Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Thursday, May 15, 2008

John Boonstra on R2P and Burma
I had contemplated weighing in on commentators' unfortunate tendency to equate the Responsibility to Protect doctrine with humanitarian invasion, but John Boonstra at UN Dispatch beat me to it. Here's a snippet:
First, by and large, the R2P doctrine has been misunderstood or misrepresented in calls to "invade" Burma. R2P is often implied to boil down to a simple equation: if a government is unable or unwilling to adequately protect its citizens, then the international community has a right to forcibly intervene to protect these people. The first part of this conditional is accurate, but the second is a gross oversimplification. R2P does not prescribe invasion any more than the Constitution of the United States mandates impeachment. Military intervention is only one component of the R2P framework, and one of last resort, at that; it is only to be undertaken when a series of specific conditions are met, ensuring that intervention is justified, well-intentioned, practical, authorized by the proper authority (i.e., the UN Security Council), and will not cause more harm than good.

Wielding R2P as a Trojan horse for invasion and regime change, as Robert Kaplan seems to desire, is harmful to the integrity and future viability of the concept, as well as to the more pressing concern of alleviating the Burmese people's suffering.
The whole post is well worth a read. It's here.

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Is It Time to Invade Burma? (Is It Time to Invade Georgia?)
The first part of this post's title is also the title of a new article at Time.com. (Note: on CNN.com, they title the article "Time to Invade Myanmar?")

And so begins the latest iteration of the humanitarian intervention debate. After a recap of the situation in Myanmar, the article notes:
...it's hard to imagine a regime this insular and paranoid accepting robust aid from the US military, let alone agreeing to the presence of US Marines on Burmese soil — as Thailand and Indonesia did after the tsunami. The trouble is that the Burmese haven't shown the ability or willingness to deploy the kind of assets needed to deal with a calamity of this scale — and the longer Burma resists offers of help, the more likely it is that the disaster will devolve beyond anyone's control. "We're in 2008, not 1908," says Jan Egeland, the former U.N. emergency relief coordinator. "A lot is at stake here. If we let them get away with murder we may set a very dangerous precedent."

That's why it's time to consider a more serious option: invading Burma. Some observers, including former USAID director Andrew Natsios, have called on the US to unilaterally begin air drops to the Burmese people regardless of what the junta says. The Bush Administration has so far rejected the idea — "I can't imagine us going in without the permission of the Myanmar government," Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday — but it's not without precedent: as Natsios pointed out to the Wall Street Journal, the US has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid without the host government's consent in places like Bosnia and Sudan.
The article concludes that, if current attempts at assistance fail,
"It's important for the rulers to know the world has other options," [Jan Egeland, a former UN emergency reloief coordinator] says. "If there were, say, the threat of a cholera epidemic that could claim hundreds of thousands of lives and the government was incapable of preventing it, then maybe yes — you would intervene unilaterally." But by then, it could be too late. The cold truth is that states rarely undertake military action unless their national interests are at stake; and the world has yet to reach a consensus about when, and under what circumstances, coercive interventions in the name of averting humanitarian disasters are permissible. As the response to the 2004 tsunami proved, the world's capacity for mercy is limitless. But we still haven't figured out when to give war a chance.
I am of two minds when it comes to humanitarian intervention. Cases such as Myanmar may be the less difficult cases--situations where there is a threat of widepread disease or famine (let alone the physical injuries and other forms of suffering caused by the storm) and a government is either incapable or uninterested in actually doing what needs to happen to save its own citizens. I'm not saying that that is an easy case for humanitarian intervention, just that it is not as hard as other examples that are more politically ambiguous, such as intervening because of civil strife or sectarian violence.

Turning such a political decision into a legal rule is fraught with dangers. What do we do if the Russian intervene militarily in Georgia, on the pretext that they are protecting Russian passport holders? What of Turkey's intervention in Northern Cyprus in the 1970's on the argument that it was protecting Turkish Cypriots from violence? As I've written regarding Kosovo, the law of unintended consequences is a mighty force to reckon with.

The people of Myanmar desperately need help and they need it now. Perhaps intervening without the consent of their government will be the necessary and moral thing to do. I don't know enough about the facts on the ground to judge that. But, even if various states do undertake such an action, they should think very carefully about proclaiming the existence of a legal principle favoring humanitarian intervention.




Tuesday, May 6, 2008

How Do You Chip out of a Mortar Hole?
I'm sorry, I just can't let this one go:
Picture, if you will, a tree-lined plaza in Baghdad's International Village, flanked by fashion boutiques, swanky cafes, and shiny glass office towers. Nearby a golf course nestles agreeably, where a chip over the water to the final green is but a prelude to cocktails in the club house and a soothing massage in a luxury hotel, which would not look out of place in Sydney harbour. Then, as twilight falls, a pre-prandial stroll, perhaps, amid the cool of the Tigris Riverfront Park, where the peace is broken only by the soulful cries of egrets fishing.

Improbable though it all may seem, this is how some imaginative types in the US military are envisaging the future of Baghdad's Green Zone, the much-pummelled redoubt of the Iraqi capital where a bunker shot has until now had very different connotations.

A $5bn (£2.5bn) tourism and development scheme for the Green Zone being hatched by the Pentagon and an international investment consortium would give the heavily fortified area on the banks of the Tigris a "dream" makeover that will become a magnet for Iraqis, tourists, business people and investors. About half of the area is now occupied by coalition forces, the US state department or private foreign companies.

The US military released the first tentative artists' impression yesterday. An army source said the barbed wire, concrete blast barriers and checkpoints that currently disfigure the 5 sq mile area would be replaced by shopping malls, hotels, elegant apartment blocks and leisure parks. "This is at the end of the day an Iraqi-owned area and we will give it back to them with added value," said the source, who requested anonymity.

Potential investors are being encouraged to take a punt that years ahead, Baghdad's fortunes may mirror former war-torn cities such as Sarajevo and Beirut that have risen from the ashes.

Marriott International has already signed a deal to build a hotel in the Green Zone, according to Navy Captain Thomas Karnowski, the chief US liaison. Also in the pipeline is a possible $1bn investment from MBI International, a hotel and resorts specialist led by Saudi sheikh, Mohamed Bin Issa Al Jaber.

One Los Angeles-based firm, C3, has said it wants to build an amusement park on the Green Zone's outskirts. As part of the first phase, a skateboard park is due to open this summer.
The best thing about the "artist's rendering" is the complete absence of background. Wonder why that is?

Thursday, May 1, 2008

John Yoo and the Justice Case -- Post at Balkinization
Marty Lederman has kindly published a long post I have written on what — if anything — the Justice Case has to say about the criminal responsibility of government lawyers like Yoo. Here is the introduction:
Scholars who argue that John Yoo’s authorship of the infamous torture memos makes him complicit in various war crimes -– torture, illegal detention, etc. -– almost invariably cite the WWII-era case United States v. Alstoetter, commonly referred to as the Justice Case, for the proposition that a government lawyer can be held criminally responsible for giving erroneous legal advice to his political superiors. Here, for example, is what Scott Horton, an excellent scholar and one of our finest bloggers, has to say:
Can a lawyer at the Department of Justice be criminally liable for giving opinions that lead to the torture and abuse of prisoners in war time? The answer is: Yes. The precedent is United States v. Altstoetter. The sentence handed down was ten years, less time served awaiting trial. It’s a case for John Yoo to study in the period leading up to his inevitable prosecution.
I do not know enough about Yoo’s actions to venture a general opinion about their possible criminality. I do know something, however, about the Justice Case -– I am currently writing a book for Oxford University Press on the jurisprudence of that trial and the eleven other trials held in the American zone of occupation between 1946 and 1949, which are collectively known as the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT). So I thought readers might be interested in a detailed look at what the Justice Case says -– or doesn’t say -– about the culpability of government lawyers who advise their clients that unlawful conduct is, in fact, lawful. The bottom line, in my view, is that as reprehensible as Yoo’s opinions were –- and they were indeed reprehensible -– the case provides far less support for prosecuting him than most scholars assume.
I hope readers will check out the entire post, along with Marty's excellent introduction, in which he discusses his general views on the issue. I completely agree with Marty and hope that readers will not misunderstand my position. I am not saying that nothing John Yoo and the other government lawyers did could ever be considered criminal. I am not saying that the Justice Case rules out the possibility of a future prosecution. Indeed, I can imagine — counterfactually — a situation in which the NMT would have convicted a government lawyer of complicity for giving his political superiors advice he knew full well violated international law. My position is simply that the Justice Case did not involve such a situation and that, as a result, the judgment has almost no precedential value for a future prosecution of Yoo and/or others.

Monday, April 28, 2008

Bellinger on the United States and the ICC
I think there is more to Bellinger’s speech on the United States and the ICC than Julian suggests. Let me just summarize the best parts of the speech. First, Bellinger emphasizes that the ICC is not a partisan issue:

A relatively straight line runs from the positions on the ICC taken by our Congress in 1990, to those of U.S. negotiators in Rome, to President Clinton’s decision not to seek Senate ratification of the Rome Statute and to recommend the same to his successor, and to the current position of the Bush Administration.

Second, Bellinger argues that this position is not likely to change with the next Administration:

Even if a future President were to advocate U.S. accession to the Rome Statute, he or she could very well face a skeptical reaction in the U.S. Senate. It’s worth bearing in mind that the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act – legislation that was not sought by the Bush Administration and that includes a range of restrictions on U.S. support for the ICC – passed the Senate in 2002 by a vote of 75-19, including the affirmative votes of Senators Clinton and McCain, as well as those of the current Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, Senators Reid and McConnell.

Third, if we accept that the United States will remain outside the ICC for the forseeable future, what should be the response? Bellinger has the following suggestion:

The core concerns of the United States about the Rome Statute have not been resolved during the past decade, and are unlikely to be resolved in the next decade, unless the Statute is changed. Accordingly, as we look forward, the United States will very likely remain outside the Rome Statute regime. This is a reality that ICC supporters should accept. Agreeing to disagree about the ICC is the essential first step toward developing a more mature and productive relationship that can effectively advance our shared goal of promoting international criminal justice. This will involve seizing opportunities for cooperative efforts where they exist and avoiding pitfalls that risk reigniting past tensions. We should be guided in our efforts by the premise that the ends we seek are far more important than the means by which we seek them. The United States and ICC supporters can do more to prevent impunity for serious crimes by working together than either can achieve on their own, and it is in our mutual interest to develop a relationship that recognizes this.

Finally, as for concrete ways that the United States and the ICC can work together in a cooperative manner, Bellinger mentions Darfur, the Security Council, and the Rome Statute review conference on a crime of aggression:

It is important that we put aside our differences on these issues because the next decade poses challenges that will require our collective efforts as well as pitfalls that risk further inflaming tensions over ICC issues. Let me now discuss a few issues that I think will shape the relationship between the United States and the ICC in the coming years.

A first area relates to the response to large scale and horrific crimes in Darfur. Absent a decision by the ICC to pursue an investigation or prosecution against a U.S. person, the outcome of the ICC’s Darfur work is likely to do more than any other factor in the near term to shape U.S. perceptions of the role and impact of the ICC…. Darfur is … a good example of an area where, with respect and goodwill on all sides, there may be opportunities for constructive cooperation….

A second more general area that will shape U.S. views and policy toward the ICC in the coming years will be the impact of the ICC’s work on the UN Security Council…. Now that the ICC is a reality, it will be important to the United States to ensure that the work of the ICC complements the work of the Council to maintain international peace and security…. As the ICC proceeds to investigate and prosecute cases under the Rome Statute, the Security Council must be prepared to act if and when necessary to ensure harmony between the ICC’s work and the Council’s broader efforts....

A final area that will shape U.S. views and policy toward the ICC is the outcome of the upcoming Rome Statute review conference, now scheduled for 2010. If Rome Statute parties were interested in trying to address the core U.S. concerns about the ICC, the Review Conference could provide an opportunity to do so. These issues aside, a principal focus of work of the conference will likely relate to proposals to define a crime of aggression over which the ICC could exercise jurisdiction…. Efforts to design an aggression regime for the ICC will also need to address the regime’s applicability to countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute. As I have noted, a core principle of our ICC policy is that, as we acknowledge the decisions of other states to join the Rome Statute and to submit to its jurisdiction, we ask that other states accept our decision not to do so. In this context, should Rome Statute parties seek to make an aggression regime they adopt applicable to non-parties, they will almost certainly provoke a serious new crisis in the ICC’s relationship with a new U.S. Administration.

I’m not sure whether this constitutes new rhetoric or not, but I like the notion that if the United States is not joining the ICC anytime soon, then we should move toward accepting that political reality and find ways to cooperate on areas where the United States and the ICC share common interests. I particularly think that developing a framework for a crime of aggression must be done with the close cooperation of the United States. As a practical matter the world has almost no other major defense force to support the cause of international peace and security. To think that our allies in the ICC would dictate to the United States how it will use those resources without input from the United States is a serious mistake.


Sunday, April 13, 2008

Pirates are People, Too
Naomi Norberg has a fascinating post today at IntLawGrrls about the legal treatment of modern-day pirates. I just want to point readers to a recent article in The Sunday Times about British fears that captured pirates could ask for asylum in the UK:
The Royal Navy, once the scourge of brigands on the high seas, has been told by the Foreign Office not to detain pirates because doing so may breach their human rights.

Warships patrolling pirate-infested waters, such as those off Somalia, have been warned that there is also a risk that captured pirates could claim asylum in Britain.

The Foreign Office has advised that pirates sent back to Somalia could have their human rights breached because, under Islamic law, they face beheading for murder or having a hand chopped off for theft.

[snip]

Britain is part of a coalition force that patrols piracy stricken areas and the guidance has troubled navy officers who believe they should have more freedom to intervene.

The guidance was sharply criticised by Julian Brazier MP, the Conservative shipping spokesman, who said: “These people commit horrendous offences. The solution is not to turn a blind eye but to turn them over to the local authorities. The convention on human rights quite rightly doesn’t cover the high seas. It’s a pathetic indictment of what our legal system has come to.”

A Foreign Office spokesman said: “There are issues about human rights and what might happen in these circumstances. The main thing is to ensure any incident is resolved peacefully.”

The guidance is the latest blow to the robust image of the navy. Last year 15 of its sailors were taken prisoner by the Iranians and publicly humiliated.
I don't know whether a captured pirate could actually seek asylum, but I don't see why he wouldn't be protected by one of the various conventions — CAT, the ECHR, the Refugee Convention — against refoulement to a state that would likely torture him. Readers?

Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Bilal Hussein To Be Released -- Maybe... (UPDATED)
Finally, some good news out of Iraq:
An Iraqi judicial committee has dismissed terrorism-related allegations against Associated Press photographer Bilal Hussein and ordered him released nearly two years after he was detained by the U.S. military.

Hussein, 36, remained in custody Wednesday at Camp Cropper, a U.S. detention facility near Baghdad's airport.

A decision by a four-judge panel said Hussein's case falls under a new amnesty law. It ordered Iraqi courts to "cease legal proceedings" and ruled that Hussein should be "immediately" released unless other accusations are pending.

The U.S. military referred the case in December to an investigating judge, who reviewed the evidence and submitted his findings to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq to determine whether the case should go to trial.

In February, however, parliament approved a law providing amnesty to those held for insurgency-related offenses — including detainees such as Hussein who have never been convicted.

The committee from the Iraqi Federal Appeals Court ruled Monday that allegations against Hussein were covered by the Anti-Terrorist Law and were subject to the amnesty law.
I have previously discussed the Bush administration's shameful attempts to engineer Hussein's conviction, as has — in far more depth — Scott Horton. It will be interesting to see what the administration does now; as the article notes, Hussein is actually in U.S. military custody. As the AP article notes, it may not let him go without a fight:
U.S. military authorities have said a U.N. Security Council mandate allows them to retain custody of a detainee they believe is a security risk even if an Iraqi judicial body has ordered that prisoner freed. The U.N. mandate is due to expire at the end of this year.

Also, the amnesty committee's ruling on Hussein may not cover a separate allegation that has been raised in connection with the case.

[snip]

In response to a question from the AP, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said it "will be up to officials in Iraq" on whether to release Hussein. The decision, he said, will be "based upon their assessment as to whether he remains a threat."

Under Iraq's 2-month-old amnesty law, a grant of amnesty effectively closes a case and does not assume guilt of the accused.

Hussein has been held by the U.S. military since being detained by Marines on April 12, 2006, in Ramadi, about 70 miles west of Baghdad. Throughout his incarceration, he has maintained he is innocent and was only doing the work of a professional news photographer in a war zone.

The amnesty committee's decision covers various allegations by the U.S. military against Hussein, including claims he was in possession of bomb-making material, conspired with insurgents to take photographs synchronized with an explosion and offered to secure a forged ID for a terrorist evading capture by the military.

The committee may still be reviewing a separate allegation that Hussein had contacts with the kidnappers of an Italian citizen, Salvatore Santoro, whose body was photographed by Hussein in December 2004 with two masked insurgents standing over Santoro with guns.

[snip]

The amnesty committee — or any Iraqi institution — cannot force the U.S. military to release or turn over any of the estimated 23,000 detainees it holds in Iraq. But a provision in the amnesty law states that the Iraqi government "is committed to take the necessary measures to move the arrested people" from U.S. control.
More later, as additional information becomes available...

UPDATE: Scott Horton provides some background on the separate allegation involving Santoro, which turns out -- not surprisingly -- to be as baseless as the other ones:
Other than the terrorism charges, the military had questioned the photographer’s presence on the scene following the abduction and killing of an Italian, Salvatore Santoro. I worked as Bilal Hussein’s counsel in 2006, and during this time I conducted a comprehensive review of the very vague allegations surrounding Santoro’s death, reviewing the documentary evidence with experts and interviewing the available witnesses. The AP photographer had been stopped with others at a check point and asked to take “trophy photos” of Santoro, who had been killed earlier in the day. A study of the photos and examination of other witnesses bore out the account, and military investigators also acknowledged off the record that there was no real basis for charges. But they continued to raise them nonetheless — apparently because they were under relentless pressure to come up with some charges.

Monday, April 7, 2008

Has Jack Goldsmith Gone Soft on International Law?
This among his useful suggestions as to how to fix the errors of Bush in anti-terror policy in a Slate column last week:
• Work with allies to establish an international legal framework for terrorists. Last week, John McCain called for a "new international understanding on the disposition of dangerous detainees under our control." This is a good idea, not because of a squishy commitment to internationalism but because an international consensus on how to treat detainees would foster deeper international cooperation crucial in thwarting terrorists.

To achieve this goal, the United States must stop talking about which international laws do not govern the detention of terrorists and start talking about which ones do. . . .
Okay, so Jack's still against squishiness. But here's the friendly challenge: how to reconcile a position that sees any value in international humanitarian regimes with the premise of his and Eric Posner's The Limits of International Law, which dismisses IL as a mostly marginal constraint on state action (see for instance pp. 85-88). The Limits is not very keen on multilateral agreements insofar as they are not subject to reliable sanctions by independent third parties. Has something changed, or is there some about the anti-terror context which makes them a meaningful vehicle for modifying state behavior?

Friday, March 21, 2008

Happy 50th, Peace Symbol!
Yes, the venerable symbol that was born as the emblem of the British anti-nuclear movement but has matured into the universal sign of peace turns 50 today.


It's a beautiful symbol, one that — alas — will likely outlive us all. But we should still continue to hope for a world in which its use will no longer be necessary.

Thursday, March 20, 2008

Kosovo Independence is a "Defeat for International Law"
Or so says Professor (and sometime-guest blogger) Eugene Kontorovich in a recent op-ed.


As a result, NATO and America have become parties to the carve-up a sovereign state that they subdued by force. To say that this goes against the core principles of the U.N. Charter is an understatement. For international law, the entire process is a string of humiliations. The Security Council comes out looking like a joke; the right of self-determination looks like it depends on the product of a group's ruthlessness and proximity to Europe; peacekeepers are hostages; and sovereignty is trumped by the threat of terror.


I am very sympathetic to Eugene's critique here. At the very least, Kosovo is as much of, or even more, of a "defeat" for international law as the invasion of Iraq. Few people (Eugene excluded) seem willing to point that out.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

O What a Rogue and Peasant State Am I!
[This was cross-posted over at Huffington Post]

Now I am alone. O what a rogue and peasant slave am I! Is it not monstrous that this player here, But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, Could force his soul so to his own conceit, That from her working all his visage wann'd, Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect, A broken voice, and his whole function suiting, With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!... Yet I, a dull and mudd-mettled rascal, peak... Am I a coward? Who calls me villain?... Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain! O, vengenance! Why, what an ass am I!

Hamlet, Act 2, Scene 2


In the famous second soliloquy of Hamlet, Hamlet is overwhelmed by a feeling of worthlessness and self-pity. He stands alone, grieving his inaction. He wallows and rambles in mindless self-doubt, remonstrating against his own failure. In his mind, he is a pitiful and weak rogue, lacking the gall to live up to his commitment to avenge his father's murder. He makes plans to test whether his revenge is justified, but his actions do not help him achieve his desired end. He finds himself a miserable, melancholy knave.

This scene from Hamlet came to mind yesterday when I attended a fascinating conference at UCLA on the topic of "rogue states." After listening to the discussion, I could not help but pity (and fear) the poor rogue state. They are full to the brim with self-pity, and self-doubt, utterly consumed by their weakness.

Exhibit One was North Korea. The former Thai Foreign Minister, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, presented a wonderful series of vignettes of his visits to North Korea that underscore the pitiful position of poor Pyongyang. The North Koreans display a room full of gifts to the deceased Kim Il-sung to show foreign dignitaries that a nation without friends has so many friends. It is poor and desperately isolated. It treats every issue as an insult, and every diplomatic overture is a potential provocation. If one focused on this abiding sense of insecurity, it is clear that labeling it a member of the "axis of evil" was a profound mistake. It only fortified their sense of weakness and vulnerability. For North Korea, the lesson of Iraq is "We are next, unless we appear strong." Nuclear weapons mollified their insecurities.

Exhibit Two was Iran. Dalia Kaye of RAND emphasized that Iran does not pose a significant conventional military threat to its neighbors, although its assymetric capabilities (such as ballistic missile development) are a concern. Iran is not the former Soviet Union. It is a weak nation attempting to exert political and ideological influence in the region. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration eliminated two of Iran's greatest enemies with its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. And yet Iran still has precious few allies abroad and remains hugely unpopular at home. Therefore, we should move away from the rhetoric of regime change and unilaterally tone down our rhetoric on Iran. After all, democracy promotion is not the same thing as regime change. Our goals should be to promote democratic ideals and the rule of law from within.

Pakistan, by all accounts, is a special case. Former Pakistan Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan described his country as a deeply troubled one. National survival has been at the core of its mission for its entire existence. It may not be a rogue state, but it is a distrusted and sanctioned ally. It is not an enemy, but an enigmatic and disenchanted ally. When Pakistan cracks down on democracy and liberalism, it feels it must do so because it thinks the very survival of the state is at issue. It generally acts out of weakness and fear. It cannot be both popular and tough, so it opts for the latter when expediency so requires, and garners worldwide condemnation. Frequent terrorist attacks and disputed borders only add to its sense of insecurity.

What was the take-away message for the next administration? Don't feed the insecurities of rogue states. Stop calling them names. The label "rogue state" mistakes the essence of the state for its actions. These nations are in a troubled and precarious state of mind. They are full of self-doubt, prone to rash action, and easily insulted.

If there is one thing worse than a rogue state, it is a failed state. We know how the tragedy of Hamlet ended. When the mad Hamlet's doubts were eventually confirmed, he achieved his revenge and died in the process. Our goal should be to change the ending.

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

Pentagon: No Ties Between Saddam and Al Qaeda (Updated)
Whatever will Fox News do now? Not even the Pentagon still believes that Saddam had operational ties to al Qaeda:
An exhaustive review of more than 600,000 Iraqi documents that were captured after the 2003 U.S. invasion has found no evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime had any operational links with Osama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist network.

The Pentagon-sponsored study, scheduled for release later this week, did confirm that Saddam's regime provided some support to other terrorist groups, particularly in the Middle East, U.S. officials told McClatchy. However, his security services were directed primarily against Iraqi exiles, Shiite Muslims, Kurds and others he considered enemies of his regime.

The new study of the Iraqi regime's archives found no documents indicating a "direct operational link" between Hussein's Iraq and al Qaida before the invasion, according to a U.S. official familiar with the report.

He and others spoke to McClatchy on condition of anonymity because the study isn't due to be shared with Congress and released before Wednesday.

President Bush and his aides used Saddam's alleged relationship with al Qaida, along with Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction, as arguments for invading Iraq after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld claimed in September 2002 that the United States had "bulletproof" evidence of cooperation between the radical Islamist terror group and Saddam's secular dictatorship.

Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell cited multiple linkages between Saddam and al Qaida in a watershed February 2003 speech to the United Nations Security Council to build international support for the invasion. Almost every one of the examples Powell cited turned out to be based on bogus or misinterpreted intelligence.

As recently as last July, Bush tried to tie al Qaida to the ongoing violence in Iraq. "The same people that attacked us on September the 11th is a crowd that is now bombing people, killing innocent men, women and children, many of whom are Muslims," he said.

The new study, entitled "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents", was essentially completed last year and has been undergoing what one U.S. intelligence official described as a "painful" declassification review.
The only surprising thing about the report is that the Bush administration didn't manage to bury it until, say... November 5th. That must be painful indeed.

P.S. McClatchy is truly a national treasure. You have to love a news organization whose motto is "truth to power." (What a radical idea!) Pray that the company's well-known financial problems — its newspapers have lost more than $1.5 billion over the past two years — don't lead to its collapse.

UPDATE: How embarrassing is the report to the Bush Administration? Consider the lengths it's going to ensure it gets read by as few people -- especially journalists -- as possible:
The Bush Administration apparently does not want a U.S. military study that found no direct connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda to get any attention. This morning, the Pentagon cancelled plans to send out a press release announcing the report's release and will no longer make the report available online.

The report was to be posted on the Joint Forces Command website this afternoon, followed by a background briefing with the authors. No more. The report will be made available only to those who ask for it, and it will be sent via U.S. mail from Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia.

It won't be emailed to reporters and it won't be posted online.

Wednesday, March 5, 2008

U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Rogue States
This conference at UCLA on March 11 addressing the topic of U.S. foreign policy toward rogue states looks really interesting.


On March 11, 2008, the Burkle Center for International Relations at UCLA will convene a conference featuring Governor Bill Richardson, Burkle Center Senior Fellows General Wesley Clark (ret.) and Former Foreign Minister to Thailand Kantathi Suphamongkhon and leading scholars, policy-makers, practitioners and military experts who will help us explore and analyze several crucial questions. Is "rogue state" a useful concept, and if so, what defines a rogue state? How has the United States treated such states in the past, and what lessons can be gleaned from these episodes? Under what conditions is engagement, isolation through sanctions and other means, or military action likely to be most effective? Join us to help shape and explore what our nation's foreign policy should be toward current states of concern like North Korea, Iran and Pakistan and for the future.

The conference schedule is here

Monday, March 3, 2008

Vladeck on Munaf
At Prawfsblawg today, my friend — and national-security law expert — Steve Vladeck discusses what the reversal of Mohammed Munaf's conviction means for his Supreme Court case. Here is a snippet:
Munaf's habeas petition is one of two brought by U.S. citizens detained in Iraq set to be argued before the Supreme Court later this month (and in which I co-authored an amicus brief in support of the federal courts' jurisdiction).

Significantly, the distinction between Munaf and the other detainee — Omar — relied upon by the D.C. Circuit was Munaf's conviction by the CCC-I... the lower courts concluded that, where the U.S. citizen-detainee had not been tried and convicted (Omar), there was jurisdiction; where he had, there wasn't (Munaf).

If Munaf's conviction has now been reversed, that has the potential to change the whole complexion of the two cases; now, both present a challenge to "pure" executive detention, without the wrinkle added by Munaf's conviction (subsequent to the filing of his habeas petition). Indeed, Munaf's almost becomes the stronger case, since his, unlike Omar's, is not in the posture of a grant of a preliminary injunction...
Steve's post is here, and the amicus brief he co-authored arguing that the federal courts have jurisdiction in both cases is here.
Colombia's Incursion into Ecuador and Anticipatory Self-Defense
At the heart of the Ecuadoran/ Colombian/ Venezuelan tensions, there is a dispute over the facts that has legal implications as to whether Colombia’s military action was self-defense or anticipatory self-defense (which, as many would see it, would make it aggression). As CNN explains:
[Ecuadoran President Rafael] Correa told reporters in Quito that [Colombia’s Presdient Alvaro] Uribe told him the raid occurred after a FARC column fled across the border [from Colombia and into Ecuador] and fired at Colombian forces, who "had to defend themselves."

But Correa said his forces investigated Uribe's claims and discovered that the Colombian planes attacked the guerrillas as they slept in a camp 2 km ( 1.2 mi) inside Ecuador.

"Of course Ecuadoran air space was invaded," he said…

"We will not permit this outrage," he said. "Either President Uribe was misinformed and will have to sanction his commanders who deceived him, breaking every international bilateral proceeding by entering our territory or Uribe simply lied. In either case, the situation is extremely grave and the Ecuadoran government is disposed to go to the ultimate consequences."
In Colombia’s version of the facts, they can claim “hot pursuit” and self-defense. But Ecuador’s version of the facts would make Colombia’s action unjustifiable under classic legal understandings of self-defense and under such facts Colombia would need to rely, as a legal matter, on the controversial post-9/11 attempts by the United States to refashion the law of use of force. As Jose Alvarez had written in his comment Hegemonic International Law Revisited (97 American Journal Int'l Law 873 (2003)):
the prospective endorsement of individual and collective self-defense by the [UN Security] Council, together with its later acquiescence in Operation Enduring Freedom, may signal, depending on how the Council's license comes to be interpreted by its licensee, the advent of three new general rules with respect to defensive force in the age of terrorism:

(1) Terrorist violence, at least when of the scale of the events of September 11, 2001, and even when undertaken by a nonstate actor, may constitute an “armed attack” for purposes of UN Charter Article 51.

(2) A state's assistance to, harboring of, or post hoc ratification of violent acts undertaken by individuals within its territory, or perhaps even mere negligence in controlling such individuals, may make that state responsible for those acts and justify military action against it. In other words, such state action (or inaction) may constitute a breach of the state's own duty not to violate UN Charter Article 2(4).

(3) The right to respond with military force against both terrorist individuals and harboring states does not become impermissible retaliation or illegal anticipatory self-defense, or exceed the rules of proportionality, merely because the threat of continued terrorist attack remains clandestine and unpredictable (as it has been since 9/11).
As this situation plays itself out, I wonder if the declarations and arguments by the political leaders of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, as well as those of other interested states, will provide a further gloss via state practice as to whether these new theories of self-defense have become more generally accepted. Will Colombia argue that, regardless as to which version of the facts you believe, they were within their rights to act?

In any case, as the troops of three countries head to their borders tonight, I hope that this situation will play itself out with nothing more than some heated rhetoric.

Related Posts (on one page):

  1. Colombia's Incursion into Ecuador and Anticipatory Self-Defense
  2. Venezuela Mobilizes Troops on Colombian Border

Sunday, March 2, 2008

Prince Harry and Jimmy McCain
Last year the British media entered into a voluntary agreement with the British Ministry of Defence to have a news blackout of Prince Harry's deployment in Afghanistan. Harry had been serving there about ten weeks when the news broke on the Drudge Report of his whereabouts. The BBC is now defending the news blackout. From the sounds of it, in exchange for extensive filming of Harry on the battlefield, the British press would keep mum about his deployment to Afghanistan. "So, for the past ten weeks, the BBC, ITV and Sky News have been filming with Prince Harry - the first time we've been up close and personal with him. We interviewed him ... in mid-December, just before he was sent to Afghanistan, we spent some time with him at the start of January when he was settling in at a remote base in Southern Helmand Province, and most recently, we filmed with him last week at a new location in Helmand Province."

When the news broke of Harry's deployment in Afghanistan, he was immediately rushed home. Harry was obviously frustrated. "It's something I would love to do... I don't want to sit around Windsor, because I generally don't like England that much and it's nice to be away from all the press and the papers."

I think the real story here is the failure of the British Ministry of Defence. They are concerned about Harry's safety, but then allow reporters to film him in action. Then when news broke of his service in Afghanistan they rush him home. We mustn't have any royals in action with the whole world watching. That would put him at risk and unduly inspire the public.

And then there is Jimmy McCain. The press, including the British media, have had no qualms reporting on the imminent deployment of McCain's youngest son to Iraq in December 2006. Then again in February 2008, they reported of McCain's reluctance to talk about his son for fear of his security.


Jimmy McCain is about to end his first rotation to Iraq. In more than a year of campaigning, McCain has publicly mentioned Jimmy only twice.... McCain’s reticence is in one sense understandable - he has not wanted to draw attention to Jimmy for fear of making him more of a target in Iraq. 'Frankly, it’s for [Jimmy’s] security and the security of the men and women serving around him.' Some of McCain’s rivals regard him as almost perverse for not trying to gain political advantage from his warrior sons. In a city well known for its presidential draft-dodgers, McCain has long stood out in Washington as an authentic military hero. “I just feel it’s inappropriate for us to mention our children,” the senator said recently. “I wouldn’t want to seem like I’m trying to gain some kind of advantage."

It's hard not to be impressed watching McCain's handling of his son's deployment in Iraq. And it's hard not to be disheartened watching the British mishandling of their favorite son's retreat from Afghanistan.

Iraqi Court Reverses US Citizen's Conviction
Shocking legal news out of Iraq — the Court of Cassation has reversed the conviction of Mohammed Munaf, the US citizen sentenced to death for helping kidnap three Romanian journalists in Iraq in 2005:
Munaf's lawyer, Joseph Margulies, said the Iraqi Court of Cassation reversed the conviction and sentence because it could not determine the role Munaf and other defendants played in the kidnapping from the court record. The Iraqi prosecutor supported the court's decision, Margulies said in an e-mail to The Associated Press.

Munaf is part of a pending Supreme Court case in which he and another naturalized American, Shawqi Omar, are trying to prevent the military from handing them over to the Iraqis.

The Bush administration argues that they should not be able to contest their pending transfers in U.S. courts since they are being held not by the United States, but by coalition forces in Iraq.

The administration, in its Supreme Court filing, said, "Munaf admitted on camera, in writing, and in front of the Iraqi investigative court that he participated as an accomplice in the kidnapping for profit of the Romanian journalists."

Munaf has said his confession was coerced.
The US role in Munaf's case has been bizarre, to say the least. According to Scott Horton, the trial judge in the case had initially been set to dismiss the charges for lack of evidence — until two Americans intervened and convinced him otherwise. I can't do the story justice, so here is Horton's account, in all its Kafkaesque glory:
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Horton, I wanted to go back to another story, one that we have covered that hasn’t gotten a lot of attention: Mohammad Munaf. He is the Iraqi American who has just been sentenced to death also. Can you talk about his case?

SCOTT HORTON: Well, I was astounded by that, when I first heard a report about it... So I spoke with the defense counsel. I also spoke with a bailiff at the court about it, to find out what had happened in this proceeding. And what they all described — in fact, completely they all had exactly the same account of what happened — was shocking.

They say that he was brought into the courtroom, Mr. Munaf, by two American officers — one they described as, quote, “the general”; the other they described as a man named Lieutenant Pirone. He was brought before the court. The court had announced, prior to session, that reviewing the evidence of the case, he had concluded that he would dismiss the charges, that there were no substantial charges, and that at this hearing, that would be a conclusion to the affair, there would be a dismissal.

[snip]

SCOTT HORTON: ... And then, the account is that this American lieutenant stood up, began arguing very loudly with the judge, saying it was unacceptable that this man be dismissed, that he had to be convicted, and moreover that he had to receive the death sentence. And the American whipped out a piece of paper saying he was there speaking on behalf of the government of Romania and the government of Romania demanded the death sentence.

Afterwards, there was a private discussion, I’m told, between the Americans and the judge. The judge emerged from this ashen-faced, looking very upset, and then proceeded immediately to convict the man and sentence him to death.

And subsequently, the government of Romania reacted, saying they knew nothing about this proceeding and they certainly did not authorize an American officer to stand up in the court and demand the death sentence. In fact, the government of Romania does not endorse the death sentence. So there’s something very strange going on about this case.
I haven't been following Munaf's Supreme Court case, so I can't discuss what effect the reversal will have. Perhaps one of our readers will weigh in.

Saturday, March 1, 2008

"How to Start Your Own Country in Four Easy Steps"
Joshua Keating of Foreign Policy has a new essay, How to Start Your Own Country in Four Easy Steps. He begins:
With Kosovo unilaterally declaring independence and a host of wannabe states looking to follow its lead, you might be thinking it’s about time to set up your own country. You’ve picked out a flag, written a national anthem, even printed up money with your face on it. But what’s the next step? Creating a new country isn’t as easy as you think.
I have some quibbles with the essay (for example, Keating's contention that "capability to enter into foreign relations" is not part of international law) but it is a quick and humorous intro to an important topic.

Thursday, February 28, 2008

Saadi -- The Ban on Torture Is Absolute
The following is a second post by Sonya Sceats, an Associate Fellow in International Law at Chatham House in London.

The ‘absolute’ nature of the torture ban was affirmed today by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, thus bringing to a close a long campaign by the UK to dilute the ban in cases involving proposed deportation of terror suspects to countries where they face a 'real risk' of torture.

The ruling comes in the case of Saadi v Italy involving a Tunisian national who is resisting deportation from Italy on the basis he could face torture in his homeland where he has been sentenced in absentia for terrorism-related offences. The UK put its own arguments to the Court to try and secure a more relaxed approach in these sorts of deportation cases where national security is at stake.

The prohibition of torture is one of the very few 'absolute' human rights, meaning that international law permits no exceptions to it — this total ban is considered an iconic achievement of the international human rights system. However, the heightened threat of international terrorism has placed the ban under increasing pressure in recent years, including from states like the US and the UK which hold themselves up as proud architects of this system.

For the UK, a key sticking point is a 1996 decision by the Strasbourg Court which blocked the UK's efforts to repatriate a supporter of Sikh separatism to India; there was strong evidence he would be tortured by Punjabi security forces and the Court held that parties to the European Convention on Human Rights must not deport anyone if they face a 'real risk' of torture upon arrival. Crucially, the Court underscored the universal nature of this protection, rejecting the UK's arguments that an exception should apply because the individual concerned, Mr Chahal, was suspected of involvement with terrorism.

For many years now the UK Government has voiced dissatisfaction with this decision. It believes that the Chahal case goes beyond what the framers of the Convention intended when they drafted the torture prohibition (providing simply that 'No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'), and that it frustrates legitimate security policies in a post-9/11 world.

In the Saadi case the UK Government mounted a legal assault on the test for deportations developed by the Strasbourg Court in the Chahal case. It urged the Court to recognise that the torture ban is not in fact absolute in such cases and that states should be permitted to weigh the risk of torture abroad against the risk of terror attacks at home.

The Court today resoundingly rejected these arguments. In a unanimous decision it confirmed that the torture ban applies equally to all human beings, regardless of their conduct, and that European states are not permitted to use a 'balancing' test when deciding whether to deport dangerous people to countries with poor track records on torture.

The ruling will come as an enormous relief to anti-torture and human rights campaigners everywhere. The prospect of one of the world’s most respected human rights courts stepping backwards on the torture ban had sparked widespread alarm in recent months. Instead the Court held firm, noting that although states are facing considerable difficulties in protecting their communities from terrorist violence, this should not call into question the absolute nature of Article 3.

This episode, despite its outcome, undoubtedly tarnishes the reputation of the UK as a leader in the field of human rights. In the past, the UK was known for the emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy but in recent years it has developed a less enviable reputation as an innovator of bad practice. For example, it has adopted the extremely controversial practice of agreeing 'diplomatic assurances' with states such as Jordan, Libya and Lebanon which provide that deportees will not be tortured on return. Human rights activists say that there is no real possibility of monitoring whether the countries concerned will keep to their promises. Although it was unsuccessful, this latest attempt to render more elastic the rules on torture will fuel deep concerns about the UK’s willingness to sacrifice basic rules of international human rights law in the name of counter-terrorism.

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

Yes, Virginia, Waterboarding Does Violate International Law
From TPM Muckraker:
[Y]ou may have despaired of ever seeing a clear, unequivocal exchange on the topic with a government official. Like this one from today's hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, with Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency:

Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) asked, "General, do you believe that waterboarding is consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?"

After pausing a moment to think, Maples replied, "No, sir, I don’t."

"Do you think it’s humane?" Levin asked.

"No, sir, I think it would go beyond that bound."
Now was that so difficult?