Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Wednesday, April 2, 2008

The Use of Statutory Construction in Defining Torture
Here is a key excerpt from pages 36-39 of the March 2003 "Torture" Memorandum:


Section 2340 defines the act of torture as an: act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control....

The key statutory phrase in the definition of torture is the statement that acts amount to torture if they cause "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." In examining the meaning of a statute, its text must be the starting point. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984). Section 2340 makes plain that the infliction of pain or suffering per se, whether it is physical or mental, is insufficient to amount to torture. Instead, the pain or suffering must be "severe." The statute does not, however, define the term "severe." "In the absence of such a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). The dictionary defines "severe" as "[u]nsparing in exaction, punishment, or censure" or "[I]nflicting discomfort or pain hard to endure; sharp; afflictive; distressing; violent; extreme; as severe pain, anguish, torture." Webster's New International Dictionary 2295 (2d ed. 1935); see American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1653 (3d ed. 1992) ("extremely violent or grievous: severe pain") (emphasis in original); IX The Oxford English Dictionary 572(1978) ("Of pain, suffering, loss, or the like: Grievous, extreme" and "of circumstances ...: hard to sustain or endure"). Thus, the adjective "severe" conveys that the pain or suffering must be of such a high level of intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure.

Congress's use of the phrase "severe pain" elsewhere in the U. S. Code can shed more light on its meaning. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) ("[W]e construe [a statutory term] to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and, comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.). Significantly, the phrase "severe pain" appears in statutes defining an emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health benefits. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000); 42 U.S.C § l395w-22 (2000); id. § 1395x (2000); id. § 1395dd (2000); id § 1396b (2000); id § 1396u-2 (2000). These statutes define an emergency condition as one "manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that a prudent lay person, who possesses an average knowledge of health and medicine, could reasonably expect the absence of 'immediate medical attention to result in-placing the health of the individual ... (i) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." Id. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Although these statutes address a substantially different subject from section 2340, they are nonetheless helpful for understanding what constitutes severe physical pain. They treat severe pain as an indicator of ailments that are, likely to result in permanent and serious physical damage in the absence of immediate medical treatment. Such damage must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the permanent, impairment of a significant body function. These statutes suggest that to constitute torture "severe pain" must rise to a similarly high level-the level that would ordinarily be associated with a physical condition or injury sufficiently serious that it would result in death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions.


If there was one principal complaint about the torture memos, it would be about statutory construction. When critics ridicule the memos for equating torture with organ failure, they are doing so because they disagree with how the statute was interpreted.

So let's look at the use of statutory construction in defining torture, and especially the phrase "severe pain." It is worth noting that the memo relied on only two rules of statutory construction to define "severe pain." First it focused on plain meaning and cited dictionary definitions. Second, it used the rule of in pari materia, which says that when a statute is ambiguous its meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on the same subject. Much of the criticism has been on the misuse of the second rule, arguing that a statute about health benefits is not on the same subject as a statute about torture.

But little has been said of other rules of statutory construction that were ignored. I think it would be worthwhile to open up discussion and identify other rules of statutory construction that could (and arguably should) have been used in the torture analysis. Legislative intent is one obvious rule of construction. Avoidance of an unconstitutional interpretation is another. The Charming Betsy doctrine that would require the statute to be read consistent with international law is yet another. A fourth might be judicial interpretations (at home and abroad) of the Convention Against Torture. Previous interpretations of the statute would be a fifth. The rule of ejusdem generis is a sixth, which would have led to an interpretation of "severe" that could apply to both physical and mental pain. Are there others that come readily to mind? For example, is there any room to argue for Chevron deference or other rules of statutory construction?

Monday, March 31, 2008

Researching the Legislative History of U.S. Treaties
Much of the attention on Medellin has (rightly to my mind) focused on the Court’s definition of a non-self-executing treaty and its method for finding the 3 treaties at issue—the VCCR Optional Protocol, the ICJ Statute and Article 94 of the U.N. Charter—to be non-self-executing. Whatever the more general implications of the Court’s method with respect to a presumption for non-self-executing treaties, it’s now very clear that the Court cares about a treaty’s domestic legislative history—i.e., what domestic legal effect the President and the Senate intended or expected the treaty to have. Now, in many instances the President and the Senate may not have had much to say on this question or what they do say may be ambiguous, but on occasion one or both may be quite clear about the treaty's intended domestic operation. In each case, however, the difficulty may well lie in finding the relevant records, if any, of the Executive and/or the Senate's views. Fortunately, there’s a relatively new resource to help with this undertaking. Christian L. Wiktor (who’s earlier Unperfected Treaties series provided an invaluable resource on treaties that never entered into force for the United States) has produced a new volume – Treaties Submitted to the United States Senate; Legislative History 1989-2004 (Brill, 2006). According to the publisher:

The main part is arranged chronologically by the date of conclusion of the treaty. Each treaty contains the following components: it provides general information about the treaty; it lists chronologically steps taken by the Senate during the treaty approval process; legislative implementation, executive action following Senate approval; entry into force, and annotations, such as references to related treaties, amendments, and present status.

The 329 treaties included in the volume can be searched by date of signature, treaty document number, or subject. In addition, there are a series of appendices that allow one to examine which treaties received “en bloc” advice and consent as well as classifications of treaties based on Senate action (i.e., advice and consent without modification, outright rejection, not to mention the multitude of in-between options such as conditioning advice and consent on declarations, reservations, understandings, provisos, etc.). It’s a very useful resource and one that I expect will get increasing use now that the Court has emphasized the importance of legislative history, not just to the justiciability of a treaty, but its very status as law of the United States.