Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Thursday, May 8, 2008

How Do You Interpret the Last-in-Time Rule?
Boring tax case, interesting international law issue. That's how I would summarize Jamieson v. CIR. The issue in Jamieson is what happens if a treaty says one thing, a subsequent statute conflicts with that treaty, and then there is a subsequent treaty change to the conflicting treaty provision, but that amendment does not remove the conflict. Under the last-in-time rule which provision prevails? Here is what the U.S. Tax Court ruled:


In 1986, while the U.S.-Canada Convention was in force, Congress amended the AMT imposed on noncorporate taxpayers by section 55 and added section 59 to the Code.... [Thereafter] the U.S.-Canada Convention was amended.... The revised Protocol Amending the Convention... made changes to Article XXIV affecting credits for Social Security tax, corporate tax exemptions, and the tax treatment of dividends, interest, and royalties,... but did not alter the general rule found in article XXIV, paragraph 1. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Protocol references section 59 [the earlier conflicting statutory provision].

It is well established that, where a statute and a treaty pertain to the same subject matter, they must be read so as to give effect to both if at all possible.... If, however, the statute and the treaty conflict, the last-in-time rule requires that “the last expression of the sovereign will ... [controls].”...

Applying the last-in-time rule, we hold that section 59(a)(2) is the last expression of the sovereign will and that it takes precedence over the U.S.-Canada Convention to the extent there is a conflict between them. [The statute] makes it very clear that Congress intended the limitation of section 59(a)(2) to supersede existing treaty provisions prohibiting double taxation. The U.S.-Canada Convention was one of those treaties. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Protocol contains any provision clearly indicating that Congress's intention to ensure that taxpayers with sufficient means should contribute a minimum amount of tax to the United States had been superseded.

So a treaty provision conflicts with a statute, and then that treaty provision is amended without fixing the conflict. Under the last-in-time rule, although the amended treaty provision came later, the failure to address the conflict means that the earlier conflicting statute controls? That logic seems more than a little curious to me. I wonder what others think.

Monday, May 5, 2008

Medellin Execution Date Set
Jose Ernesto Medellin is scheduled for execution by the state of Texas on August 5, 2008. If one assumes that Executive Branch officials have an interest in trying to find new ways to comply with the Avena decision (an open question I know), that does not leave them much time. From my perspective, the Executive Branch has two, equally unattractive, options.

First, they can try for federal legislation, which the Medellin decision suggests would be the appropriate vehicle for converting the non-self-executing treaty obligations of the UN Charter (or the VCCR Optional Protocol) into judicially enforceable domestic law. Of course, getting Congress to pass such a bill in an election year seems pretty unlikely, especially when one considers the crimes for which Mr. Medellin was convicted (and that's without even trying to figure out what the bill would say). Second, before the Supreme Court's decision, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals had suggested that they'd enforce an Executive Agreement with Mexico "settling" Mexico's claims against the United States even with respect to criminal proceedings such as those involving Mr. Medellin. So perhaps Mexico and the United States could "agree" that Mexico has outstanding claims against the United States for its non-compliance with the Avena decision that will be resolved by providing the named individuals judicial review and reconsideration in U.S. Courts (again, there may be a thorny question of which U.S. courts -- federal or state?) But the Supreme Court's Medellin opinion may have made that option less viable--or at least given the Texas Court cause to reconsider its earlier views--since it took a much narrower view of Executive Power than earlier precedents like Crosby and Garamendi might otherwise have suggested.

Since I know we have a few readers out there who work for the Executive Branch, I'd encourage others to chime in with their views on the options I propose and/or alternative solutions that could lead to Avena compliance in some manner that's consistent with the Court's Medellin decision.
Are Evolving Standards of Decency a One-Way Ratchet?
One of the more intriguing questions from the oral argument in the child rape death penalty case of Kennedy v. Louisiana is whether evolving standards of decency are a one-way ratchet. Here is Justice Stevens' question from the oral argument last month:


[O]ne question that interests me but is a little divorced from the terms of the arguments so far. I know it is not popular to refer to refer to international commentary on issues like this, but the English law lords have filed an amicus brief discussing the international principle that nations that retain the death penalty may not extend the death penalty to crimes to which it does not presently apply. They suggest that as a matter of international law, there's sort of a correspondence to our evolving standards of decency that have generally governed our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. It's kind of a one-way rachet, we look at trends in one direction but we don't look to see if you suddenly have changed gears and go in the other direction. Could you just comment on that argument?... I just use[] that as an analogy to our evolving standards of decency cases which has been part of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, that sort of is a — one way direction in which these cases go. Do you think it's appropriate — are you aware of any case saying we can turn around and go in another direction?

The amicus brief of British Law Lords referenced by Justice Stevens summarizes the one-way ratchet argument succinctly:

International authorities have long agreed that nations that retain the death penalty must refrain from expanding the death penalty to crimes to which it currenlty does not apply--a principle that has been codified in a regional convention and reaffirmed by the jurisprudence of human rights bodies. There is an equally strong global consensus that nations should gradually narrow the categories of offenses for which the death penalty may be imposed.

It is an interesting idea. Note that the role of comparative and international law is not with respect to the content of a particular substantive right but rather the methodology by which standards should evolve. The question posed is not what other countries do with respect to child rape and the death penalty, but rather whether other countries allow for the expansion of the death penalty. Justice Stevens is suggesting that perhaps a living constitution should evolve in the same manner that international law evolves, with the death penalty moving in only one direction toward abolition.

The apparent concern that animates Justice Stevens' question is that the national consensus may be trending toward allowing the death penalty for child rape. If the national consensus is evolving toward a conclusion that this punishment is not cruel and unusual, on what basis can Justice Stevens limit the use of that evolving standard? I seriously doubt that the Court will rely on international or comparative law to embrace a one-way ratchet, but it is worth discussing whether our own jurisprudence would allow for such a limit on the evolving standards of decency.