Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Friday, May 2, 2008

The Role of Precedent at the WTO
Earlier this week the WTO Appellate Body clarified the role of legal precedent in WTO jurisprudence. The background to the discussion was a WTO panel’s refusal to follow a previous Appellate Body decision because the panel viewed the previous Appellate Body decision as failing to accord proper deference to permissible Member State interpretations. The details of the panel decision are here. I have written about judicial overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body and basically agreed with the lower panel’s legal reasoning on deference to permissible interpretations of Member States in the AD/CVD context.

Well, the Appellate Body in Stainless Steel (Mexico) did not take kindly to the panel’s refusal to follow the previous Appellate Body report and issued the following smack down:

158. It is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does not mean that subsequent panels are free to disregard the legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports that have been adopted by the DSB….

160. Dispute settlement practice demonstrates that WTO Members attach significance to reasoning provided in previous panel and Appellate Body reports. Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often cited by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In addition, when enacting or modifying laws and national regulations pertaining to international trade matters, WTO Members take into account the legal interpretation of the covered agreements developed in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. Thus, the legal interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports becomes part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute settlement system. Ensuring "security and predictability" in the dispute settlement system … implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.

161. In the hierarchical structure contemplated in the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body have distinct roles to play…. The Panel's failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues undermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence clarifying Members' rights and obligations under the covered agreements as contemplated under the DSU….

162. We are deeply concerned about the Panel's decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues. The Panel's approach has serious implications for the proper functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system ….

Did you catch all of that? WTO Appellate Body decisions are not binding, but they must be followed. Unless, that is, there are cogent reasons not to follow them. But then if you don’t follow them because you think you do have cogent reasons (i.e., the standard of review in the treaty was ignored by the previous Appellate Body report), then the Appellate Body will be deeply concerned.

The role of precedent has always been difficult with respect to international courts and tribunals. But I read the Appellate Body in Stainless Steel (Mexico) as essentially requiring panels to follow Appellate Body decisions and treat them as legal precedent. You can't call it legal precedent, but it is. As one anonymous commenter put it in this post, the message from the Appellate Body to panels is the following:


You really, really should follow prior Appellate Body decisions. It would be quite bad for the system if you do not. But if you've got what you think are compelling reasons for not doing so, we understand if you feel you have to go your own way. Bearing in mind, of course, that if you do, we will almost certainly reverse you on appeal. You may think your reasons are pretty good, but if they were really that persuasive we would have gone that way ourselves, hence they are not, in fact, "cogent".

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

Aftermath of the NAFTA Lumber Wars: More Litigation
Longtime readers may recall my previous obsession with the seemingly endless Lumber Wars between Canada and the U.S. over Canadian timber subsidies and U.S. tariffs punishing such subsidies. The dispute threatened NAFTA, or at least Chapter 19 of NAFTA, because of the U.S. lumber industry's lawsuit to declare that chapter unconstitutional.

Now it turns out that the deal to end the lumber wars is itself provoking litigation. As Roger noted in a previous post, the deal was itself highly unusual and outside of the NAFTA system. As this article points out, there are big questions about the $1 billion the U.S. government retained in the deal.


Is it an illegal $1 billion slush fund for Bush administration friends in the timber industry, extorted from Canada and designed to evade congressional oversight?

Or is it a fairly negotiated end to an expensive trade war that's "the best thing that has happened to private forest land conservation in the United States in 100 years?"

It depends on your point of view. Now, a federal lawsuit filed in Seattle is bringing more scrutiny to the controversial deal. Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., is spearheading a Senate effort to get more information about who got the money and what they're doing with it.



Sounds like a neat case. If anyone has a copy of the complaint, I would be happy to post it online here.
When Does Application of the Warsaw Convention End and State Tort Law Begin?
Last week a Florida state court rendered an interesting decision on the scope of application of the Warsaw Convention. The court recognized that state tort law is preempted by the Warsaw Convention, but the critical question in Bowe v. Worldwide Flight Services was at what point in exiting a plane does the application of the treaty end and state tort law begin.


The plaintiffs in this case allege they were injured as a result of an accident that occurred on an up escalator as they exited an area the parties describe as a “bus depot,” located one level below Main Concourse E at the airport, when Mrs. Ferguson, Mrs. Deleveaux's eighty-eight-year-old mother, apparently fell backward onto both Ms. Bowe and Mrs. Deleveaux, resulting in all three suffering personal injuries. The complaint alleges the defendants were negligent by failing to fulfill a request for wheelchair assistance made for Mrs. Ferguson, which caused the plaintiffs to fend for themselves and hence, the escalator accident.

The record reflects the accident in this case occurred on July 29, 2001. Ms. Bowe, Mrs. Deleveaux, and Mrs. Ferguson had just arrived in Miami on an American Eagle commuter aircraft from Nassau. The aircraft arrived at a freestanding building, separate from the main concourse. In accordance with practice for aircraft arriving at that location, Ms. Bowe, Mrs. Deleveaux, and Mrs. Ferguson departed the aircraft and boarded an American Airlines bus for the short trip to the main terminal. The bus brought them to the bus depot. Although it appears from the record the bus depot is served by two escalators and an elevator, at best the record is murky concerning ingress, egress, and the extent to which the general passenger populace on the concourses is free to enter the depot area….

The preemptive effect of the Convention on local law extends no further than the Convention's own substantive scope. In this regard, it is clear from the text of the Convention it applies only to a “carrier.” Warsaw Convention, art. 17. In addition, the Convention applies only to injuries occurring either on board an aircraft or “in the course of any operations of embarking or disembarking.” Warsaw Convention, art. 17. These requirements constitute the initial inquiries we must make to determine whether the Convention is applicable to the claims being made and those we must consider here….

The Warsaw Convention also does not define or elucidate upon the phrase “operations of embarking or disembarking.” See Warsaw Convention, art. 17. However, it is clear the term does not automatically exclude events transpiring, as is the case here, within an airline terminal building. Rather than impose location-based or other rigid criteria to delimit these periods of liability under the Warsaw Convention, courts employ a three-prong test or guide to determine whether a passenger is entitled to seek the benefits of the Convention by considering: (1) the passenger's activity at the time of the accident; (2) the passenger's whereabouts at the time of the accident; and (3) the amount of control being exercised by the carrier at the time of the injury. In addition, when considering these factors, these same courts have made clear that no single factor is dispositive. Instead, “the three factors form a ‘single, unitary [analytical] base.'"

That three-part test poses difficult questions as to when the application of the treaty ends and state law begins. Depending on what the passenger is doing, where they are doing it, and whether they are “controlled” by the carrier, the Warsaw Convention applies. The key idea is that there is a point in every flight of every passenger that he or she ceases to “disembark” from flight. At that exact moment state tort law applies. But before that moment, the Warsaw Convention applies and preempts contrary state law. So where should that line be? At the airplane door, the terminal gate, the baggage carousel, or perhaps the airport parking lot?

Incidentally, the court in Bowe makes no mention of Medellin and whether the Warsaw Convention should still be interpreted as a self-executing treaty in light of Medellin. Supreme Court precedent indicates that the Warsaw Convention is self-executing, but the preemption analysis in the Supreme Court’s decision in El Al Israel v. Tseng offers a useful comparison to the self-executing analysis in Medellin. In El Al Israel, the Court ruled that a “home-centered preemption analysis … should not be applied, mechanically, in construing our international obligations” and that the “text, drafting history, and underlying purpose of the Convention” should be examined to determine whether a treaty preempts state law. The Court also looked extensively to the interpretations given to the treaty in the “opinions of sister signatories.” Medellin, by contrast, focused primarily on text and the interpretion of the United States, which it said is entitled to great weight. As we try to make sense of Medellin, it would be useful to analyze why the Court ruled that the Warsaw Convention is self-executing in El Al Israel, but that in Medellin it ruled that Article 94 of the U.N. Charter is not.


Monday, April 28, 2008

Bellinger on the United States and the ICC
I think there is more to Bellinger’s speech on the United States and the ICC than Julian suggests. Let me just summarize the best parts of the speech. First, Bellinger emphasizes that the ICC is not a partisan issue:

A relatively straight line runs from the positions on the ICC taken by our Congress in 1990, to those of U.S. negotiators in Rome, to President Clinton’s decision not to seek Senate ratification of the Rome Statute and to recommend the same to his successor, and to the current position of the Bush Administration.

Second, Bellinger argues that this position is not likely to change with the next Administration:

Even if a future President were to advocate U.S. accession to the Rome Statute, he or she could very well face a skeptical reaction in the U.S. Senate. It’s worth bearing in mind that the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act – legislation that was not sought by the Bush Administration and that includes a range of restrictions on U.S. support for the ICC – passed the Senate in 2002 by a vote of 75-19, including the affirmative votes of Senators Clinton and McCain, as well as those of the current Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, Senators Reid and McConnell.

Third, if we accept that the United States will remain outside the ICC for the forseeable future, what should be the response? Bellinger has the following suggestion:

The core concerns of the United States about the Rome Statute have not been resolved during the past decade, and are unlikely to be resolved in the next decade, unless the Statute is changed. Accordingly, as we look forward, the United States will very likely remain outside the Rome Statute regime. This is a reality that ICC supporters should accept. Agreeing to disagree about the ICC is the essential first step toward developing a more mature and productive relationship that can effectively advance our shared goal of promoting international criminal justice. This will involve seizing opportunities for cooperative efforts where they exist and avoiding pitfalls that risk reigniting past tensions. We should be guided in our efforts by the premise that the ends we seek are far more important than the means by which we seek them. The United States and ICC supporters can do more to prevent impunity for serious crimes by working together than either can achieve on their own, and it is in our mutual interest to develop a relationship that recognizes this.

Finally, as for concrete ways that the United States and the ICC can work together in a cooperative manner, Bellinger mentions Darfur, the Security Council, and the Rome Statute review conference on a crime of aggression:

It is important that we put aside our differences on these issues because the next decade poses challenges that will require our collective efforts as well as pitfalls that risk further inflaming tensions over ICC issues. Let me now discuss a few issues that I think will shape the relationship between the United States and the ICC in the coming years.

A first area relates to the response to large scale and horrific crimes in Darfur. Absent a decision by the ICC to pursue an investigation or prosecution against a U.S. person, the outcome of the ICC’s Darfur work is likely to do more than any other factor in the near term to shape U.S. perceptions of the role and impact of the ICC…. Darfur is … a good example of an area where, with respect and goodwill on all sides, there may be opportunities for constructive cooperation….

A second more general area that will shape U.S. views and policy toward the ICC in the coming years will be the impact of the ICC’s work on the UN Security Council…. Now that the ICC is a reality, it will be important to the United States to ensure that the work of the ICC complements the work of the Council to maintain international peace and security…. As the ICC proceeds to investigate and prosecute cases under the Rome Statute, the Security Council must be prepared to act if and when necessary to ensure harmony between the ICC’s work and the Council’s broader efforts....

A final area that will shape U.S. views and policy toward the ICC is the outcome of the upcoming Rome Statute review conference, now scheduled for 2010. If Rome Statute parties were interested in trying to address the core U.S. concerns about the ICC, the Review Conference could provide an opportunity to do so. These issues aside, a principal focus of work of the conference will likely relate to proposals to define a crime of aggression over which the ICC could exercise jurisdiction…. Efforts to design an aggression regime for the ICC will also need to address the regime’s applicability to countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute. As I have noted, a core principle of our ICC policy is that, as we acknowledge the decisions of other states to join the Rome Statute and to submit to its jurisdiction, we ask that other states accept our decision not to do so. In this context, should Rome Statute parties seek to make an aggression regime they adopt applicable to non-parties, they will almost certainly provoke a serious new crisis in the ICC’s relationship with a new U.S. Administration.

I’m not sure whether this constitutes new rhetoric or not, but I like the notion that if the United States is not joining the ICC anytime soon, then we should move toward accepting that political reality and find ways to cooperate on areas where the United States and the ICC share common interests. I particularly think that developing a framework for a crime of aggression must be done with the close cooperation of the United States. As a practical matter the world has almost no other major defense force to support the cause of international peace and security. To think that our allies in the ICC would dictate to the United States how it will use those resources without input from the United States is a serious mistake.