Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Wednesday, March 5, 2008

U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Rogue States
This conference at UCLA on March 11 addressing the topic of U.S. foreign policy toward rogue states looks really interesting.


On March 11, 2008, the Burkle Center for International Relations at UCLA will convene a conference featuring Governor Bill Richardson, Burkle Center Senior Fellows General Wesley Clark (ret.) and Former Foreign Minister to Thailand Kantathi Suphamongkhon and leading scholars, policy-makers, practitioners and military experts who will help us explore and analyze several crucial questions. Is "rogue state" a useful concept, and if so, what defines a rogue state? How has the United States treated such states in the past, and what lessons can be gleaned from these episodes? Under what conditions is engagement, isolation through sanctions and other means, or military action likely to be most effective? Join us to help shape and explore what our nation's foreign policy should be toward current states of concern like North Korea, Iran and Pakistan and for the future.

The conference schedule is here

Monday, March 3, 2008

Vladeck on Munaf
At Prawfsblawg today, my friend — and national-security law expert — Steve Vladeck discusses what the reversal of Mohammed Munaf's conviction means for his Supreme Court case. Here is a snippet:
Munaf's habeas petition is one of two brought by U.S. citizens detained in Iraq set to be argued before the Supreme Court later this month (and in which I co-authored an amicus brief in support of the federal courts' jurisdiction).

Significantly, the distinction between Munaf and the other detainee — Omar — relied upon by the D.C. Circuit was Munaf's conviction by the CCC-I... the lower courts concluded that, where the U.S. citizen-detainee had not been tried and convicted (Omar), there was jurisdiction; where he had, there wasn't (Munaf).

If Munaf's conviction has now been reversed, that has the potential to change the whole complexion of the two cases; now, both present a challenge to "pure" executive detention, without the wrinkle added by Munaf's conviction (subsequent to the filing of his habeas petition). Indeed, Munaf's almost becomes the stronger case, since his, unlike Omar's, is not in the posture of a grant of a preliminary injunction...
Steve's post is here, and the amicus brief he co-authored arguing that the federal courts have jurisdiction in both cases is here.
Colombia's Incursion into Ecuador and Anticipatory Self-Defense
At the heart of the Ecuadoran/ Colombian/ Venezuelan tensions, there is a dispute over the facts that has legal implications as to whether Colombia’s military action was self-defense or anticipatory self-defense (which, as many would see it, would make it aggression). As CNN explains:
[Ecuadoran President Rafael] Correa told reporters in Quito that [Colombia’s Presdient Alvaro] Uribe told him the raid occurred after a FARC column fled across the border [from Colombia and into Ecuador] and fired at Colombian forces, who "had to defend themselves."

But Correa said his forces investigated Uribe's claims and discovered that the Colombian planes attacked the guerrillas as they slept in a camp 2 km ( 1.2 mi) inside Ecuador.

"Of course Ecuadoran air space was invaded," he said…

"We will not permit this outrage," he said. "Either President Uribe was misinformed and will have to sanction his commanders who deceived him, breaking every international bilateral proceeding by entering our territory or Uribe simply lied. In either case, the situation is extremely grave and the Ecuadoran government is disposed to go to the ultimate consequences."
In Colombia’s version of the facts, they can claim “hot pursuit” and self-defense. But Ecuador’s version of the facts would make Colombia’s action unjustifiable under classic legal understandings of self-defense and under such facts Colombia would need to rely, as a legal matter, on the controversial post-9/11 attempts by the United States to refashion the law of use of force. As Jose Alvarez had written in his comment Hegemonic International Law Revisited (97 American Journal Int'l Law 873 (2003)):
the prospective endorsement of individual and collective self-defense by the [UN Security] Council, together with its later acquiescence in Operation Enduring Freedom, may signal, depending on how the Council's license comes to be interpreted by its licensee, the advent of three new general rules with respect to defensive force in the age of terrorism:

(1) Terrorist violence, at least when of the scale of the events of September 11, 2001, and even when undertaken by a nonstate actor, may constitute an “armed attack” for purposes of UN Charter Article 51.

(2) A state's assistance to, harboring of, or post hoc ratification of violent acts undertaken by individuals within its territory, or perhaps even mere negligence in controlling such individuals, may make that state responsible for those acts and justify military action against it. In other words, such state action (or inaction) may constitute a breach of the state's own duty not to violate UN Charter Article 2(4).

(3) The right to respond with military force against both terrorist individuals and harboring states does not become impermissible retaliation or illegal anticipatory self-defense, or exceed the rules of proportionality, merely because the threat of continued terrorist attack remains clandestine and unpredictable (as it has been since 9/11).
As this situation plays itself out, I wonder if the declarations and arguments by the political leaders of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, as well as those of other interested states, will provide a further gloss via state practice as to whether these new theories of self-defense have become more generally accepted. Will Colombia argue that, regardless as to which version of the facts you believe, they were within their rights to act?

In any case, as the troops of three countries head to their borders tonight, I hope that this situation will play itself out with nothing more than some heated rhetoric.

Related Posts (on one page):

  1. Colombia's Incursion into Ecuador and Anticipatory Self-Defense
  2. Venezuela Mobilizes Troops on Colombian Border

Sunday, March 2, 2008

Prince Harry and Jimmy McCain
Last year the British media entered into a voluntary agreement with the British Ministry of Defence to have a news blackout of Prince Harry's deployment in Afghanistan. Harry had been serving there about ten weeks when the news broke on the Drudge Report of his whereabouts. The BBC is now defending the news blackout. From the sounds of it, in exchange for extensive filming of Harry on the battlefield, the British press would keep mum about his deployment to Afghanistan. "So, for the past ten weeks, the BBC, ITV and Sky News have been filming with Prince Harry - the first time we've been up close and personal with him. We interviewed him ... in mid-December, just before he was sent to Afghanistan, we spent some time with him at the start of January when he was settling in at a remote base in Southern Helmand Province, and most recently, we filmed with him last week at a new location in Helmand Province."

When the news broke of Harry's deployment in Afghanistan, he was immediately rushed home. Harry was obviously frustrated. "It's something I would love to do... I don't want to sit around Windsor, because I generally don't like England that much and it's nice to be away from all the press and the papers."

I think the real story here is the failure of the British Ministry of Defence. They are concerned about Harry's safety, but then allow reporters to film him in action. Then when news broke of his service in Afghanistan they rush him home. We mustn't have any royals in action with the whole world watching. That would put him at risk and unduly inspire the public.

And then there is Jimmy McCain. The press, including the British media, have had no qualms reporting on the imminent deployment of McCain's youngest son to Iraq in December 2006. Then again in February 2008, they reported of McCain's reluctance to talk about his son for fear of his security.


Jimmy McCain is about to end his first rotation to Iraq. In more than a year of campaigning, McCain has publicly mentioned Jimmy only twice.... McCain’s reticence is in one sense understandable - he has not wanted to draw attention to Jimmy for fear of making him more of a target in Iraq. 'Frankly, it’s for [Jimmy’s] security and the security of the men and women serving around him.' Some of McCain’s rivals regard him as almost perverse for not trying to gain political advantage from his warrior sons. In a city well known for its presidential draft-dodgers, McCain has long stood out in Washington as an authentic military hero. “I just feel it’s inappropriate for us to mention our children,” the senator said recently. “I wouldn’t want to seem like I’m trying to gain some kind of advantage."

It's hard not to be impressed watching McCain's handling of his son's deployment in Iraq. And it's hard not to be disheartened watching the British mishandling of their favorite son's retreat from Afghanistan.

Iraqi Court Reverses US Citizen's Conviction
Shocking legal news out of Iraq — the Court of Cassation has reversed the conviction of Mohammed Munaf, the US citizen sentenced to death for helping kidnap three Romanian journalists in Iraq in 2005:
Munaf's lawyer, Joseph Margulies, said the Iraqi Court of Cassation reversed the conviction and sentence because it could not determine the role Munaf and other defendants played in the kidnapping from the court record. The Iraqi prosecutor supported the court's decision, Margulies said in an e-mail to The Associated Press.

Munaf is part of a pending Supreme Court case in which he and another naturalized American, Shawqi Omar, are trying to prevent the military from handing them over to the Iraqis.

The Bush administration argues that they should not be able to contest their pending transfers in U.S. courts since they are being held not by the United States, but by coalition forces in Iraq.

The administration, in its Supreme Court filing, said, "Munaf admitted on camera, in writing, and in front of the Iraqi investigative court that he participated as an accomplice in the kidnapping for profit of the Romanian journalists."

Munaf has said his confession was coerced.
The US role in Munaf's case has been bizarre, to say the least. According to Scott Horton, the trial judge in the case had initially been set to dismiss the charges for lack of evidence — until two Americans intervened and convinced him otherwise. I can't do the story justice, so here is Horton's account, in all its Kafkaesque glory:
AMY GOODMAN: Scott Horton, I wanted to go back to another story, one that we have covered that hasn’t gotten a lot of attention: Mohammad Munaf. He is the Iraqi American who has just been sentenced to death also. Can you talk about his case?

SCOTT HORTON: Well, I was astounded by that, when I first heard a report about it... So I spoke with the defense counsel. I also spoke with a bailiff at the court about it, to find out what had happened in this proceeding. And what they all described — in fact, completely they all had exactly the same account of what happened — was shocking.

They say that he was brought into the courtroom, Mr. Munaf, by two American officers — one they described as, quote, “the general”; the other they described as a man named Lieutenant Pirone. He was brought before the court. The court had announced, prior to session, that reviewing the evidence of the case, he had concluded that he would dismiss the charges, that there were no substantial charges, and that at this hearing, that would be a conclusion to the affair, there would be a dismissal.

[snip]

SCOTT HORTON: ... And then, the account is that this American lieutenant stood up, began arguing very loudly with the judge, saying it was unacceptable that this man be dismissed, that he had to be convicted, and moreover that he had to receive the death sentence. And the American whipped out a piece of paper saying he was there speaking on behalf of the government of Romania and the government of Romania demanded the death sentence.

Afterwards, there was a private discussion, I’m told, between the Americans and the judge. The judge emerged from this ashen-faced, looking very upset, and then proceeded immediately to convict the man and sentence him to death.

And subsequently, the government of Romania reacted, saying they knew nothing about this proceeding and they certainly did not authorize an American officer to stand up in the court and demand the death sentence. In fact, the government of Romania does not endorse the death sentence. So there’s something very strange going on about this case.
I haven't been following Munaf's Supreme Court case, so I can't discuss what effect the reversal will have. Perhaps one of our readers will weigh in.