work around the globe, has been a partner of the truth commission, sending dozens of Minnesota attorneys into the community here and nationally to take written testimony about Liberians' war trauma and its effects years later.


We can add the ability to travel to take testimony in foreign countries to the list of distinctions between TRCs and national prosecutions for war-time atrocities. It would also appear to have at least one important advantage over prosecutions in that it permits the participation of victims who are too traumatized to ever be able to return to their home country and/or groups that are too long exiled to be considered active participants in politics back home.

For those in the St. Paul area who are interested, the public hearings are taking place at Hamline University (full press release here):

The hearings will take place Tuesday, June 10 through Saturday, June 14 from 9:30 a.m.-5:30 p.m. (CST) in Sundin Music Hall, located at 1536 Hewitt Avenue on Hamline University’s Saint Paul campus. The hearings are free, and the public is welcome to sit in and observe the proceedings.

Tuesday, June 10, 2008

GITMO Interrogators Instructed to Destroy Notes
First the judge who felt "badgered, beaten, and bruised" by prosecutors for trying to protect Khadr's rights was removed from the case "for personnel reasons." Now it turns out that Khadr's interrogators were "instructed" -- read: ordered -- to destroy their notes, lest anyone ever find out that Khadr had been tortured or mistreated:
Navy Lieutenant Commander Bill Kuebler said in a statement sent to reporters he considers the notes crucial to the defense of his client, Canadian Omar Khadr, during his upcoming murder trial by a special military tribunal at the US naval base.

Kuebler said the instructions were handed down to interrogators from the US Department of Defense as part of a standard operating procedure or "SOP" directive that he obtained from prosecutors last week.

If they were carried out, US interrogators may have "routinely destroyed evidence" that might have been used to defend the Khadr and other detainees, Kuebler charged.

"If handwritten notes were destroyed in accordance with the SOP, the government intentionally deprived Omar's lawyers of key evidence with which to challenge the reliability" of alleged confessions made to military interrogators, Kuebler said.

He cited in particular one passage of the directive to military interrogators stating that "this mission has legal and political issues that may lead to interrogators being called to testify."

"Keeping the number of documents with interrogation information to a minimum can minimize certain legal issues," the policy statement said, according to Kuebler.
Yes, it certainly can. So can suborning perjury and fabricating evidence -- but that doesn't make them good ideas.

Can we please stop pretending that the (un)fairness of military commissions is still open to rational debate?

Monday, June 9, 2008

Roma Protest their Mistreatment
In an important first, Roma gathered in Rome on Sunday to protest their continued harrassment and persecution at the hands of the Italian government:
The first national demonstration of Gypsies brought hundreds of people to the capital Sunday to protest recent episodes of racism in Italy that have targeted Roma and Sinti people, as they prefer to be called.

"We're being used as scapegoats" to gain political advantage, said Stoyanovic Vojislav, a Serbian Roma and one of the organizers of the colorful demonstration, which involved about a dozen organizations.

Roma communities and illegal immigrants are increasingly blamed for rising crime in Italy, although statistics do not reflect a marked change over previous years.

The demonstration, Vojislav said, will make Italians understand "that the Roma are very different from how we are depicted" in the media and by some center-right politicians. More than half of the estimated 160,000 Roma in this country are Italian citizens, while most of the remainder are from Romania - since 2007 part of the European Union - or from the former Yugoslavia. But they are usually treated as foreigners.

"This is the first time in six centuries that we are demanding our rights," said Santino Spinelli, another organizer, who is a popular Gypsy musician and a professor of Roma culture at the University of Trieste. "We are demanding to be integrated because we are citizens like any others."

[snip]

Silvio Berlusconi's center-right government has promised tough legislation that would allow the police to shut down unauthorized Roma camps. The government also wants to carry out a census of people living in the camps. Interior Minister Roberto Maroni said last week that the issue of the Roma camps would be resolved by the end of the year.

Many of the demonstrators on Sunday wore black triangles, like those that the Nazis forced the Roma to wear in concentration camps.

"Today is a great day for the Rom," said Gina, a Roma from Romania who did not want to give her last name. "Remember that if you forget history, it can repeat itself."
The protest came two days after Italian authorities forcibly destroyed a Roma camp containing 120 people, including 40 children. Most of the camp's occupants were Italian citizens who had been transferred there -- with a promise of a decent living situation, no less -- after their previous camp had also been dismantled. They are obviously still waiting.

A final thought: it's revealing -- but not surprising -- that the article calls the protesters "Gypsies" while noting, in the very first paragraph, that they prefer to be called Roma. I somehow doubt that the International Herald Tribune would be so dismissive of other minority groups' preferred appellations.

Thursday, June 5, 2008

New Blog on the European Convention on Human Rights
Dr. Antoine Buyse of the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM), Utrecht University, has started a new blog on the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Posts are on topics as diverse as the use of separate opinions by the European Court of Human Rights, a review of a case on whether envrionment-friendly wind turbines are a nuisance (thus showing potentially novel conflict between human rights law and environmental policy), recent cases concerning disappearances in Chechnya, and the implementation of judgments.

This looks like it will be a great resource for anyone interested in human rights, international courts, and/or comparative law.

Welcome to the blogosphere!

Tuesday, June 3, 2008

ICTR Refuses to Transfer Munyakazi to Rwanda
Last month, I noted that the ICTR Prosecutor had "disowned" Human Rights Watch for daring to criticize his request to refer Yusuf Munyakazi to Rwanda for trial. I guess he'll now have to disown Trial Chamber III, as well, because on Monday it agreed with HRW and rejected the referral:
Chances of genocide suspect and former Rwandan Interhamwe militia leader Yussuf Munyakazi of being tried on home ground were diminished on Wednesday when the United Nations war crimes tribunal rebuffed opposition application to hold the trial in the small east African state.

Mr Munyakazi is facing charges of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in which UN estimates show that over 800,000 people, mostly ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus were allegedly murdered by his armed forces between April and July.

The 73 year-old former farmer and businessman was arrested in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2004, prior to being brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

He allegedly masterminded and in some instances, actually participated in the killing of the Tutsis who had sought sanctuary in numerous churches in Rwanda’s Bugarame commune.
The Trial Chamber's decision is comprehensive and well-reasoned. National referrals are governed by Rule 11bis, which provides in relevant part that "[i]n determining whether to refer the case... the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out."

The Trial Chamber began by noting that Rwanda had, in fact, abolished the death penalty. It pointed out, however, that defendants convicted in Rwandan courts of torture, murder, genocide, and crimes against humanity will be sentenced to life imprisonment "with special conditions" — namely, life imprisonment in permanent isolation from other prisoners. Such punishment, the Trial Chamber held, was inconsistent with international standards for detention, which require imprisonment in isolation to be an exceptional punishment "applicable only where necessary and proportionate" and to be imposed with numerous procedural safeguards, such as periodic judicial review to determine whether isolation remains necessary. Those safeguards are completely absent from Rwandan law.

Although the isolation ground would likely have been enough to deny the referral, the Trial Chamber offered two additional grounds for denying it:
  • One judge would have presided over Munyakazi's trial, making the court particularly susceptible to political pressure from the Rwandan government — which has a long history of undermining the independence of the judiciary. (A panel of three judges, the Trial Chamber noted, would likely satisfy Rule 11bis. At present, however, Rwandan law does not provide for such panels.)

  • The Rwandan government has consistently harassed, arrested, detained, and sometimes even killed witnesses for the defense, making it unlikely that Munyakazi would have the ability to secure and examine witnesses "under the same conditions as witnesses against him," a right guaranteed by Article 20 of the ICTR Statute. Moreover, the Trial Chamber noted that the Rwandan government has done nothing to help defendants in Rwandan courts obtain witnesses who are located outside of Rwanda.
The Trial Chamber's decision obviously represents a significant setback for the ICTR's completion strategy. Rwanda will now have to make additional, and likely time-consuming, changes to its criminal-justice system if it wants to receive the 17 suspects the ICTR intends to transfer. That said, the decision will no doubt help legitimize the completion strategy itself, which many have criticized — including an ICTR appellate judge — as being far less concerned with fairness to defendants than with dissolving the ICTR as quickly and cheaply as possible. At the administrative level, those criticisms may still hold. Fortunately, at least for now, the Trial Chamber seems disinclined to play along.

Wednesday, May 28, 2008

Learning from the Legacy of Telford Taylor
We all know the adage that those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it. In a recent op-ed, Mark Shulman of Pace Law School shows how if only the Bush Administration had remembered history, they may have repeated it.

Shulman, who besides being a lawyer also has a doctorate in history and a particular expertise in military history, explains how the legacy of Telford Taylor, one of the Nuremberg prosecutors, could have been a guide to avoid the pitfalls of the current administration’s detention and interrogation policies.

The op-ed was published on May 23rd, the tenth anniversary of Taylor’s death. Shulman reminds us that Taylor used humane methods when interrogating Nazis prior to the trial. But, more than that, Shulman also highlights how Taylor's experiences at Nuremberg informed his ongoing legal career and his devotion to the rule of law:
Having spent the 1940s witnessing the effects of a government that held itself above the law, Taylor dedicated the remainder of his long life to ensuring a robust rule of law, evenly applied.

During the McCarthy era, he defended the First Amendment rights of Communists. In the 1960s he appeared before hostile Southern courts to defend the Freedom Riders from persecution. In 1970 he decried both North Vietnam's heinous treatment of POWs and the indiscriminate U.S. bombing campaigns.

He wrote, "The laws of war do not apply only to the suspected criminals of vanquished nations. There is no moral or legal basis for immunizing victorious nations from scrutiny. The laws of war are not a one-way street."

Throughout his career, Taylor promoted a strong America guided by wise policies and robust institutions. His final report from Nuremberg concluded: "By prudent military preparedness, by unflagging efforts to lay the groundwork for international society and the rule of law among nations, and by constant improvement in the economic and social foundations of our own democracy, we may hope at one and the same time to undermine these destructive and tyrannical forces and obviate the necessity for a victory by force of arms."
Contrast Taylor's words and actions with those of so many senior adminsitration lawyers. And then imagine if history had, in one small way, repeated itself: if the War on Terror had actually inspired in the the current administration an increased commitment to the rule of law, both domestic and international. But unfortunately that is an alternate history to our own.

Shulman’s whole essay is well worth the read. Especially by those who do (or hope to) wield power.