From 1992 until his election to the U.S. Senate in 2004, Barack Obama served as a professor in the Law School. He was a Lecturer from 1992 to 1996. He was a Senior Lecturer from 1996 to 2004, during which time he taught three courses per year. Senior Lecturers are considered to be members of the Law School faculty and are regarded as professors, although not full-time or tenure-track. The title of Senior Lecturer is distinct from the title of Lecturer, which signifies adjunct status. Like Obama, each of the Law School's Senior Lecturers has high-demand careers in politics or public service, which prevent full-time teaching. Several times during his 12 years as a professor in the Law School, Obama was invited to join the faculty in a full-time tenure-track position, but he declined.Three courses per year is "not full-time"? I teach three courses per year — 9 hours of teaching — and I'm full-time. Academic readers? What's your course load?]]>
[1] Even the most ‘absolutist’ or tyrannical sovereigns have understood themselves to be both responsible and answerable to someone or something –Hitler to future Aryan historians, the Stuarts to God…. Some contemporary thinkers like John Rawls argue that the crucial and sufficient check on political power, both internally and externally, is juridical law: the rule of constitutional or public law domestically, the rule of international law internationally, is sufficient to ensure the just exercise of sovereign power. One of the many things about such positions that I find troubling … is that international law and international institutions are frequently expected to play an overarching political and moral role as political and moral ‘overseers’, one that far exceeds claims made in the name of Christendom by the most … absolutist of Popes.
[2] Augustine has things to say, of course, about the governance of emperors and princes, etc.... His interest lies always, however, with the ‘rightness’ of their rule and not with the mechanics of it. He offers no theory of how to rule because no human model of politics can be normative. The normative model is the City of God. All earthly cities are deficient in their administration of justice…. If we must use the word in the context of Augustine’s theology, the only thing to say is that there is no ‘rightness’ (iustitia) in earthly sovereignty. Robber kings may have disciplines of peace that enable their kingdoms to function cooperatively. The role of the Church is to teach what is and is not praiseworthy against the model of the City of God….
[3] Internal sovereignty does not give states the freedom to act toward their own citizens in whatever way they choose, nor does external sovereignty mean that states abusive toward their own citizens are immune from interference by outside agents. Both forms of independence are challenged by the notions of “sovereignty as responsibility’ and by its corollary, the “responsibility to protect.” These responsibilities also challenge the notion that states have duties only toward the well being of their own citizens. Responsibility reaches across borders.
[4] Responsibility must be taken within a country for the overall discharge of the proper tasks of government in that country …. [But] responsibility [also] must be taken for the overall discharge of the proper tasks of governance in the world at large, including governing relations between the entities that are taking responsibility for discharging the proper tasks of government in each particular country.
[5] Perhaps one of the reasons it is difficult to think of international institutions having attributes of sovereignty is that they rarely impose duties on individuals. It is difficult to render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s if the emperor never asks for anything…. Even the granting of rights is not commonly among the delegated duties assigned to international institutions…. The idea of international institutions “governing over us” by conferring rights does not resonate with the general public…. So if international institutions do not impose duties or guarantee rights, what do they do that is “sovereign”? The answer, if there is one, is that they perform sovereign functions. The best way to think of international institutions is that they are entities that “we the people” through our governments delegate tasks that cannot be achieved without international coordination.
[6] Few would now question the responsibility of governments to their citizens in terms of the basic rights and opportunities…. A government that fails in these purposes lacks legitimacy, and its sovereign authority is clearly at risk from a people whose obedience it can no longer claim as a matter of right. With respect to internal sovereignty, we appear to have gradually returned from the unquestioned sovereignty of Hobbes to the kind of de facto sovereignty that Thomas Aquinas conferred on tyrannical princes. Obedience is due as long as the ruler is oriented to the common good. Where that orientation is lacking, obedience rests on a calculation of relative costs and benefits.
[7] Theories of absolute sovereignty and theories of international law limiting it to the positive agreements or practices of states have supported the unrestricted use of force. The primary scholarly response to such theories has been to argue, in line with Augustine and Aquinas, that all human action must be subject to higher principle. One of the fundamental reasons behind the evolution of legal systems in communities was the desire to subject force, both military and individual, to law. Law exists wherever human beings strive to live together in peace and this is true of the international community as of any national or local community. Certain limited use of force for the enforcement of the law is consistent with a well-functioning legal system; force to promote the ambitions of leaders free of legal restraint is not. Thus, the history of ideas about enforcement in international law is blended with this teaching of restraint on the use of force and the superiority of law to leadership.
Let’s start with the most profound one: More and more, I am convinced that the big foreign policy failure that will be pinned on this administration is not the failure to make Iraq work, as devastating as that has been. It will be one with much broader balance-of-power implications — the failure after 9/11 to put in place an effective energy policy…The second main shift isn’t so much about our self-imposed weakness due to oil consumption, but the rise of other states due to the changes in their societies. Friedman cites to Fareed Zakaria’s new book, The Post-American World:
The failure of Mr. Bush to fully mobilize the most powerful innovation engine in the world — the U.S. economy — to produce a scalable alternative to oil has helped to fuel the rise of a collection of petro-authoritarian states — from Russia to Venezuela to Iran — that are reshaping global politics in their own image.
Mr. Zakaria’s central thesis is that while the U.S. still has many unique assets, “the rise of the rest” — the Chinas, the Indias, the Brazils and even smaller nonstate actors — is creating a world where many other countries are slowly moving up to America’s level of economic clout and self-assertion, in every realm…The third shift, described in David Rothkopf’s book Superclass (see Peter’s take on it here) describes the rise in power of
For too long, argues Zakaria, America has taken its many natural assets — its research universities, free markets and diversity of human talent — and assumed that they will always compensate for our low savings rate or absence of a health care system or any strategic plan to improve our competitiveness.
“That was fine in a world when a lot of other countries were not performing,” argues Zakaria, but now the best of the rest are running fast, working hard, saving well and thinking long term. “They have adopted our lessons and are playing our game,” he said. If we don’t fix our political system and start thinking strategically about how to improve our competitiveness, he added, “the U.S. risks having its unique and advantageous position in the world erode as other countries rise.”
a small group of players — “the superclass” — a new global elite, who are much better suited to operating on the global stage and influencing global outcomes than the vast majority of national political leaders.None of this is especially new. Think of the fears of the rise of OPEC in the 1970's or the discussion of American relative decline in the 1980's (spurred, in part, by the publication of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and more generally by the economic rise of Japan) and even Friedman's own essays on "super-empowered individuals" in the 1990's.
Some of this new elite “are from business and finance,” says Rothkopf. “Some are members of a kind of shadow elite — criminals and terrorists. Some are masters of new or traditional media; some are religious leaders, and a few are top officials of those governments that do have the ability to project their influence globally.”
Name of School; First and Last Name; JD Law School (Year); Advanced Degree Institution (Year); Second Advanced Degree Institution (Year); (Scholarly Specialization)
Pepperdine; Donald ("Trey") Childress; JD Duke (2004); MA Oxford Brookes University (1999); LLM Duke (2004); (International and Comparative Law)
Name of School; First and Last Name; From Law School; JD Law School (Year); Advanced Degree Institution (Year); Second Advanced Degree Institution (Year); (Scholarly Specialization)
Alabama; Ronald Krotoszynski; From Washington & Lee; JD Duke (1991); LLM Duke (1991); (Comparative Law)