Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Friday, July 11, 2008

ICC Prosecutor To Charge Sudan's President with Genocide
I mentioned last month that the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, was considering bringing genocide charges against Sudanese officials far more senior than Ahmed Haroun, the country's "humanitarian affairs" minister. Well, he's now decided to do exactly that — and his target is no other than Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the President of Sudan himself:
The chief prosecutor of the Internationals Criminal Court will seek an arrest warrant Monday for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, charging him with genocide and crimes against humanity in the orchestration of a campaign of violence that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the nation's Darfur region during the past five years, according to U.N. officials and diplomats.

The action by the prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo of Argentina, will mark the first time that the tribunal in The Hague charges a sitting head of state with such crimes, and represents a major step by the court to implicate the highest levels of the Sudanese government for the atrocities in Darfur.

[snip]

"I will present my case and my evidence to the [ICC] judges, and they will take two to three months to decide," Moreno-Ocampo said in an interview Wednesday, referring to a pretrial panel made up of judges from Brazil, Ghana and Latvia. "We will request a warrant of arrest, and the judges have to evaluate the evidence." On Thursday, Moreno-Ocampo's office said in a statement that the prosecutor will "summarize the evidence, the crimes and name individual(s) charged" at a news conference Monday in The Hague.
Wow. To say this is a bold move — and one fraught with danger — is an understatement. I've long disagreed with Julian about whether the ICC's involvement in Darfur undermines the peace process (which is better referred to as the "peace process," because the Sudanese government has never been committed to it). But this time I think Julian's concerns have to be taken very seriously. The UN is certainly worried:
Some U.N. officials raised concerns Thursday that the decision would complicate the peace process in Darfur, possibly triggering a military response by Sudanese forces or proxies against the nearly 10,000 U.N. and African Union peacekeepers located there. At least seven peacekeepers were killed and 22 were injured Tuesday during an ambush by a well-organized and unidentified armed group.

[snip]

Representatives from the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — met with U.N. officials Thursday to discuss the safety of peacekeepers in Darfur. U.N. military planners have begun moving peacekeepers to safer locations and are distributing food and equipment in case the Sudanese government cuts off supplies.

"All bets are off; anything could happen," said one U.N. official, adding that circumstantial evidence shows that the government of Sudan orchestrated this week's ambush. "The mission is so fragile, it would not take much for the whole thing to come crashing down."
If there was a reasonable chance that indicting Bashir would convince China and Russia to discontinue their economic, political, and military support for Khartoum, these risks might be worth it. But that is obviously unlikely to happen — both countries have consistently opposed the ICC's efforts in Darfur and will no doubt oppose this new move, as well.

As a side note, I am very anxious to find out what evidence the Prosecutor has that ostensibly proves Bashir is guilty of genocide. As I pointed out in my previous post, the Security Council-sponsored International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur specifically — and controversially, to be sure — recommended that the ICC not pursue genocide charges against the Sudanese government:
The Commission concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide. Arguably, two elements of genocide might be deduced from the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by Government forces and the militias under their control. These two elements are, first, the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physical destruction; and, second, on the basis of a subjective standard, the existence of a protected group being targeted by the authors of criminal conduct. However, the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned. Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.
Though I'm sympathetic to those who want to call the atrocities in Darfur "genocide," I've always found the Commission's legal analysis of the situation quite persuasive. So I hope that the Prosecutor's subsequent investigations have uncovered new evidence that the Sudanese government was not simply — if murderously — trying to maintain its power in the face of a concerted rebel threat. If they haven't, it will look like Moreno-Ocampo is simply giving into political pressure.

Once again — wow. I don't know what else to say. First the Court stays the Lubanga trial. Now the Prosecutor seeks to indict and arrest the President of the Sudan. This is turning out to be quite a week for the ICC...

More on the story as it develops.

Thursday, July 10, 2008

The Aussies Are Coming! The Aussies Are Coming!
Every week, an Australian show called The Gruen Transfer asks two advertising companies to compete with each other to sell the unsellable. This week's challenge: create a TV ad to whip up support in Oz for a military invasion of New Zealand. One of the ads is okay — but this one had me laughing so hard there were tears running down my face:



The ad pokes fun at the 100% New Zealand advertising campaign that is all over the Antipodean airwaves, in case you were wondering.

Watch it!

Sunday, June 29, 2008

There Will Be Blood
The NY Times Week in Review has an article written by Graham Bowley on the effect of recent attacks by Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure and the effects of these attacks on world oil prices. The piece begins:
When armed rebels from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta attacked an enormous oil facility 75 miles off the swampy West African coast on June 19, traveling hours by speedboat under cover of darkness and kidnapping an oil worker, their brazen assault underlined the perhaps underappreciated dependence of the United States — and the world — on oil from Nigeria.

Three days afterward, Nigerian officials said at a hastily arranged global energy summit in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, that recent attacks had cut Nigeria’s oil production to its lowest level in nearly two decades, giving oil markets the jitters and helping to send prices higher…

“We always focus on the Persian Gulf but this is one of the key oil security issues in the world today,” said Daniel Yergin, one of the nation’s best-known energy experts and chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, a consulting firm. “It’s tied up with Nigerian politics, regional and national battles for power, and criminality.” When Mr. Yergin spoke to lawmakers at a hearing in Congress last week, he was asked what would most help stabilize world markets. “Helping bring peace to the Niger Delta would be a major contribution,” he responded.
The Times article continues that responding to the situation in Nigeria will need both a sound development policy and a counter-insurgency strategy:
According to J. Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, the government led by Nigeria’s new president, Umaru Yar’Adua, must break with decades of neglect and pay attention to the troubles of the southern delta region by promoting development but also cracking down on the rebels and “demonstrating that these guys cannot operate with impunity.”

He’s not very optimistic, however. “When you look at the delta, the overwhelming picture is that the situation has very little promise of being fixed,” he said.
While development policy is always a complex issue, the “operate with impunity” part is also a problem, as MEND has started attacking not just oil pipelines, but offshore oil platforms, as well. MEND even issued a press release that states, "The location for today's attack was deliberately chosen to remove any notion that off-shore oil exploration is far from our reach." Jeff Vail of The Oil Drum explains that this is especially significant as 90% of Nigeria’s oil growth is expected to be via new offshore platforms. Which now seem vulnerable to attack.

John Robb, who writes extensively on guerilla-based “fourth generation warfare” is concerned that destabilization from infrastructure attacks will worsen:
So, given production limitations and strong/concentrated demand, even small disruptions by guerrilla groups on light sweet crude production is likely to have a direct influence on global oil pricing (in contrast, disruptions aimed at heavy crude production should have little impact on global pricing). Further, there are already active groups in many of the most critical production areas.

Fortunately, from the demonstrated behavior of these groups it doesn't appear that guerrilla/terrorist groups have fully grasped their potential market power with small attacks (despite aspirational pronouncements from al Qaeda and large scale attacks in 2005/2006). Once they do, as bad as disruption is today, it could get MUCH worse.

Why? A direct connection to scalable profits...

As we saw with e-mail spam/phishing, even the faintest whiff of profits can turn a loose collection of individuals/groups into a torrential crime-fueled marketplace generated billions and attracting tens of thousands of participants. Are we about to see the same occur with oil?
For example, consider Columbia. John Robb notes that
Disruption isn't limited to Nigeria. A remote control bomb by the FARC on Occidental Petroleum's pipeline in Colombia just knocked out 100,000 barrels a day. It's also interesting to note how irrelevant the US military/national security system has become in regards to global energy security. The entire paradigm of warfare has changed but the $1 Trillion behemoth has barely budged.
While I doubt that the end is nigh, the situation is obviously serious and it won’t be solved by a combination of a dithering domestic energy policy and a foreign policy of “assisted” regime-change. So, for now, only one thing is certain…

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

World Attitudes Toward Torture
WorldPublicOpinion.org has released an interesting survey of world attitudes toward torture. Here is the summary of their findings:
A WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 19 nations finds that in 14 of them most people favor an unequivocal rule against torture, even in the case of terrorists who have information that could save innocent lives. Four nations lean toward favoring an exception in the case of terrorists.

However, large majorities in all 19 nations favor a general prohibition against torture. In all nations polled, the number saying that the government should generally be able to use torture is less than one in five.

On average across all nations polled, 57 percent opt for unequivocal rules against torture. Thirty-five percent favor an exception when innocent lives are at risk. Just 9 percent favor the government being able to use torture in general.

The four publics that favor an exception for terrorists when innocent lives are at risk include majorities in India (59%), Nigeria (54%), and Turkey (51%), and a plurality in Thailand (44%).

Support for the unequivocal position was highest in Spain (82%), Great Britain (82%) and France (82%), followed by Mexico (73%), China (66%), the Palestinian territories (66%), Poland (62%), Indonesia (61%), and the Ukraine (59%). In five countries either modest majorities or pluralities support a ban on all torture: Azerbaijan (54%), Egypt (54%), the United States (53%), Russia (49%), and Iran (43%). South Koreans are divided.

[snip]

The survey presented respondents with an argument in favor of allowing the torture of potential terrorists who threaten civilians: "Terrorists pose such an extreme threat that governments should now be allowed to use some degree of torture if it may gain information that would save innocent lives." In fourteen nations, a majority or plurality rejected this argument in favor of the unequivocal view: "Clear rules against torture should be maintained because any use of torture is immoral and will weaken international human rights standards against torture."
The executive director of the company sees the results as extremely encouraging, but I'm not so sure that his enthusiasm is warranted. Yes, the overall trends are positive. But it's still a little unsettling that nearly 4 out of 10 people world-wide are willing to countenance torture in at least some circumstances, including 44% of Americans, and that nearly 2 out of 10 think it should be generally available to the government. (Who else do they want tortured? Shoplifters?) Even worse, the number of people who accept torture is generally on the rise:
Only India had even a modest plurality favoring an exception for terrorists in 2006. In the current survey three countries (India, Nigeria, and Turkey) have a majority supporting such exceptions, Thailand has a plurality and South Korea is divided.

Four countries included in both surveys show dramatic increases in support for allowing the torture of terrorists: India (from 32% to 59%), Nigeria (39% to 54%), Turkey (24% to 51%), and South Korea (31% to 51%). Substantial increases also occurred in Egypt (25% to 46%) and the United States (36% to 44%).

At the same time there have been equally dramatic increases among those favoring a complete ban on torture. Support has grown substantially in Mexico (rising from 50% to 73%), Spain (65% to 82%), China (49% to 66%), Indonesia (51% to 61%), Britain (72% to 82%), and Russia (43% to 49%).

On average, support for an exception has gone up six points while support for an unequivocal rule has gone up two points. Thus the net increase in favor of an exception is just four points.
As the summary notes, acceptance of torture is affected — unsurprisingly — by the distribution of terrorist attacks. Since the previous poll in 2006, three of the six countries in which acceptance has increased have experienced terrorist attacks (India, Turkey, South Korea) and four of the six in which it has decreased have not (Spain, Britain, Indonesia, and Russia).

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Israeli Supreme Court Upholds Unlawful Combatants Law
As our Boumediene instant symposium gets underway, I thought it might be interesting to note that the Israeli Supreme Court has just upheld the Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, which permits the indefinite detention of a person who does not qualify for POW status and "who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel or is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel." From Ha'aretz:
The Supreme Court yesterday upheld the constitutionality of the law allowing for the detention of "unlawful combatants," which Israel uses to hold Hezbollah fighters.

Supreme Court President Dorit Beinisch and Justices Edmond Levy and Ayala Procaccia rejected an appeal by two Gazan Palestinians who were detained after their involvement in terror activity on behalf of Hezbollah was proved.

The Unlawful Combatants Law authorizes the state to detain foreign nationals who belong to terror organizations or have participated directly or indirectly in hostile actions against the State of Israel.

Its goal is to prevent their continued activities.

Beinisch wrote in the verdict that although the law involves substantial harm and the suppression of personal freedom through administrative detention, the harm is proportional.

She noted that it was passed in a "harsh security reality" that justifies the violation of to personal freedom.

"The law's harm to the constitutional right to personal freedom, although substantial, is no greater than necessary," Beinisch wrote.

"Therefore, we have concluded that the law meets the criteria of the limitations ruling and there is no constitutional grounds to intervene in it."
The Unlawful Combatants Law requires a District Court to determine every six months whether a prisoner's release "will not harm State security" or whether "there are special grounds justifying his release"; the court's decision can then be appealed to a single judge of the Supreme Court for review. Scholars question, however, whether the Law's review procedures adequately protect prisoners' rights. Here is what Ron Dudai of SOAS had to say two years ago, when the Israeli Supreme Court first upheld the detention of "unlawful combatants":
Yet how powerful can this judicial review be? Not only does the Illegal Combatants law create a new category not recognized in international law, it reverses the burden of proof. Once an order is signed by the Chief of Staff, the burden of proof is on the defendant: he has to prove to the court that he is not an enemy combatant. Moreover, he is expected do this when the charge against him is based solely on classified evidence, which he is barred from examining and is therefore unable to challenge. One of the defendants told the court he was arrested in his house, for no reason, and added that if he were exposed to the evidence against him he would be able to respond. But that, of course, did not happen. After the defense lawyers argued their case, they and their clients had to exit the courtroom, leaving the security services’ representatives to reveal their secret evidence to the judge.
Food for comparative thought.

Tuesday, June 10, 2008

GITMO Interrogators Instructed to Destroy Notes
First the judge who felt "badgered, beaten, and bruised" by prosecutors for trying to protect Khadr's rights was removed from the case "for personnel reasons." Now it turns out that Khadr's interrogators were "instructed" -- read: ordered -- to destroy their notes, lest anyone ever find out that Khadr had been tortured or mistreated:
Navy Lieutenant Commander Bill Kuebler said in a statement sent to reporters he considers the notes crucial to the defense of his client, Canadian Omar Khadr, during his upcoming murder trial by a special military tribunal at the US naval base.

Kuebler said the instructions were handed down to interrogators from the US Department of Defense as part of a standard operating procedure or "SOP" directive that he obtained from prosecutors last week.

If they were carried out, US interrogators may have "routinely destroyed evidence" that might have been used to defend the Khadr and other detainees, Kuebler charged.

"If handwritten notes were destroyed in accordance with the SOP, the government intentionally deprived Omar's lawyers of key evidence with which to challenge the reliability" of alleged confessions made to military interrogators, Kuebler said.

He cited in particular one passage of the directive to military interrogators stating that "this mission has legal and political issues that may lead to interrogators being called to testify."

"Keeping the number of documents with interrogation information to a minimum can minimize certain legal issues," the policy statement said, according to Kuebler.
Yes, it certainly can. So can suborning perjury and fabricating evidence -- but that doesn't make them good ideas.

Can we please stop pretending that the (un)fairness of military commissions is still open to rational debate?

Thursday, May 29, 2008

Here Comes the Treaty to Ban Cluster Bombs
Nearly 100 nations have reached an agreement on a draft treaty to ban the use of cluster bombs within 8 years. This may or may not be a good idea. But since key cluster bomb producers and users like the United States, Russia, China, Israel, India and Pakistan are not signatories, the importance of this treaty, beyond its symbolism, is questionable. Like the treaty to ban landmines, the vast majority of countries that will sign on to this treaty do not possess cluster bombs anyway. Hence, this is, for most countries, a costless decision and the use of landmines or cluster bombs is not substantially affected.

To be sure, for some countries, there are real costs to signing on. Britain had the most difficult decision, and it is a challenge for realists to explain why a country like Britain would give up a military weapon without gaining any concessions from most of its treaty partners. Moreover, the status of U.S. cluster bomb stockpiles in Britain are going to be legally problematic.

Saturday, May 24, 2008

Power Shifts, Old and New
Wednesday’s NY Times had a good essay by Thomas Friedman on the current evolution of the global distribution of power. He argues that there are actually three shifts taking place:

The first shift is due to our “oil addiction”:
Let’s start with the most profound one: More and more, I am convinced that the big foreign policy failure that will be pinned on this administration is not the failure to make Iraq work, as devastating as that has been. It will be one with much broader balance-of-power implications — the failure after 9/11 to put in place an effective energy policy…

The failure of Mr. Bush to fully mobilize the most powerful innovation engine in the world — the U.S. economy — to produce a scalable alternative to oil has helped to fuel the rise of a collection of petro-authoritarian states — from Russia to Venezuela to Iran — that are reshaping global politics in their own image.
The second main shift isn’t so much about our self-imposed weakness due to oil consumption, but the rise of other states due to the changes in their societies. Friedman cites to Fareed Zakaria’s new book, The Post-American World:
Mr. Zakaria’s central thesis is that while the U.S. still has many unique assets, “the rise of the rest” — the Chinas, the Indias, the Brazils and even smaller nonstate actors — is creating a world where many other countries are slowly moving up to America’s level of economic clout and self-assertion, in every realm…

For too long, argues Zakaria, America has taken its many natural assets — its research universities, free markets and diversity of human talent — and assumed that they will always compensate for our low savings rate or absence of a health care system or any strategic plan to improve our competitiveness.

“That was fine in a world when a lot of other countries were not performing,” argues Zakaria, but now the best of the rest are running fast, working hard, saving well and thinking long term. “They have adopted our lessons and are playing our game,” he said. If we don’t fix our political system and start thinking strategically about how to improve our competitiveness, he added, “the U.S. risks having its unique and advantageous position in the world erode as other countries rise.”
The third shift, described in David Rothkopf’s book Superclass (see Peter’s take on it here) describes the rise in power of
a small group of players — “the superclass” — a new global elite, who are much better suited to operating on the global stage and influencing global outcomes than the vast majority of national political leaders.

Some of this new elite “are from business and finance,” says Rothkopf. “Some are members of a kind of shadow elite — criminals and terrorists. Some are masters of new or traditional media; some are religious leaders, and a few are top officials of those governments that do have the ability to project their influence globally.”
None of this is especially new. Think of the fears of the rise of OPEC in the 1970's or the discussion of American relative decline in the 1980's (spurred, in part, by the publication of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and more generally by the economic rise of Japan) and even Friedman's own essays on "super-empowered individuals" in the 1990's.

Noting that these ideas are not new is not to criticize Friedman. To the contrary, he recognizes that simply because some issues fall in and out of vogue (oil dependency, for example) does not change the fact that they affect global power day in and day out. Each of these three trends played a role in the distribution of power in decades past and they continue to do so today. Besides looking for what is new in international politics, it is important to reiterate the fundamentals. Especially if they still have not been addressed in any meaningful sense by policymakers.

Tuesday, May 20, 2008

Dave Glazier on the Wall Street Journal on Gitmo Defense Attorneys
Over at National Security Advisors, our colleague Dave Glazier has a superb post on whether the Gitmo defense attorneys are responsible for the ills of the military commissions, as the Wall Street Journal's far-right editorial page seems to believe. Here's the intro:
The Wall Street Journal published a scathing editorial today blasting the military and civilian defense attorneys it portrays as unreasonably obstructing the capital military commission prosecutions of high value terrorists, including alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). It is not surprising that a paper noted for its politically conservative editorial stance should defend the government's general approach to the so-called "War on Terror." But it is disappointing to see the editors of a paper that is generally well regarded for the basic quality of its journalism get so many points of law, history, and fact wrong, as well as to question the integrity of so many career military lawyers and judges. It is also ironic to see how far the editors have shifted their views on the role of law and justice since the time of the trial they hold up as a prototype.
The post includes a fascinating discussion of the events underlying Ex parte Quirin — and the Journal's rather different take on that case in 1942. Check it out!

Thursday, May 15, 2008

John Boonstra on R2P and Burma
I had contemplated weighing in on commentators' unfortunate tendency to equate the Responsibility to Protect doctrine with humanitarian invasion, but John Boonstra at UN Dispatch beat me to it. Here's a snippet:
First, by and large, the R2P doctrine has been misunderstood or misrepresented in calls to "invade" Burma. R2P is often implied to boil down to a simple equation: if a government is unable or unwilling to adequately protect its citizens, then the international community has a right to forcibly intervene to protect these people. The first part of this conditional is accurate, but the second is a gross oversimplification. R2P does not prescribe invasion any more than the Constitution of the United States mandates impeachment. Military intervention is only one component of the R2P framework, and one of last resort, at that; it is only to be undertaken when a series of specific conditions are met, ensuring that intervention is justified, well-intentioned, practical, authorized by the proper authority (i.e., the UN Security Council), and will not cause more harm than good.

Wielding R2P as a Trojan horse for invasion and regime change, as Robert Kaplan seems to desire, is harmful to the integrity and future viability of the concept, as well as to the more pressing concern of alleviating the Burmese people's suffering.
The whole post is well worth a read. It's here.

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Is It Time to Invade Burma? (Is It Time to Invade Georgia?)
The first part of this post's title is also the title of a new article at Time.com. (Note: on CNN.com, they title the article "Time to Invade Myanmar?")

And so begins the latest iteration of the humanitarian intervention debate. After a recap of the situation in Myanmar, the article notes:
...it's hard to imagine a regime this insular and paranoid accepting robust aid from the US military, let alone agreeing to the presence of US Marines on Burmese soil — as Thailand and Indonesia did after the tsunami. The trouble is that the Burmese haven't shown the ability or willingness to deploy the kind of assets needed to deal with a calamity of this scale — and the longer Burma resists offers of help, the more likely it is that the disaster will devolve beyond anyone's control. "We're in 2008, not 1908," says Jan Egeland, the former U.N. emergency relief coordinator. "A lot is at stake here. If we let them get away with murder we may set a very dangerous precedent."

That's why it's time to consider a more serious option: invading Burma. Some observers, including former USAID director Andrew Natsios, have called on the US to unilaterally begin air drops to the Burmese people regardless of what the junta says. The Bush Administration has so far rejected the idea — "I can't imagine us going in without the permission of the Myanmar government," Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday — but it's not without precedent: as Natsios pointed out to the Wall Street Journal, the US has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid without the host government's consent in places like Bosnia and Sudan.
The article concludes that, if current attempts at assistance fail,
"It's important for the rulers to know the world has other options," [Jan Egeland, a former UN emergency reloief coordinator] says. "If there were, say, the threat of a cholera epidemic that could claim hundreds of thousands of lives and the government was incapable of preventing it, then maybe yes — you would intervene unilaterally." But by then, it could be too late. The cold truth is that states rarely undertake military action unless their national interests are at stake; and the world has yet to reach a consensus about when, and under what circumstances, coercive interventions in the name of averting humanitarian disasters are permissible. As the response to the 2004 tsunami proved, the world's capacity for mercy is limitless. But we still haven't figured out when to give war a chance.
I am of two minds when it comes to humanitarian intervention. Cases such as Myanmar may be the less difficult cases--situations where there is a threat of widepread disease or famine (let alone the physical injuries and other forms of suffering caused by the storm) and a government is either incapable or uninterested in actually doing what needs to happen to save its own citizens. I'm not saying that that is an easy case for humanitarian intervention, just that it is not as hard as other examples that are more politically ambiguous, such as intervening because of civil strife or sectarian violence.

Turning such a political decision into a legal rule is fraught with dangers. What do we do if the Russian intervene militarily in Georgia, on the pretext that they are protecting Russian passport holders? What of Turkey's intervention in Northern Cyprus in the 1970's on the argument that it was protecting Turkish Cypriots from violence? As I've written regarding Kosovo, the law of unintended consequences is a mighty force to reckon with.

The people of Myanmar desperately need help and they need it now. Perhaps intervening without the consent of their government will be the necessary and moral thing to do. I don't know enough about the facts on the ground to judge that. But, even if various states do undertake such an action, they should think very carefully about proclaiming the existence of a legal principle favoring humanitarian intervention.




Tuesday, May 6, 2008

How Do You Chip out of a Mortar Hole?
I'm sorry, I just can't let this one go:
Picture, if you will, a tree-lined plaza in Baghdad's International Village, flanked by fashion boutiques, swanky cafes, and shiny glass office towers. Nearby a golf course nestles agreeably, where a chip over the water to the final green is but a prelude to cocktails in the club house and a soothing massage in a luxury hotel, which would not look out of place in Sydney harbour. Then, as twilight falls, a pre-prandial stroll, perhaps, amid the cool of the Tigris Riverfront Park, where the peace is broken only by the soulful cries of egrets fishing.

Improbable though it all may seem, this is how some imaginative types in the US military are envisaging the future of Baghdad's Green Zone, the much-pummelled redoubt of the Iraqi capital where a bunker shot has until now had very different connotations.

A $5bn (£2.5bn) tourism and development scheme for the Green Zone being hatched by the Pentagon and an international investment consortium would give the heavily fortified area on the banks of the Tigris a "dream" makeover that will become a magnet for Iraqis, tourists, business people and investors. About half of the area is now occupied by coalition forces, the US state department or private foreign companies.

The US military released the first tentative artists' impression yesterday. An army source said the barbed wire, concrete blast barriers and checkpoints that currently disfigure the 5 sq mile area would be replaced by shopping malls, hotels, elegant apartment blocks and leisure parks. "This is at the end of the day an Iraqi-owned area and we will give it back to them with added value," said the source, who requested anonymity.

Potential investors are being encouraged to take a punt that years ahead, Baghdad's fortunes may mirror former war-torn cities such as Sarajevo and Beirut that have risen from the ashes.

Marriott International has already signed a deal to build a hotel in the Green Zone, according to Navy Captain Thomas Karnowski, the chief US liaison. Also in the pipeline is a possible $1bn investment from MBI International, a hotel and resorts specialist led by Saudi sheikh, Mohamed Bin Issa Al Jaber.

One Los Angeles-based firm, C3, has said it wants to build an amusement park on the Green Zone's outskirts. As part of the first phase, a skateboard park is due to open this summer.
The best thing about the "artist's rendering" is the complete absence of background. Wonder why that is?

Thursday, May 1, 2008

John Yoo and the Justice Case -- Post at Balkinization
Marty Lederman has kindly published a long post I have written on what — if anything — the Justice Case has to say about the criminal responsibility of government lawyers like Yoo. Here is the introduction:
Scholars who argue that John Yoo’s authorship of the infamous torture memos makes him complicit in various war crimes -– torture, illegal detention, etc. -– almost invariably cite the WWII-era case United States v. Alstoetter, commonly referred to as the Justice Case, for the proposition that a government lawyer can be held criminally responsible for giving erroneous legal advice to his political superiors. Here, for example, is what Scott Horton, an excellent scholar and one of our finest bloggers, has to say:
Can a lawyer at the Department of Justice be criminally liable for giving opinions that lead to the torture and abuse of prisoners in war time? The answer is: Yes. The precedent is United States v. Altstoetter. The sentence handed down was ten years, less time served awaiting trial. It’s a case for John Yoo to study in the period leading up to his inevitable prosecution.
I do not know enough about Yoo’s actions to venture a general opinion about their possible criminality. I do know something, however, about the Justice Case -– I am currently writing a book for Oxford University Press on the jurisprudence of that trial and the eleven other trials held in the American zone of occupation between 1946 and 1949, which are collectively known as the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (NMT). So I thought readers might be interested in a detailed look at what the Justice Case says -– or doesn’t say -– about the culpability of government lawyers who advise their clients that unlawful conduct is, in fact, lawful. The bottom line, in my view, is that as reprehensible as Yoo’s opinions were –- and they were indeed reprehensible -– the case provides far less support for prosecuting him than most scholars assume.
I hope readers will check out the entire post, along with Marty's excellent introduction, in which he discusses his general views on the issue. I completely agree with Marty and hope that readers will not misunderstand my position. I am not saying that nothing John Yoo and the other government lawyers did could ever be considered criminal. I am not saying that the Justice Case rules out the possibility of a future prosecution. Indeed, I can imagine — counterfactually — a situation in which the NMT would have convicted a government lawyer of complicity for giving his political superiors advice he knew full well violated international law. My position is simply that the Justice Case did not involve such a situation and that, as a result, the judgment has almost no precedential value for a future prosecution of Yoo and/or others.

Monday, April 28, 2008

Bellinger on the United States and the ICC
I think there is more to Bellinger’s speech on the United States and the ICC than Julian suggests. Let me just summarize the best parts of the speech. First, Bellinger emphasizes that the ICC is not a partisan issue:

A relatively straight line runs from the positions on the ICC taken by our Congress in 1990, to those of U.S. negotiators in Rome, to President Clinton’s decision not to seek Senate ratification of the Rome Statute and to recommend the same to his successor, and to the current position of the Bush Administration.

Second, Bellinger argues that this position is not likely to change with the next Administration:

Even if a future President were to advocate U.S. accession to the Rome Statute, he or she could very well face a skeptical reaction in the U.S. Senate. It’s worth bearing in mind that the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act – legislation that was not sought by the Bush Administration and that includes a range of restrictions on U.S. support for the ICC – passed the Senate in 2002 by a vote of 75-19, including the affirmative votes of Senators Clinton and McCain, as well as those of the current Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, Senators Reid and McConnell.

Third, if we accept that the United States will remain outside the ICC for the forseeable future, what should be the response? Bellinger has the following suggestion:

The core concerns of the United States about the Rome Statute have not been resolved during the past decade, and are unlikely to be resolved in the next decade, unless the Statute is changed. Accordingly, as we look forward, the United States will very likely remain outside the Rome Statute regime. This is a reality that ICC supporters should accept. Agreeing to disagree about the ICC is the essential first step toward developing a more mature and productive relationship that can effectively advance our shared goal of promoting international criminal justice. This will involve seizing opportunities for cooperative efforts where they exist and avoiding pitfalls that risk reigniting past tensions. We should be guided in our efforts by the premise that the ends we seek are far more important than the means by which we seek them. The United States and ICC supporters can do more to prevent impunity for serious crimes by working together than either can achieve on their own, and it is in our mutual interest to develop a relationship that recognizes this.

Finally, as for concrete ways that the United States and the ICC can work together in a cooperative manner, Bellinger mentions Darfur, the Security Council, and the Rome Statute review conference on a crime of aggression:

It is important that we put aside our differences on these issues because the next decade poses challenges that will require our collective efforts as well as pitfalls that risk further inflaming tensions over ICC issues. Let me now discuss a few issues that I think will shape the relationship between the United States and the ICC in the coming years.

A first area relates to the response to large scale and horrific crimes in Darfur. Absent a decision by the ICC to pursue an investigation or prosecution against a U.S. person, the outcome of the ICC’s Darfur work is likely to do more than any other factor in the near term to shape U.S. perceptions of the role and impact of the ICC…. Darfur is … a good example of an area where, with respect and goodwill on all sides, there may be opportunities for constructive cooperation….

A second more general area that will shape U.S. views and policy toward the ICC in the coming years will be the impact of the ICC’s work on the UN Security Council…. Now that the ICC is a reality, it will be important to the United States to ensure that the work of the ICC complements the work of the Council to maintain international peace and security…. As the ICC proceeds to investigate and prosecute cases under the Rome Statute, the Security Council must be prepared to act if and when necessary to ensure harmony between the ICC’s work and the Council’s broader efforts....

A final area that will shape U.S. views and policy toward the ICC is the outcome of the upcoming Rome Statute review conference, now scheduled for 2010. If Rome Statute parties were interested in trying to address the core U.S. concerns about the ICC, the Review Conference could provide an opportunity to do so. These issues aside, a principal focus of work of the conference will likely relate to proposals to define a crime of aggression over which the ICC could exercise jurisdiction…. Efforts to design an aggression regime for the ICC will also need to address the regime’s applicability to countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute. As I have noted, a core principle of our ICC policy is that, as we acknowledge the decisions of other states to join the Rome Statute and to submit to its jurisdiction, we ask that other states accept our decision not to do so. In this context, should Rome Statute parties seek to make an aggression regime they adopt applicable to non-parties, they will almost certainly provoke a serious new crisis in the ICC’s relationship with a new U.S. Administration.

I’m not sure whether this constitutes new rhetoric or not, but I like the notion that if the United States is not joining the ICC anytime soon, then we should move toward accepting that political reality and find ways to cooperate on areas where the United States and the ICC share common interests. I particularly think that developing a framework for a crime of aggression must be done with the close cooperation of the United States. As a practical matter the world has almost no other major defense force to support the cause of international peace and security. To think that our allies in the ICC would dictate to the United States how it will use those resources without input from the United States is a serious mistake.


Sunday, April 13, 2008

Pirates are People, Too
Naomi Norberg has a fascinating post today at IntLawGrrls about the legal treatment of modern-day pirates. I just want to point readers to a recent article in The Sunday Times about British fears that captured pirates could ask for asylum in the UK:
The Royal Navy, once the scourge of brigands on the high seas, has been told by the Foreign Office not to detain pirates because doing so may breach their human rights.

Warships patrolling pirate-infested waters, such as those off Somalia, have been warned that there is also a risk that captured pirates could claim asylum in Britain.

The Foreign Office has advised that pirates sent back to Somalia could have their human rights breached because, under Islamic law, they face beheading for murder or having a hand chopped off for theft.

[snip]

Britain is part of a coalition force that patrols piracy stricken areas and the guidance has troubled navy officers who believe they should have more freedom to intervene.

The guidance was sharply criticised by Julian Brazier MP, the Conservative shipping spokesman, who said: “These people commit horrendous offences. The solution is not to turn a blind eye but to turn them over to the local authorities. The convention on human rights quite rightly doesn’t cover the high seas. It’s a pathetic indictment of what our legal system has come to.”

A Foreign Office spokesman said: “There are issues about human rights and what might happen in these circumstances. The main thing is to ensure any incident is resolved peacefully.”

The guidance is the latest blow to the robust image of the navy. Last year 15 of its sailors were taken prisoner by the Iranians and publicly humiliated.
I don't know whether a captured pirate could actually seek asylum, but I don't see why he wouldn't be protected by one of the various conventions — CAT, the ECHR, the Refugee Convention — against refoulement to a state that would likely torture him. Readers?

Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Bilal Hussein To Be Released -- Maybe... (UPDATED)
Finally, some good news out of Iraq:
An Iraqi judicial committee has dismissed terrorism-related allegations against Associated Press photographer Bilal Hussein and ordered him released nearly two years after he was detained by the U.S. military.

Hussein, 36, remained in custody Wednesday at Camp Cropper, a U.S. detention facility near Baghdad's airport.

A decision by a four-judge panel said Hussein's case falls under a new amnesty law. It ordered Iraqi courts to "cease legal proceedings" and ruled that Hussein should be "immediately" released unless other accusations are pending.

The U.S. military referred the case in December to an investigating judge, who reviewed the evidence and submitted his findings to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq to determine whether the case should go to trial.

In February, however, parliament approved a law providing amnesty to those held for insurgency-related offenses — including detainees such as Hussein who have never been convicted.

The committee from the Iraqi Federal Appeals Court ruled Monday that allegations against Hussein were covered by the Anti-Terrorist Law and were subject to the amnesty law.
I have previously discussed the Bush administration's shameful attempts to engineer Hussein's conviction, as has — in far more depth — Scott Horton. It will be interesting to see what the administration does now; as the article notes, Hussein is actually in U.S. military custody. As the AP article notes, it may not let him go without a fight:
U.S. military authorities have said a U.N. Security Council mandate allows them to retain custody of a detainee they believe is a security risk even if an Iraqi judicial body has ordered that prisoner freed. The U.N. mandate is due to expire at the end of this year.

Also, the amnesty committee's ruling on Hussein may not cover a separate allegation that has been raised in connection with the case.

[snip]

In response to a question from the AP, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said it "will be up to officials in Iraq" on whether to release Hussein. The decision, he said, will be "based upon their assessment as to whether he remains a threat."

Under Iraq's 2-month-old amnesty law, a grant of amnesty effectively closes a case and does not assume guilt of the accused.

Hussein has been held by the U.S. military since being detained by Marines on April 12, 2006, in Ramadi, about 70 miles west of Baghdad. Throughout his incarceration, he has maintained he is innocent and was only doing the work of a professional news photographer in a war zone.

The amnesty committee's decision covers various allegations by the U.S. military against Hussein, including claims he was in possession of bomb-making material, conspired with insurgents to take photographs synchronized with an explosion and offered to secure a forged ID for a terrorist evading capture by the military.

The committee may still be reviewing a separate allegation that Hussein had contacts with the kidnappers of an Italian citizen, Salvatore Santoro, whose body was photographed by Hussein in December 2004 with two masked insurgents standing over Santoro with guns.

[snip]

The amnesty committee — or any Iraqi institution — cannot force the U.S. military to release or turn over any of the estimated 23,000 detainees it holds in Iraq. But a provision in the amnesty law states that the Iraqi government "is committed to take the necessary measures to move the arrested people" from U.S. control.
More later, as additional information becomes available...

UPDATE: Scott Horton provides some background on the separate allegation involving Santoro, which turns out -- not surprisingly -- to be as baseless as the other ones:
Other than the terrorism charges, the military had questioned the photographer’s presence on the scene following the abduction and killing of an Italian, Salvatore Santoro. I worked as Bilal Hussein’s counsel in 2006, and during this time I conducted a comprehensive review of the very vague allegations surrounding Santoro’s death, reviewing the documentary evidence with experts and interviewing the available witnesses. The AP photographer had been stopped with others at a check point and asked to take “trophy photos” of Santoro, who had been killed earlier in the day. A study of the photos and examination of other witnesses bore out the account, and military investigators also acknowledged off the record that there was no real basis for charges. But they continued to raise them nonetheless — apparently because they were under relentless pressure to come up with some charges.

Monday, April 7, 2008

Has Jack Goldsmith Gone Soft on International Law?
This among his useful suggestions as to how to fix the errors of Bush in anti-terror policy in a Slate column last week:
• Work with allies to establish an international legal framework for terrorists. Last week, John McCain called for a "new international understanding on the disposition of dangerous detainees under our control." This is a good idea, not because of a squishy commitment to internationalism but because an international consensus on how to treat detainees would foster deeper international cooperation crucial in thwarting terrorists.

To achieve this goal, the United States must stop talking about which international laws do not govern the detention of terrorists and start talking about which ones do. . . .
Okay, so Jack's still against squishiness. But here's the friendly challenge: how to reconcile a position that sees any value in international humanitarian regimes with the premise of his and Eric Posner's The Limits of International Law, which dismisses IL as a mostly marginal constraint on state action (see for instance pp. 85-88). The Limits is not very keen on multilateral agreements insofar as they are not subject to reliable sanctions by independent third parties. Has something changed, or is there some about the anti-terror context which makes them a meaningful vehicle for modifying state behavior?

Friday, March 21, 2008

Happy 50th, Peace Symbol!
Yes, the venerable symbol that was born as the emblem of the British anti-nuclear movement but has matured into the universal sign of peace turns 50 today.


It's a beautiful symbol, one that — alas — will likely outlive us all. But we should still continue to hope for a world in which its use will no longer be necessary.

Thursday, March 20, 2008

Kosovo Independence is a "Defeat for International Law"
Or so says Professor (and sometime-guest blogger) Eugene Kontorovich in a recent op-ed.


As a result, NATO and America have become parties to the carve-up a sovereign state that they subdued by force. To say that this goes against the core principles of the U.N. Charter is an understatement. For international law, the entire process is a string of humiliations. The Security Council comes out looking like a joke; the right of self-determination looks like it depends on the product of a group's ruthlessness and proximity to Europe; peacekeepers are hostages; and sovereignty is trumped by the threat of terror.


I am very sympathetic to Eugene's critique here. At the very least, Kosovo is as much of, or even more, of a "defeat" for international law as the invasion of Iraq. Few people (Eugene excluded) seem willing to point that out.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

O What a Rogue and Peasant State Am I!
[This was cross-posted over at Huffington Post]

Now I am alone. O what a rogue and peasant slave am I! Is it not monstrous that this player here, But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, Could force his soul so to his own conceit, That from her working all his visage wann'd, Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect, A broken voice, and his whole function suiting, With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!... Yet I, a dull and mudd-mettled rascal, peak... Am I a coward? Who calls me villain?... Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain! O, vengenance! Why, what an ass am I!

Hamlet, Act 2, Scene 2


In the famous second soliloquy of Hamlet, Hamlet is overwhelmed by a feeling of worthlessness and self-pity. He stands alone, grieving his inaction. He wallows and rambles in mindless self-doubt, remonstrating against his own failure. In his mind, he is a pitiful and weak rogue, lacking the gall to live up to his commitment to avenge his father's murder. He makes plans to test whether his revenge is justified, but his actions do not help him achieve his desired end. He finds himself a miserable, melancholy knave.

This scene from Hamlet came to mind yesterday when I attended a fascinating conference at UCLA on the topic of "rogue states." After listening to the discussion, I could not help but pity (and fear) the poor rogue state. They are full to the brim with self-pity, and self-doubt, utterly consumed by their weakness.

Exhibit One was North Korea. The former Thai Foreign Minister, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, presented a wonderful series of vignettes of his visits to North Korea that underscore the pitiful position of poor Pyongyang. The North Koreans display a room full of gifts to the deceased Kim Il-sung to show foreign dignitaries that a nation without friends has so many friends. It is poor and desperately isolated. It treats every issue as an insult, and every diplomatic overture is a potential provocation. If one focused on this abiding sense of insecurity, it is clear that labeling it a member of the "axis of evil" was a profound mistake. It only fortified their sense of weakness and vulnerability. For North Korea, the lesson of Iraq is "We are next, unless we appear strong." Nuclear weapons mollified their insecurities.

Exhibit Two was Iran. Dalia Kaye of RAND emphasized that Iran does not pose a significant conventional military threat to its neighbors, although its assymetric capabilities (such as ballistic missile development) are a concern. Iran is not the former Soviet Union. It is a weak nation attempting to exert political and ideological influence in the region. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration eliminated two of Iran's greatest enemies with its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. And yet Iran still has precious few allies abroad and remains hugely unpopular at home. Therefore, we should move away from the rhetoric of regime change and unilaterally tone down our rhetoric on Iran. After all, democracy promotion is not the same thing as regime change. Our goals should be to promote democratic ideals and the rule of law from within.

Pakistan, by all accounts, is a special case. Former Pakistan Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan described his country as a deeply troubled one. National survival has been at the core of its mission for its entire existence. It may not be a rogue state, but it is a distrusted and sanctioned ally. It is not an enemy, but an enigmatic and disenchanted ally. When Pakistan cracks down on democracy and liberalism, it feels it must do so because it thinks the very survival of the state is at issue. It generally acts out of weakness and fear. It cannot be both popular and tough, so it opts for the latter when expediency so requires, and garners worldwide condemnation. Frequent terrorist attacks and disputed borders only add to its sense of insecurity.

What was the take-away message for the next administration? Don't feed the insecurities of rogue states. Stop calling them names. The label "rogue state" mistakes the essence of the state for its actions. These nations are in a troubled and precarious state of mind. They are full of self-doubt, prone to rash action, and easily insulted.

If there is one thing worse than a rogue state, it is a failed state. We know how the tragedy of Hamlet ended. When the mad Hamlet's doubts were eventually confirmed, he achieved his revenge and died in the process. Our goal should be to change the ending.