Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Sunday, June 29, 2008

There Will Be Blood
The NY Times Week in Review has an article written by Graham Bowley on the effect of recent attacks by Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure and the effects of these attacks on world oil prices. The piece begins:
When armed rebels from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta attacked an enormous oil facility 75 miles off the swampy West African coast on June 19, traveling hours by speedboat under cover of darkness and kidnapping an oil worker, their brazen assault underlined the perhaps underappreciated dependence of the United States — and the world — on oil from Nigeria.

Three days afterward, Nigerian officials said at a hastily arranged global energy summit in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, that recent attacks had cut Nigeria’s oil production to its lowest level in nearly two decades, giving oil markets the jitters and helping to send prices higher…

“We always focus on the Persian Gulf but this is one of the key oil security issues in the world today,” said Daniel Yergin, one of the nation’s best-known energy experts and chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, a consulting firm. “It’s tied up with Nigerian politics, regional and national battles for power, and criminality.” When Mr. Yergin spoke to lawmakers at a hearing in Congress last week, he was asked what would most help stabilize world markets. “Helping bring peace to the Niger Delta would be a major contribution,” he responded.
The Times article continues that responding to the situation in Nigeria will need both a sound development policy and a counter-insurgency strategy:
According to J. Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, the government led by Nigeria’s new president, Umaru Yar’Adua, must break with decades of neglect and pay attention to the troubles of the southern delta region by promoting development but also cracking down on the rebels and “demonstrating that these guys cannot operate with impunity.”

He’s not very optimistic, however. “When you look at the delta, the overwhelming picture is that the situation has very little promise of being fixed,” he said.
While development policy is always a complex issue, the “operate with impunity” part is also a problem, as MEND has started attacking not just oil pipelines, but offshore oil platforms, as well. MEND even issued a press release that states, "The location for today's attack was deliberately chosen to remove any notion that off-shore oil exploration is far from our reach." Jeff Vail of The Oil Drum explains that this is especially significant as 90% of Nigeria’s oil growth is expected to be via new offshore platforms. Which now seem vulnerable to attack.

John Robb, who writes extensively on guerilla-based “fourth generation warfare” is concerned that destabilization from infrastructure attacks will worsen:
So, given production limitations and strong/concentrated demand, even small disruptions by guerrilla groups on light sweet crude production is likely to have a direct influence on global oil pricing (in contrast, disruptions aimed at heavy crude production should have little impact on global pricing). Further, there are already active groups in many of the most critical production areas.

Fortunately, from the demonstrated behavior of these groups it doesn't appear that guerrilla/terrorist groups have fully grasped their potential market power with small attacks (despite aspirational pronouncements from al Qaeda and large scale attacks in 2005/2006). Once they do, as bad as disruption is today, it could get MUCH worse.

Why? A direct connection to scalable profits...

As we saw with e-mail spam/phishing, even the faintest whiff of profits can turn a loose collection of individuals/groups into a torrential crime-fueled marketplace generated billions and attracting tens of thousands of participants. Are we about to see the same occur with oil?
For example, consider Columbia. John Robb notes that
Disruption isn't limited to Nigeria. A remote control bomb by the FARC on Occidental Petroleum's pipeline in Colombia just knocked out 100,000 barrels a day. It's also interesting to note how irrelevant the US military/national security system has become in regards to global energy security. The entire paradigm of warfare has changed but the $1 Trillion behemoth has barely budged.
While I doubt that the end is nigh, the situation is obviously serious and it won’t be solved by a combination of a dithering domestic energy policy and a foreign policy of “assisted” regime-change. So, for now, only one thing is certain…

Sunday, June 22, 2008

Thanks to Haider Hamoudi
We at Opinio Juris want to thank once again Haider Hamoudi for guest-blogging with us this past week. For more on the issues he has raised, be sure to visit his blog, Islamic Law in Our Times and read his memoir, Howling in Mesopotamia.

We hope he will soon join us again for another guest-blogging stint.

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Iraq(s?)
I have been particularly interested in Haider Hamoudi's observations in his book on cultural differences within Iraq. In two contratsing examples, Haider describes his visit to Basra in Southern Iraq and Suleymania in the North. Basra is predominantly Shi’a and Suleymania is in Kudish territory.

A couple of vignettes were striking. First, there was a guard in Basra asking Haider to prove he was Iraqi by reciting the Muslim profession of faith… specifically the Shi’a version. But what if you are a Sunni? (Or a Christian?)

That same day he was in a faculty meeting in the law school in Basra and the faculty discussed the possibility of starting a graduate level program there, which they noted would be especially useful for female students. One of the other USAID consultants explained that funding was questionable as the CPA may simply say such programs already exist in Baghdad and that the female students could study there. The response was interesting:
Howls of protest interrupted him. A more conservative professor, Ali, said, “Our women aren’t going to Baghdad unaccompanied!”

“Not everyone has a relative in Baghdad,” another added. ‘What about the ones who don’t?”

“And there are cultural and social norms they have to respect,” chimed in a third…
What strikes me about these, and other observations in other parts of the book, is the description of the different communities in Iraq and how these differences affect day-to-day life. Of course we hear about the sectarian conflicts often from the punditocracy, but it is often couched in sensationalistic “they’re all killing each other” terms.

My question to Haider is this: how deep are the commonalities as opposed to the differences? Some U.S. observers argue that it took (and will take) an authoritarian regime to hold Iraq together. (This is essentially the "it took a Tito to keep Yugoslavia together" argument.) Based on your time there, what are your thoughts on whether Iraq is primarily a cohesive community (with some violent sectarian elements that are fighting each other) or three (or more) communities that really are separate? If the latter, how effective are the efforts to knit them together? And what do you think of this talk by some foriegn policy commentators of the near-inevitability of a soft partition, if not a hard break-up?

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

Life and Law in Iraq
First of all, my thanks are due to Professor Borgen, and to all of the editors of Opinio Juris, my favorite law blog (aside from my own, of course), for giving me the opportunity to discuss these vitally important issues in this extraordinary forum. Just one small correction to Professor Borgen’s very gracious introduction: the name of my book is Howling in Mesopotamia, not Howling in Iraq. I emphasize this only because early on in the writing process, I had to fight rather energetically over this very point, whether to change the word Mesopotamia to Iraq on the theory that more readers would understand the latter. I won the argument and therefore feel compelled to make the correction, even at the expense of pedantry.

Howling in Mespotamia is a memoir, a personal experience of life in Iraq, as an Iraqi, beyond the protected walls of the Green Zone, by one with access to both the American administrators and the Iraqi people, of all sects and backgrounds. It was my purpose (and my editor’s mission in life, or so it seemed to me, to my eternal gratitude) to expunge political diatribes, legal exposition, tiresome exegeses of cultural differences, and to explain events as I saw them in as direct and unambiguous a fashion as I could, to relay a certain sense of humanity to the Iraqi people. How I was nearly shot for a terrorist by an American patrol while returning a generator to a manufacturer, what it was like for an Iraqi to eat at a restaurant at a time when several were bombed nearly every week, who these people were, waving their purple fingers at times, beating their chests at others—these were the questions I sought to address, to give a face, a name, a life, a family to the statistics, the numbers of dead and wounded, we see in the news nearly every day. Who was at fault for what, whether the invasion was a mistake, or what the role of Islamic law would be in the new Iraq were matters dear to my heart, and to my scholarship, but were not really the point of the book.

And yet, at every single forum in which I have participated, or interview I have given, concerning the memoir, these legal and political matters are discussed at some length, almost always in the context of the stories I have told in Howling. When it comes to Iraq, it seems to me, the personal is forever intertwined with the political, and life and law cannot so easily be separated from one another.

To give just one example, just last week I gave a talk at a fairly well known, and I think deservedly well respected, Washington DC based forum of Arab issues, Al Hewar. The Iraqi Ambassador and the cultural attaché were both in attendance, as were a number of prominent Arab Americans—professors, diplomats, doctors and the like. A rather nerve racking experience, given the prominence of the attendees and given that I spoke in Arabic, which presented its own unique set of challenges. Despite my penchant for attaching feminine adjectives to masculine nouns, I managed to convey the subject of the book, and, in that context, the work in which I was engaged in Iraq. These were, specifically, legal education reform through a DePaul University project run by the renowned Cherif Bassiouni and funded by USAID, and service on a Governing Council (GC) committee that was charged with advising on commercial legislation drafted by the American administrators at the time, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

With one exception, the questions I received were polite, cogent and well informed. They were also largely, though not entirely, adversarial, particularly as concerned my advisory work, where my role in reviewing commercial legislation was in fact quite minor, as I emphasized. I was given a period of hours to review quite often poorly drafted legislation that members of the Governing Council in some cases said quite openly would never be implemented in any significant fashion. I could as a result only correct the most embarrassing and egregious of errors. Had the CPA not dissolved in June of 2004, I am sure I would have quit shortly thereafter, less because I considered the work harmful and more because I found it largely pointless. I spent three hours offering comments on an intellectual property law that is so widely ignored that I needed to send someone to Amman to purchase legal copies of Microsoft to comply with a US government contract. Even the Iraqi government offices I visited did not quite understand what I wanted, until I managed to meet a Minister of Higher Education in Kurdistan who had spent time in France, heard my dilemma and smiled, gently offering Amman as the only solution she could think of.

Nevertheless, harmless as I found this experience, and compelling as I found the stories that arose out of it, the matter did create some controversy at Al Hewar. It also, in the opinion of some, cast some doubt on my ability to tell stories of the Iraqi people as an Iraqi. Hadn’t I in fact worked with the occupier? (I guess so, sort of.) Did they in fact have the right to pass all of this legislation under international law? (Probably not.) And even harder to digest, for me--did Iraq even need new commercial laws? (Absolutely, the laws on security for loans are quite outdated, to name the simplest example.) And couldn’t domestic Iraqi lawyers, real Iraqi lawyers (i.e. not me) make the necessary changes? (Absolutely, with international consultation, nobody had seen a real cross border deal in Iraq for decades.)

What made the matter even more striking however, is how much less controversial the drafting of the Constitution was. Some raised questions, to be sure, one raised a fuss about my supposed role in its drafting and how awful it was. I had no such role, but my uncle was head of the committee that drafted that document and so the document in Arab circles, where kin is king, is often indirectly attributed to me, I am finding. However, for the most part, and despite this attribution, the Constitution was not raised nearly as often as this quite silly and pointless legislation. This is not the first time this has happened, and it should give anyone pause—why is it that nobody asks whether Iraq’s foundational document should have been amended, whether it was necessary, whether it was legal, and yet the questions came concerning issues of far less consequence? Clearly much of the Iraq constitution was influenced by other constitutions, as the CPA orders were influenced by material taken from other jurisdictions. Why then this rather striking difference in treatment?

I think there is a clear enough legal answer as to why this was, and how it came to be that what was in fact a recitation of personal and familial experiences in Iraq led to a rather enlightening example on the nature of law and the legal transplant. The CPA laws were clearly drafted by an occupying authority and approved by a Governing Council that had been selected by that authority. As I have relayed elsewhere, the GC selection was largely competent, the major Iraq players at the time were largely represented, but still, it was an appointed body. The idea of that process leading to anything but disaster remains for many Arabs unpalatable, and examples in my ">scholarship of CPA successes are never kindly met in such fora.

By contrast, the Constitution was written by an elected body, through elections urged by Grand Ayatollah Sistani, no American appointee, and in connection with which the Grand Ayatollah decreed that to vote was an Islamic obligation. (More on this subject later in the week.) The Kurds and the Shi’a both enthusiastically participated. This was not the product of the occupier, it is hard to make a case otherwise. As a result, questions concerning its necessity disappear, and objections as to the necessity of any legal reform are shunted from an entirely rewritten constituent document to subsidiary statutes. In other words, we may have needed a new Iraqi constitution, if the Iraqis think so, but we don’t need new Iraqi commercial law (all the evidence to the contrary notwithstanding), at least not unless the Iraqis say so.

This is not to say that there is no controversy attending the Constitution, but this relates to the sectarian nature of the drafting process, a matter I will turn to in another entry. That fact clearly does detract from the document’s authenticity and leads to Sunni accusations of a different foreign influence, Iran. For now, however, the point is this—a law is not controversial because it has been imported from, or at least influenced by, other jurisdictions. So much of Iraqi law already is. It is the process of importation, and the appearance of domestic legitimacy (ie urged by Sistani, drafted by an elected assembly) that is, I believe, dispositive. That in itself is not surprising, in fact I suppose it might be obvious, but the fact that it became manifest, in this context, not in an academic forum but rather in a presentation that was supposed to be about personal Iraqi lives and experiences was, to my mind, worthy of note. Nothing seems to escape law and politics in Iraq, I think, it is near to the minds of all Iraqis. No matter what else we might want to be thinking about, it looms always near in these difficult and precarious times.

This was by way of introduction, tomorrow I will endeavor to discuss some pressing legal matters in more depth.
Opinio Juris Welcomes Guest Blogger Haider Hamoudi
We are pleased to welcome guest blogger Professor Haider Ala Hamoudi of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Professor Hamoudi is a prolific scholar on Islamic and comparative law and also has a blog, Islamic Law in Our Times.

Professor Hamoudi has also recently published Howling in Mesopotamia: an Iraqi-American Memoir, described on Amazon.com as
… a groundbreaking insider's story about America's war in Iraq. His unique perspective and fresh insight into the conflict that has divided our country were informed by living with relatives in an average residential neighborhood in Baghdad during the war. Many of his relatives were intimately involved in the unfolding political process, such as his uncle, who became chair of the Iraqi Constitutional Committee, and his cousin, Ahmed Chalabi, one of the most prominent Iraqi exiles to return after the fall of the previous regime.

Hamoudi saw firsthand the frustrations and fears that plagued Iraqi civilians during a crucial period of the war. As an American in Iraq working on a USAID-funded contract, he also interacted with American administrators regularly, and was able to see the developing situation from their point of view as well. Howling in Mesopotamia is a critical look at what went wrong in Iraq from a person who was there. Hamoudi's gripping memoir will shed light on the events, mistakes, and misunderstandings.
We look forward to Professor Hamoudi joining us this week for a conversation about his book, the fate of Iraq, Islamic law, and other related issues.

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Israeli Supreme Court Upholds Unlawful Combatants Law
As our Boumediene instant symposium gets underway, I thought it might be interesting to note that the Israeli Supreme Court has just upheld the Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, which permits the indefinite detention of a person who does not qualify for POW status and "who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel or is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel." From Ha'aretz:
The Supreme Court yesterday upheld the constitutionality of the law allowing for the detention of "unlawful combatants," which Israel uses to hold Hezbollah fighters.

Supreme Court President Dorit Beinisch and Justices Edmond Levy and Ayala Procaccia rejected an appeal by two Gazan Palestinians who were detained after their involvement in terror activity on behalf of Hezbollah was proved.

The Unlawful Combatants Law authorizes the state to detain foreign nationals who belong to terror organizations or have participated directly or indirectly in hostile actions against the State of Israel.

Its goal is to prevent their continued activities.

Beinisch wrote in the verdict that although the law involves substantial harm and the suppression of personal freedom through administrative detention, the harm is proportional.

She noted that it was passed in a "harsh security reality" that justifies the violation of to personal freedom.

"The law's harm to the constitutional right to personal freedom, although substantial, is no greater than necessary," Beinisch wrote.

"Therefore, we have concluded that the law meets the criteria of the limitations ruling and there is no constitutional grounds to intervene in it."
The Unlawful Combatants Law requires a District Court to determine every six months whether a prisoner's release "will not harm State security" or whether "there are special grounds justifying his release"; the court's decision can then be appealed to a single judge of the Supreme Court for review. Scholars question, however, whether the Law's review procedures adequately protect prisoners' rights. Here is what Ron Dudai of SOAS had to say two years ago, when the Israeli Supreme Court first upheld the detention of "unlawful combatants":
Yet how powerful can this judicial review be? Not only does the Illegal Combatants law create a new category not recognized in international law, it reverses the burden of proof. Once an order is signed by the Chief of Staff, the burden of proof is on the defendant: he has to prove to the court that he is not an enemy combatant. Moreover, he is expected do this when the charge against him is based solely on classified evidence, which he is barred from examining and is therefore unable to challenge. One of the defendants told the court he was arrested in his house, for no reason, and added that if he were exposed to the evidence against him he would be able to respond. But that, of course, did not happen. After the defense lawyers argued their case, they and their clients had to exit the courtroom, leaving the security services’ representatives to reveal their secret evidence to the judge.
Food for comparative thought.

Thursday, May 29, 2008

Muslim Views of the United States


The Pew Research Center has a fascinating poll released earlier this month on Muslim perceptions of the United States. Here is a quick summary:


Simply put, America’s image in much of the Muslim world remains abysmal. Iraq, the war on terrorism, American support for Israel and other key features of U.S. foreign policy continue to generate animosity in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere. In many nations considered central to the war on terror, the general public deeply distrusts the United States. Even in countries like Kuwait that have long been considered relatively pro-American, the U.S. image has declined.

On the bright side, America seems to be winning the battle of ideas on some important fronts. First and foremost, support for terrorism has declined dramatically over the last few years in many Muslim countries. Fewer Muslims now consider suicide bombing justifiable, and confidence in Osama bin Laden has waned. Moreover, the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey revealed the extent to which there is broad support for democracy, capitalism and globalization throughout all regions of the world, including Muslim nations. Support for American ideas, however, does not necessarily translate into warm feelings for the United States. Instead, Muslims believe the United States fails to live up to its rhetoric on democracy, and they tend to blame the United States for the aspects of globalization they do not like.



Tuesday, May 6, 2008

How Do You Chip out of a Mortar Hole?
I'm sorry, I just can't let this one go:
Picture, if you will, a tree-lined plaza in Baghdad's International Village, flanked by fashion boutiques, swanky cafes, and shiny glass office towers. Nearby a golf course nestles agreeably, where a chip over the water to the final green is but a prelude to cocktails in the club house and a soothing massage in a luxury hotel, which would not look out of place in Sydney harbour. Then, as twilight falls, a pre-prandial stroll, perhaps, amid the cool of the Tigris Riverfront Park, where the peace is broken only by the soulful cries of egrets fishing.

Improbable though it all may seem, this is how some imaginative types in the US military are envisaging the future of Baghdad's Green Zone, the much-pummelled redoubt of the Iraqi capital where a bunker shot has until now had very different connotations.

A $5bn (£2.5bn) tourism and development scheme for the Green Zone being hatched by the Pentagon and an international investment consortium would give the heavily fortified area on the banks of the Tigris a "dream" makeover that will become a magnet for Iraqis, tourists, business people and investors. About half of the area is now occupied by coalition forces, the US state department or private foreign companies.

The US military released the first tentative artists' impression yesterday. An army source said the barbed wire, concrete blast barriers and checkpoints that currently disfigure the 5 sq mile area would be replaced by shopping malls, hotels, elegant apartment blocks and leisure parks. "This is at the end of the day an Iraqi-owned area and we will give it back to them with added value," said the source, who requested anonymity.

Potential investors are being encouraged to take a punt that years ahead, Baghdad's fortunes may mirror former war-torn cities such as Sarajevo and Beirut that have risen from the ashes.

Marriott International has already signed a deal to build a hotel in the Green Zone, according to Navy Captain Thomas Karnowski, the chief US liaison. Also in the pipeline is a possible $1bn investment from MBI International, a hotel and resorts specialist led by Saudi sheikh, Mohamed Bin Issa Al Jaber.

One Los Angeles-based firm, C3, has said it wants to build an amusement park on the Green Zone's outskirts. As part of the first phase, a skateboard park is due to open this summer.
The best thing about the "artist's rendering" is the complete absence of background. Wonder why that is?

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Tariq Aziz's Trial Begins
As a brief follow-up to Sonya's post, it's worth noting that the IHT began trying Tariq Aziz, Saddam's deputy prime minister and the highest ranking Christian in Saddam's regime, earlier this week:
Iraq's former deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz, was known as the 'Ace of Spades' in the United States' deck of playing cards of Iraq's most wanted.

But he was better-known as the regime's moderate public face, who fronted the cameras in the days before the US invasion with his trademark black-rimmed glasses and Cuban cigars.

Aziz has now gone on trial in Iraq on genocide charges, accused of approving the execution of scores of business people while the country was under economic sanctions.

He has been in US custody for the last five years and if he is found guilty, he could face death by hanging.

The 72-year-old entered the courtroom with a walking stick, looking frail and weak.

He and seven others are on trial for executing 42 Baghdad merchants in 1992, who were accused of raising food prices at a time when Iraq was facing stiff UN economic sanctions.

[snip]

Judge Rahim Hassan al-U'kaili says Aziz and his seven co-defendants will be charged with war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

"Tariq Aziz didn't have any role in the issue of the execution of merchants," he said.

"However, his participation in the issuance of two resolutions which stipulated the following - each one who monopolises foodstuffs for commercial purposes should be executed, and his portable and non-portable properties should be confiscated."
Although I haven't examined the case against Aziz in any detail, the genocide charges are puzzling. The victims were merchants executed (almost certainly illegally) for price-gouging. So where is the specific intent to destroy a racial, ethnic, national, or religious group?
The Iraqi High Tribunal Post-U.S. Involvement
The following article was written by Sonya Sceats, Associate Fellow in International Law at Chatham House in London. It first appeared in The World Today, Chatham House's journal. I am reprinting it here for our readers who are interested in the more recent activities of the Iraqi High Tribunal.

Rowdy sessions of the Iraq High Tribunal attracted sensational daily news coverage while Saddam Hussein was being tried. However, following his grim execution in December 2006, coverage all but evaporated. The foreign press and most western monitors packed their bags and left, and television reporting in Iraq dwindled. Now even the United States Department of Justice, which initially provided key financial and political support, is quietly withdrawing its advisers.

So what is happening at the Tribunal and why are the Americans pulling out?

The departure of the American lawyers is hugely significant. In practical terms, it means that crucial technical assistance for the judges and prosecutors will be lost. From a more general perspective, it marks a watershed in the gradual turning inwards of the Iraqi High Tribunal. The desire of the Iraqis to try Saddam Hussein and other senior Ba’athists themselves, and their insistence on making the death penalty available, means that international involvement has always been low. But until recently, the presence of international advisers, and, in the courtroom, journalists and observers, ensured some connection with the outside world.

DYSFUNCTIONAL

According to insiders, the Tribunal is in a state of internal turmoil. Morale among the judges is said to be very low. For example, the judges who heard the case relating to widespread attacks on Kurdish villages in 1998 are reportedly disillusioned by ongoing political wrangling over the execution warrants for Ali Hassan al-Majid, better known as Chemical Ali, and two others found guilty – former defence minister Sultan Hashem Ahmed and Hussein Rashid Mohammed, a deputy chief of staff in the army. Powerful interests are resisting the execution of Sultan Hashem in particular because he is widely respected in the military and in Mosul, where his tribe is fighting Al Qaeda, and there are fears his execution will inflame the insurgency.

It seems likely that the US Department of Justice is withdrawing in a bid to disassociate itself from the high levels of dysfunction. Infighting and absenteeism among the judges have both become rife. This has caused a sharp drop in productivity which will in turn almost certainly delay the commencement of important new trials. Meanwhile the loss of international interest may have compounded the problems. With the departure of the press and most independent monitors, vital forms of external scrutiny have been lost.

GENOCIDE CASE IGNORED

The Tribunal has concluded two trials and is nearing the end of a third. The opening case concerning the massacre of 148 villagers in Dujail was the subject of intense scrutiny by the media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics, and others. Key talking points included the courtroom antics of Saddam and his co-defendants and frequent boycotts by their lawyers, the challenging security context – several staff and defence lawyers were killed while the trial was in progress – and the important question of whether it was fair. Unfortunately, subsequent cases, involving crimes of far greater magnitude, have barely been reported or discussed. The Tribunal’s second, and arguably most important, trial concerned the series of chemical and other attacks launched by Iraqi armed forced on thousands of Kurdish villages in 1998. An estimated 180,000 people lost their lives in what came to be known as the ‘Anfal’ – spoils of war – campaign. Between August 2006 and June 2007, six leaders of the attacks including al-Majid were tried for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Charges were also brought against Saddam, who attended early sessions, but were dropped following his execution. Undoubtedly, his absence was the primary reason for such patchy news coverage. This is deeply regrettable because, in contrast to the Dujail killings, a relatively minor incident, the Anfal campaign was an iconic symbol of the barbarity of the Ba’athist regime. It is therefore understandable that many Kurds feel bitter that Saddam escaped accountability for these atrocities because of a prosecution strategy which prioritised Dujail to secure a ‘quick win’.

Lack of interest also means that ongoing problems and some modest improvements since the Dujail hearing have not been properly acknowledged. Low points included the removal of the first presiding judge, at the request of the Iraqi prime minister’s office, after he stated in court that Saddam was ‘not a dictator’, and another boycott by defence lawyers.

According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, the lone NGO monitor for the Anfal trial, defendants faced many challenges including impossibly vague charges, and a Tribunal failure to accommodate defence testimony; less than ten defence witnesses were heard.

On a brighter note, the proceedings were generally less chaotic. The quality of legal argument also improved – the prosecution made a strong case for the command responsibility of most defendants, proper defences were mounted and the Tribunal demonstrated increased competence in international criminal law.

From a legal perspective, the most important feature of the trial is the genocide verdict. This crime is notoriously difficult to prosecute because of the need to demonstrate a specific intent to destroy, in whole or part, the persecuted group, and this remains one of the few times it has been proved in court. The proceedings were closely followed by Iraqi Kurds. When the verdicts were announced – all but one of the defendants were found guilty – Kurds took to the streets in northern Iraq to celebrate. A decision to confiscate the assets of those convicted should mean their personal wealth is redistributed to the Kurdish communities they sought to destroy.

UPRISINGS TRIAL

A third trial, relating to the brutal suppression of mass Shi’a uprisings in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, is expected to finish in the next month or two. Fifteen defendants including al-Majid are standing trial. According to observers, order has finally been achieved in the courtroom – it is even said that the presiding judge considers al-Majid a ‘model defendant’ because he asks legal questions and is generally courteous; a far cry from his behaviour during the Anfal proceedings. However, discipline in the courtroom is not equivalent to fairness and deep concerns remain over the conduct of this trial. In particular, its hasty commencement last August before investigations were complete, and the Tribunal’s refusal to delay proceedings, has clearly prejudiced the defence.

There has also been criticism of a decision to narrow the scope of the trial to events in Amara and Basra. This was clearly pragmatic – it was thought that more than a hundred defendants would be tried if all the related uprisings were included – however, it means linkage evidence necessary to establish command responsibility may not be presented.

At least four other cases are almost ready. They relate to the infamous gassing of Kurdish villagers in Halabja; the expulsion of Fayli (Shi’a) Kurds in the 1980s; the destruction of marshes relied upon by the Marsh Arabs; and the killing of eleven merchants. The last of these is politically significant because, although the crimes were comparatively small scale, the victims were Sunni and the Tribunal hopes this will counter Sunni perceptions that it is a tool of Shi’a and Kurdish vengeance.

SERIOUS FLAWS

There is no doubt that the Dujail trial was seriously marred by political meddling and a range of fair trial failings, including inadequate time for defendants to prepare their cases, and a lack of rigour in verifying the documentary evidence crucial to establish the guilt of Saddam and his co-accused.

However, the trial was not the complete train wreck many predicted. Most would agree that the standard of justice was an improvement on trials in the mainstream Iraqi criminal justice system. And despite enormous security risks, dozens of witnesses turned up to testify, allowing a detailed record of the killings to emerge.

Since Dujail, there have been some signs of progress. The judges have achieved authority in the courtroom and their skill in trying complex international crimes seems to have improved. And yet the remaining problems are grave. Political interference appears to be continuing – judges have been leant on by politicians to drop cases and initiate others for political purposes, and the chief prosecutor, Jaffar al-Moussawi, was recently removed after criticising the Tribunal’s ‘financial and ethical corruption’.

Many will maintain that Saddam and other senior Ba’athists should have been tried instead by an ad hoc international tribunal like those set up for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, however there was no support for this within the United Nations. And, the International Criminal Court cannot try crimes committed before 1 July 2002. Hence a more realistic criticism is that there should have been more international involvement in this Iraqi-led process.

While the original statute for the Tribunal allowed the appointment of international judges, the second statute restricted this to cases involving states; none have been heard yet, despite pressure from Iran and Kuwait. International advisers are also permitted but opposition to the death penalty by European and other countries means almost all such advisers have been American. The departure now of all but four of the American lawyers is merely the latest step towards the Tribunal’s international isolation.

The predictions are that the Tribunal will be wound down in the next year or two. Let us hope that the remaining trials receive the public attention they clearly need, from both human rights monitors and the international media.

Tuesday, April 22, 2008

Incitement to Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect
[Professor Elihu Richter teaches at Hebrew University-Hadassah School of Medicine and Public Health and heads the Program on Genocide Prevention. This post follows up on last week's discussion of Susan Benesch's VJIL article.]

I congratulate the Virginia Journal of International Law for hosting this web-based discussion with Susan Benesch and Greg Gordon (among others) on the legal aspects of incitement and genocide. The core principles are that the right to life trumps all other human rights, and that we have a Responsibility to Protect (R2P- Security Council Resolution 1674). Both have written path-breaking treatises of the highest public importance. Here are my brief comments:

Precautionary Principle and the Ethical Import of Delay. I myself am a medical epidemiologist with a special interest in applying the "Precautionary Principle" to make genocide prevention effective. I would like to see an international network for surveillance of hate language and prosecution of incitement to commit genocide. There is an abundant body of knowledge showing that state sponsored hate language and incitement predicts, initiates, triggers and promotes genocide, The Precautionary Principle states that when there is uncertainty concerning the possibility of the occurrence of a major catastrophic event, the costs of inaction far outweigh those of anticipatory preventive action. The Precautionary Principle shifts the burden of proof from those suspecting a catastrophic risk to those denying it. The Precautionary Principle, which has already been applied by the European Court of Justice to uphold the ban on the UK's beef exports, states that when there is doubt about a risk, there should be no doubt about the need for its prevention. This principle is now part of many international conventions guiding Environmental Law, especially in the European Union, and has been endorsed by the International Association for Genocide Scholars. Prevention of genocide based on the Precautionary Principle needs to build upon the 2002 Statute of the International Criminal Court, the 2004 Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Prevention of Genocide, UN Security Council Resolution 1674, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome which declared he "responsibility to protect" targeted groups.

In genocide prevention, as in environmental health and disaster prevention, the case for action in applying the Precautionary Principle, as the discussants have all noted, is the catastrophic ethical cost of delaying prevention - which, as in natural disasters, can be measured in massive loss of human lives. There is an ethical import to delay in preventing genocide and genocidal terror-which is merely genocide being carried out by an NGO. The foregoing means there is an ethical imperative to deter, prevent or stop state sponsored hate language and incitement. In short, a false positive -e.g. wrongly silencing an inciter,--is much less of a problem than a false negative, e.g. letting an inciter commit his vile crime--which would be catastrophic.

Professor Gregory Stanton of Mary Washington University and GenocideWatch and Dr Rony Blum of Hebrew University and Yale University and I have advocated shifting the focus of genocide law and preventive activity from proof of intent after the event to prediction and prevention. (Memorandum submitted to Council of Foreign Relations, April 2006, via Paul Fold of US Senate Foreign Relations Committee). As is known to everyone in this discussion, The Rome Statute of the ICC, which specifies that incitement to commit genocide is a crime against humanity, is the already available platform for making this advance.

The proposal to indict the President of Iran for incitement to commit genocide is the template case study for applying the Precautionary Principle based on "predict and prevent" as opposed to "proof of intent after the event".

It is my premise that the core of a program for prevention of genocide and genocidal terror should be based on applying public health models for prediction and prevention which specify surveillance, prevention and control of early genocidal conditions and proactive interventions keyed to early predictors. Based on the lessons of the Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Darfur, and many other genocides, it is clear that state sponsored incitement and hate language are highly specific early warning signs that should be the trip points for preventive legal action, instead of waiting for prosecution after genocide is over.

Text, subcontext, and context. The foregoing is the basis for some statements I would like to make about text, subtext, and context. The text is the threats--some claim they are merely predictions--to wipe Israel off the map as part of this decision. The subtext is the pictures of missiles below which phrases such as these threats appear. The context is the enriching of uranium in violation of UN resolutions, developing ever more advanced missile systems, promoting Holocaust denial, and supporting terror groups with explicitly stated genocidal agendas, and the fact that the President of the country carrying out such enrichment, is the most vocal advocate of these genocidal threats.

Subtext and context, I submit, are critically important. Up to Oct. 25 2005, Ahmadinejad's predecessors were quoted as having made many threats similar to those made by Ahmadinejad. These were ignored by the International legal community. Had these "inchoate" statements triggered some kind of punitive action, would we be where we are now? Re context, I would be willing to bet that Ahmadinejad--and many others--had made many similar statements on all kinds of soapboxes when he was a minor politician unknown to the world. The case for action to prevent an imminent peril emerged from the day he became President, acquired real power, his statements about wiping Israel off the map became headlines everywhere, and his government rejected all UN resolutions concerning Iran's nuclear plans.

Lapsed period between the statements and the actions. I believe the discussion of the lapsed period has to take into account the fact that children are those most vulnerable to the effects of incitement and hate language from official state sponsored sources, such as texts, media, and places of worship, and the effects may be decades later. We know that for adults, where there is an authoritarian environment, incitement can convert normal people into sadistic killers over a matter of months. But children are the most vulnerable group, as is the case for so many toxic exposures in medicine, and incitement and hate language reaching children increases the likelihood of intergenerational transmission of the effects. As with all cause-effect relationships in which the relations between exposure and effect may be years or decades (e.g. Asbestos, cigarette smoking and cancer, or DES in mothers and congenital malformations in their offspring), we cannot dismiss the case for legal action and accountability just because there is a long lapsed period between exposure and effect. Where the audience for incitement includes schoolchildren, even if there are no immediate effects, we have an obligation to apply R2P-the responsibility to protect future generations-to ensure R4L-Respect for Life.


Tuesday, April 15, 2008

A Convenient Untruth: A Reply to Adams
Our hope for those who are working to promote the legal concept of odious debt—whatever their political stripe or ecumenical affiliation—is that our exploration of Sack’s life will serve to lessen the focus on Sack and his theory in a way that will redound to the benefit of the movement. The emphasis on Sack’s résumé has had two negative effects on odious debts scholarship.

First, scholars have glossed over the details of Sack’s theory, which simply does not do the work that odious debts proponents want it to. Which of the modern world’s debt-burdened nations will be helped by a doctrine that requires state succession as a condition precedent? Under Sack’s doctrine, mere political transformation, no matter how revolutionary (e.g., from absolutist monarchy to authoritarian oligarchy to representative democracy), would never trigger the possibility of odious debts forgiveness. Taken seriously, the three conjunctive prongs of Sack’s doctrine—despotic regime, lack of benefit to the populace, and creditor awareness of the illegal purposes of the loan—would disqualify virtually all debt from being odious. We think it quite clear that Sack intended his doctrine to be extremely strict and creditor-friendly, to avoid future financial fiascos similar to the Soviet repudiation of the Tsar’s debts.

Second, the focus on Sack has drawn attention away from other scholars and sources that may ultimately prove more—or less—valuable to promoting a strong doctrine of odious debts. If we are going to laud the synthesizers of doctrine, perhaps more attention should be paid to Mohammed Bedjaoui, who reviewed the odious debts literature and attempted to formulate a doctrine in the 1970s. Or to Gaston Jèze, who braved violent public objections to represent Haile Selassie in his negotiations with Italy before the League of Nations. And perhaps scholars should be investigating more carefully other historical figures and precedents that are viewed as the pillars of the odious debts doctrine. Is the characterization of the Tinoco arbitration in the odious debt literature accurate? Or the U.S. position in its negotiation with Spain over Cuba? What other historical icons have been under-analyzed or taken for granted? Imagine showing up in federal court in New York (most sovereign debt contracts are governed by New York law), arguing for the adoption of a doctrine of public international law. Credibility with the judge, who is already going to be wary about doing anything perceived to be an extension of law, will evaporate when she discovers that the historical underpinnings of the doctrine haven’t been adequately researched.

Finally, our article gives Sack every credit he deserves; he was a remarkable student or else he would not have received a higher education in anti-Semitic imperial Russia; he did teach at numerous prestigious law faculties; he did synthesize the existing strands of the odious debts doctrine and coin a lasting name for the idea; he did publish a treatise on sovereign debt partition that was widely reviewed and, in part, well received. But what our article doesn’t do is give Sack the credits he doesn’t deserve and never claimed for himself. He never claimed to have been a tsarist minister, and there is no evidence that he considered himself to be a foremost scholar of sovereign debt in his lifetime.

It would have been easy to stop researching Sack after determining that he was never a tsarist minister. But we felt compelled to continue seeking the details of his life partly because we were curious, but also out of a sense of fairness to the man, who lived a difficult life and whose fate was shaped by some of the harsher forces of recent history—institutionalized anti-Semitism, revolution, civil and world wars. Is his life fairly summarized by the phrase—however felicitous—“once a minister of Tsarist Russia and thence, after the October Revolution, a Parisian law professor”? (Hoeflich, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 39, 41 (1982)). Why not strive for accuracy, and describe him as “a professor of international law and finance who synthesized a cautious version of the odious debts doctrine in 1927”? What we gain in accuracy we lose in glamour. And while we might feel gratitude to Sack for his work in synthesizing the odious debts doctrine, it does not follow that we should “reward” him by puffing his résumé or accomplishments posthumously. Instead, we have memorialized the man by describing the contours of his life with as much accuracy as the distance of history permits.

When a myth is unquestioningly repeated by so many scholars and political activists, it is a fair question to ask why. What purpose does this myth serve? What wish—articulated or not—does it fulfill? Perhaps we will learn the answer to those questions another day.




Alexander Sack and Odious Debts: A Response to Ludington and Gulati
I am very grateful to Professors Mitu Gulati and Sarah Ludington for the wealth of information they have gathered about the life of Alexander Sack, the Russian legal scholar who penned the doctrine of odious debts, in their article "A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious Debts." I have taken note of the authors' view that an inadvertent error was made by Michael Hoeflich, whom I cited in my book, Odious Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption and the Third World's Environmental Legacy. I will amend the online version of my book, to discuss their view that Sack was a legal advisor to the Provisional Government of 1917, rather than a minister in the Tsarist regime.

In their paper's abstract, Gulati and Ludington set out to expose the "murky reality" of the life of Alexander Nahum Sack, and how this reality conflicts with the "myth perpetuated in the odious debts literature." The dominant theme, though insinuated rather than stated clearly, is that the odious debts movement has deliberately exaggerated Sack's eminence in order to establish the doctrine as customary international law. The authors also make few distinctions among the various organizations in the debt forgiveness movement. I would recommend that the authors stick to the facts rather than assign motives, and be precise in their charges rather than employing broad brushes.

The facts they do present in their paper, in my view, do not diminish Sack's scholarship on the issue of state debts and odious debts, in particular, but strengthen it. Moreover, rather than dispel myths, I fear their paper creates them.

Let me start with the issue I know best, the views that the authors, with their broad brush, may be wrongly ascribing to me. They seem to think that I have embraced Sack's doctrine in order to indiscriminately relieve Third World debts. They have jumped to that conclusion without any basis in fact – nothing in my writings or in my organization's indicate that Probe International is after debt relief, per se. Rather, as our history shows, we want honest and accountable international finance by establishing the responsibilities of creditors (or borrowers), and thus their rights to repayment (or repudiation). For this reason, we have always argued against giving blank checks to Third World governments in the first order, or in the form of debt relief.

While we are concerned about Third World poverty, we are not a poverty group. But, we believe, a crucial step in eliminating Third World poverty is to eliminate the moral hazard that has plagued sovereign Third World borrowing for the past 60 years. We applaud Sack for wanting countries and their citizens to assume responsibility for legitimate state debts. We also applaud him for wanting to place responsibility for the illegitimate debts where they belong — with the lenders and the true borrowing party, the dictator. Nowhere do I try to make of him a radical, as the authors seem to believe.

From this wrong premise as to my motives (as part of the so-called "radical debt forgiveness movement"), the authors seem to have leapt to other unwarranted assumptions. For example, to extract this "radical debt forgiveness" agenda from Alexander Sack's doctrine they imply that I (and the "debt forgiveness crowd") had to do some fancy footwork around Sack's "consistently and uncompromisingly pro-creditor position" to fit his thesis to our bill. Here they have misrepresented Sack's thesis.

Sack argued that state debts should be repaid in the interest of international commerce, with one exception — when the debts are odious. This is the qualifier — when creditors lend to a sovereign they need beware that the funds are not ultimately used against the interests of the people, to oppress the people, for manifestly personal purposes, etc., lest they lose their claim to repayment. To avoid arbitrary repudiation, Sack also proposed an arbitral procedure in which each side could make their case.

Are the authors saying that Sack didn't mean to carve out "odious" debts as the exception to the rule of repayment of state debts? Are they saying that he disingenuously designed his test of odiousness to fail and therefore to appease creditors of the day? I prefer to take Sack at his written word rather than assign motives to a dead man as the authors seem to have done.

To their credit, Professors Gulati and Ludington concede that Sack's innovative proposal for a new body of law that viewed states as private actors when they borrowed from foreign citizens on the international debt market – essentially, private contract law — didn't turn out to be harebrained after all, even though it was dismissed at the time by some in the legal academy. "Sack was prescient," they say, "because this is indeed the way in which the law governing state debts to foreign bondholders has evolved."

I would argue that Sack's genius may have stemmed from his economics and public finance perspective, and from experience that gave him novel insight into the perils of sovereign borrowing.

But there I go again, "lionizing" the man. I don't mean to give credit to Alexander Sack to the exclusion of other scholars who have written about sovereign debt: I am grateful to Jeze for his articulation of the phrase "debts de regime," to Charles Cheney Hyde for his notion of "hostile debts," to the American Commissioners to the Spanish-American War peace negotiations for their arguments against assuming the so-called Cuban debts, to Chief Justice Taft for his opinion about the legitimacy of the Tinoco debts, and to Grotius for using the word "odious" 400 years ago, etc. The more the better, I say. But, as professors Gulati and Ludington point out, Sack did a rather good job synthesizing the various principles articulated by the above mentioned scholars and developing the concept of the duty of creditors. In short, he fashioned the doctrine of odious debts.

His inspired insights resonate with me. And — I'll go out on a limb here – with millions (even billions, I dare say) of ordinary citizens around the world who sense that there ought to be a law against the kind of unaccountable sovereign borrowing that created the intractable Third World debt crisis.

As a non lawyer, but as one who is constantly searching for rules of law to correct injustices, derisive treatment of Alexander Sack at Gulati and Ludington's hand suggests to me that the problem rests more with the process of international law-making than with Mr. Sack.

Put another way, does it really matter to law-makers today if Alexander Sack is deemed to have had no authority (according to the rules of international law making) to influence international public law, if the people, masses of people, say his formulation of the doctrine of odious debts is the law they want? More than people wanting his law, his doctrine has been accepted by quasi-judicial bodies such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which surely must have some standing, by large segments of the Church community as a whole, which as we all know once wrote the law, and by leaders and governments in numerous countries. And their approach is not to repudiate, but to investigate, to separate the odious debts from the non-odious debts, and then to arbitrate. Alexander Nahum Sack made a great contribution to the advancement of the rule of law, a contribution that almost a century later resonates with great force. We should give the man his due.

And that is something the authors seem intent on robbing him of posthumously.

I am not persuaded that Sack did not enjoy wide respect in his day. For someone – a Jew in the anti-Semitic Europe of 100 years ago no less — to have been welcomed into the University of Petrograd, the school of International Law at The Hague, the Institute des Sciences Sociales et Politiques and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Paris, as he was, is remarkable. For a prestigious publisher to publish his major work, as it did, and for the work to be widely and favorably (and unfavorably) reviewed by some of the most prominent scholars in international law as it was, also demands respect. For respected schools such as Northwestern University and later New York University to have sought him, as they did, also speaks to the high regard in which he must have been held. There is no basis on which to judge Sack's hardships as being deserved. After all, they chiefly stemmed from an accusation of having Soviet sympathies, a not uncommon charge in that nascent McCarthyite era, but surely a threatening and disturbing one to someone such as Alexander Sack.

To denigrate Sack, as the authors do, by portraying him as having no eminence as a scholar in any field of law, by describing his teaching history as "peripatetic," and his response to ill-treatment (firing) by NYU as "cantankerous, outspoken, querulous and litigious" rings of "it serves him right."

In the end, it seems to me that Gulati and Ludington are saying that Alexander Sack's formulation of a doctrine of odious debts should be discounted because he wasn't eminent enough or pleasant enough to win friends and influence people in international law. That he may have been difficult to work with (if this is indeed the case) seems beside the point. Many great personages throughout history have been difficult if not impossible to work with. We remember them for their accomplishments, not for their desirability as dinner guests.



A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious Debts
Those of you who follow the literature and debate about odious debts forgiveness have probably noted the frequent mention of Alexander Sack, who is credited with authoring the doctrine of odious debts in his 1927 treatise on the subject of sovereign debt partition: Les Effets des transformations des Etats sur leurs dettes publiques et autres obligations financiers. Sack is variously described as a tsarist minister, a Russian jurist living in Paris, the foremost scholar of sovereign debts of the day, and the father of the odious debts movement. Sack has been lauded so frequently by odious debts proponents that his name even worked its way into the official proceedings of the Iraqi National Assembly, when it declared its willingness to repudiate debts incurred by Saddam Hussein:

There is a strong basis in international legal principle and precedent to define these debts as being "odious" and thus not legally enforceable. This legal doctrine of odious debt was formulated in the 1920s by Alexander Sack, a former Russian Minister working as a legal professor in the Sorbonne University in Paris. He published the most extensive and important works on the treatment of state debts in the event of regime change.

We have just published an article that examines the life of Professor Sack and his relevance to the odious debts movement. We began with the project of confirming the biography recited by odious debts proponents; what we found surprised us, because so little of the Sackian myth held up to reality.

To summarize our findings, Sack was indeed a professor of law who was born and trained in pre-Soviet Russia, but he was not a tsarist minister. He was only 27 and recently returned home from military service when Tsar Nicholas II, the last tsar of Russia, abdicated. Sack was also Jewish, further reducing the likelihood that he could have risen to a position of prominence in the regime of the notoriously anti-Semitic Tsar. Sack left Russia in 1920 and was teaching law in Paris when he published his famous treatise, but he left Europe for good in 1930 and spent the remainder of his life (and the majority of his teaching career) in the United States. And while it is always difficult to measure a scholar’s eminence in his field, an examination of contemporary reviews reveals that Sack’s treatise, while well received in some parts, hardly established him as the preeminent scholar in the field of sovereign debts. His doctrine of odious debts, which appears to have been synthesized from a variety of international law treatises that Sack cites in Les Effets, was virtually overlooked until odious debts forgiveness became a hot political topic in the 1990s. Last but not least, Sack was not a political revolutionary—as, we suspect, many of his modern supporters would like him to be. His writings as a whole suggest that he was actually quite conservative and likely would have been unsupportive of the modern odious debt movement that holds him up as a hero.

Perhaps most surprisingly, we found that Sack was not the source of his own mythology. We found several resumes and job applications authored by Sack, and in none of them does Sack claim to have been a tsarist minister. And so as researchers, we began to question the significance of the Sackian myths to the group of scholars and odious debts proponents who had been perpetuating the myths. Why had the odious debts movement invested such weight in the resume of this obscure legal scholar? How and why did Sack’s iconic status arrive so suddenly and with so little biographical information about the man?

The answer lies partly in a quirk of customary international law. Sack’s prominence—particularly his status as a minister in the tsarist government—lends authority to his doctrine of odious debts and buttresses the claims of its proponents that such a doctrine exists as part of customary international law. The “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists”—which include the writings of prominent scholars in international law—are among the secondary sources of authority that customary international law recognizes, and thus Sack’s eminence is directly linked to a desire to validate his doctrine of odious debts. Ministerial experience would show that Sack had authority and first hand knowledge of state practice, and perhaps even shaped state practice—similar, for example, to Charles Cheney Hyde, who was both the legal counsel of the state department (and thus in a position to shape state practice) and a professor of international law.

The rest of the answer may lie in Sack’s probable greatest achievement—the coining of the phrase “odious debts.” The idea of odious debts—debts void on moral or equitable grounds—had been floated and written about in international legal circles prior to the publication of Sack’s treatise. But, other writers had referred to them in a variety of other terms—as war debts, imposed debts, subjugation debts, or “dettes de regime.” What Sack did, it seems, was to synthesize the various strands of these arguments in his treatise and give them a catchy descriptor, one that has stood the test of time and can provide a rallying point for a movement.

For us, unearthing the Sackian story has been fun, fascinating actually. If we were real historians, there is undoubtedly much more we could have unearthed: for example, about Sack’s relationship with John Davis, the Davis Polk partner who argued Brown v. Board on the Board side, and the full story of why Sack was fired from his tenured position at NYU. But the more interesting story, and the one to which we have no definitive answer, is how this could have happened. How was the Sackian myth constructed with no one figuring out that it was a house of cards? And is this commonplace in public international law?

One answer we have gotten from our critics is that Sack’s identity and ideas are quite irrelevant to the modern ideas about odious debts. Okay, but surely it cannot help the credibility of those ideas if the founding father of a movement—the former tsarist minister turned revolutionary hero—is a fictional character. The two of us are supporters of the ideas behind the modern odious debt movement; we believe strongly that debt forgiveness could be a powerful and valuable instrument for international justice. And so we pose the following question to the odious debts movement: Why not drop Sack? His theory is too conservative and he wasn’t prominent enough to give any real credibility to the doctrine. Isn’t it time for a new hero?



Wednesday, April 9, 2008

Bilal Hussein To Be Released -- Maybe... (UPDATED)
Finally, some good news out of Iraq:
An Iraqi judicial committee has dismissed terrorism-related allegations against Associated Press photographer Bilal Hussein and ordered him released nearly two years after he was detained by the U.S. military.

Hussein, 36, remained in custody Wednesday at Camp Cropper, a U.S. detention facility near Baghdad's airport.

A decision by a four-judge panel said Hussein's case falls under a new amnesty law. It ordered Iraqi courts to "cease legal proceedings" and ruled that Hussein should be "immediately" released unless other accusations are pending.

The U.S. military referred the case in December to an investigating judge, who reviewed the evidence and submitted his findings to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq to determine whether the case should go to trial.

In February, however, parliament approved a law providing amnesty to those held for insurgency-related offenses — including detainees such as Hussein who have never been convicted.

The committee from the Iraqi Federal Appeals Court ruled Monday that allegations against Hussein were covered by the Anti-Terrorist Law and were subject to the amnesty law.
I have previously discussed the Bush administration's shameful attempts to engineer Hussein's conviction, as has — in far more depth — Scott Horton. It will be interesting to see what the administration does now; as the article notes, Hussein is actually in U.S. military custody. As the AP article notes, it may not let him go without a fight:
U.S. military authorities have said a U.N. Security Council mandate allows them to retain custody of a detainee they believe is a security risk even if an Iraqi judicial body has ordered that prisoner freed. The U.N. mandate is due to expire at the end of this year.

Also, the amnesty committee's ruling on Hussein may not cover a separate allegation that has been raised in connection with the case.

[snip]

In response to a question from the AP, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said it "will be up to officials in Iraq" on whether to release Hussein. The decision, he said, will be "based upon their assessment as to whether he remains a threat."

Under Iraq's 2-month-old amnesty law, a grant of amnesty effectively closes a case and does not assume guilt of the accused.

Hussein has been held by the U.S. military since being detained by Marines on April 12, 2006, in Ramadi, about 70 miles west of Baghdad. Throughout his incarceration, he has maintained he is innocent and was only doing the work of a professional news photographer in a war zone.

The amnesty committee's decision covers various allegations by the U.S. military against Hussein, including claims he was in possession of bomb-making material, conspired with insurgents to take photographs synchronized with an explosion and offered to secure a forged ID for a terrorist evading capture by the military.

The committee may still be reviewing a separate allegation that Hussein had contacts with the kidnappers of an Italian citizen, Salvatore Santoro, whose body was photographed by Hussein in December 2004 with two masked insurgents standing over Santoro with guns.

[snip]

The amnesty committee — or any Iraqi institution — cannot force the U.S. military to release or turn over any of the estimated 23,000 detainees it holds in Iraq. But a provision in the amnesty law states that the Iraqi government "is committed to take the necessary measures to move the arrested people" from U.S. control.
More later, as additional information becomes available...

UPDATE: Scott Horton provides some background on the separate allegation involving Santoro, which turns out -- not surprisingly -- to be as baseless as the other ones:
Other than the terrorism charges, the military had questioned the photographer’s presence on the scene following the abduction and killing of an Italian, Salvatore Santoro. I worked as Bilal Hussein’s counsel in 2006, and during this time I conducted a comprehensive review of the very vague allegations surrounding Santoro’s death, reviewing the documentary evidence with experts and interviewing the available witnesses. The AP photographer had been stopped with others at a check point and asked to take “trophy photos” of Santoro, who had been killed earlier in the day. A study of the photos and examination of other witnesses bore out the account, and military investigators also acknowledged off the record that there was no real basis for charges. But they continued to raise them nonetheless — apparently because they were under relentless pressure to come up with some charges.

Wednesday, April 2, 2008

The Use of Statutory Construction in Defining Torture
Here is a key excerpt from pages 36-39 of the March 2003 "Torture" Memorandum:


Section 2340 defines the act of torture as an: act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control....

The key statutory phrase in the definition of torture is the statement that acts amount to torture if they cause "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." In examining the meaning of a statute, its text must be the starting point. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984). Section 2340 makes plain that the infliction of pain or suffering per se, whether it is physical or mental, is insufficient to amount to torture. Instead, the pain or suffering must be "severe." The statute does not, however, define the term "severe." "In the absence of such a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). The dictionary defines "severe" as "[u]nsparing in exaction, punishment, or censure" or "[I]nflicting discomfort or pain hard to endure; sharp; afflictive; distressing; violent; extreme; as severe pain, anguish, torture." Webster's New International Dictionary 2295 (2d ed. 1935); see American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1653 (3d ed. 1992) ("extremely violent or grievous: severe pain") (emphasis in original); IX The Oxford English Dictionary 572(1978) ("Of pain, suffering, loss, or the like: Grievous, extreme" and "of circumstances ...: hard to sustain or endure"). Thus, the adjective "severe" conveys that the pain or suffering must be of such a high level of intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure.

Congress's use of the phrase "severe pain" elsewhere in the U. S. Code can shed more light on its meaning. See, e.g., West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) ("[W]e construe [a statutory term] to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and, comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.). Significantly, the phrase "severe pain" appears in statutes defining an emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health benefits. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000); 42 U.S.C § l395w-22 (2000); id. § 1395x (2000); id. § 1395dd (2000); id § 1396b (2000); id § 1396u-2 (2000). These statutes define an emergency condition as one "manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that a prudent lay person, who possesses an average knowledge of health and medicine, could reasonably expect the absence of 'immediate medical attention to result in-placing the health of the individual ... (i) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." Id. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Although these statutes address a substantially different subject from section 2340, they are nonetheless helpful for understanding what constitutes severe physical pain. They treat severe pain as an indicator of ailments that are, likely to result in permanent and serious physical damage in the absence of immediate medical treatment. Such damage must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the permanent, impairment of a significant body function. These statutes suggest that to constitute torture "severe pain" must rise to a similarly high level-the level that would ordinarily be associated with a physical condition or injury sufficiently serious that it would result in death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions.


If there was one principal complaint about the torture memos, it would be about statutory construction. When critics ridicule the memos for equating torture with organ failure, they are doing so because they disagree with how the statute was interpreted.

So let's look at the use of statutory construction in defining torture, and especially the phrase "severe pain." It is worth noting that the memo relied on only two rules of statutory construction to define "severe pain." First it focused on plain meaning and cited dictionary definitions. Second, it used the rule of in pari materia, which says that when a statute is ambiguous its meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on the same subject. Much of the criticism has been on the misuse of the second rule, arguing that a statute about health benefits is not on the same subject as a statute about torture.

But little has been said of other rules of statutory construction that were ignored. I think it would be worthwhile to open up discussion and identify other rules of statutory construction that could (and arguably should) have been used in the torture analysis. Legislative intent is one obvious rule of construction. Avoidance of an unconstitutional interpretation is another. The Charming Betsy doctrine that would require the statute to be read consistent with international law is yet another. A fourth might be judicial interpretations (at home and abroad) of the Convention Against Torture. Previous interpretations of the statute would be a fifth. The rule of ejusdem generis is a sixth, which would have led to an interpretation of "severe" that could apply to both physical and mental pain. Are there others that come readily to mind? For example, is there any room to argue for Chevron deference or other rules of statutory construction?

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

Two Damage Awards, Two Different Bush Administration Positions
Has anyone else noticed the inconsistent -- and yes, somewhat hypocritical -- positions the Bush administration has taken toward damage awards US courts have imposed against Iraq and the Palestinian Authority? The administration is concerned that the $174 million award given to the family of a US citizen killed in Israel in 2002 will harm the Palestinian Authority's "political and financial viability," yet refuses to offer an opinion about whether a federal judge should nullify the award:
The decision in effect allows the State Department to sidestep a politically vexing issue concerning victims of terrorism, while retaining the option of intervening later if it appears that the cases could imperil the government headed by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, officials said. In its filing to the court yesterday, the administration said it supports compensation for victims of terrorism, but urged a settlement of the lawsuits to the "mutual benefit" of all parties.

Lawmakers had urged State in recent weeks not to intervene, and the families of victims held emotional meetings with officials from the State and Justice departments two weeks ago. All sides claimed some measure of victory with the filing yesterday.

"I am glad that the government will not interfere at this stage and am hopeful that it will refrain from supporting the legal position of the terrorists-defendants in the future," said Leslye Knox, widow of Aharon Ellis, a U.S. citizen killed in Israel in 2002. A federal judge in 2006 ordered the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority to pay Knox and other Ellis relatives nearly $174 million, but nothing has been paid.
By contrast, the administration has actively opposed payment of the $1 billion in damages awarded to US soldiers who were tortured by Saddam's regime:
In a court challenge that the administration is winning so far but is not eager to publicize, administration lawyers have argued that Iraqi assets frozen in bank accounts in the United States are needed for Iraqi reconstruction and that the judgment won by the 17 former American prisoners should be overturned.

If the administration succeeds, the former prisoners would be deprived of the money they won and, they say, of the validation of a judge's ruling that documented their accounts of torture by the Iraqis — including beatings, burnings, starvation, mock executions and repeated threats of castration and dismemberment.

"I don't want to say that I feel betrayed, because I still believe in my country," said Lt. Col. Dale Storr, whose Air Force A-10 fighter jet was shot down by Iraqi fire in February 1991.

"I've always tried to keep in the back of my mind that we were never going to see any of the money," said Colonel Storr, who was held by the Iraqis for 33 days — a period in which he says his captors beat him with clubs, broke his nose, urinated on him and threatened to cut off his fingers if he did not disclose military secrets. "But it goes beyond frustration when I see our government trying to pretend that this whole case never happened."

Another former prisoner, David Eberly, a retired Air Force colonel whose F-15 fighter was shot down over northwest Iraq and who said his interrogators repeatedly pointed a gun at his head and pulled the trigger on an empty chamber, said he was surprised by the administration's eagerness to overturn the judgment.

"The administration wants $87 billion for Iraq," he said. "The money in our case is just a drop of blood in the bucket."
I will leave it to our intrepid readers to discern the politics behind the different positions...

Thursday, March 13, 2008

O What a Rogue and Peasant State Am I!
[This was cross-posted over at Huffington Post]

Now I am alone. O what a rogue and peasant slave am I! Is it not monstrous that this player here, But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, Could force his soul so to his own conceit, That from her working all his visage wann'd, Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect, A broken voice, and his whole function suiting, With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!... Yet I, a dull and mudd-mettled rascal, peak... Am I a coward? Who calls me villain?... Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain! O, vengenance! Why, what an ass am I!

Hamlet, Act 2, Scene 2


In the famous second soliloquy of Hamlet, Hamlet is overwhelmed by a feeling of worthlessness and self-pity. He stands alone, grieving his inaction. He wallows and rambles in mindless self-doubt, remonstrating against his own failure. In his mind, he is a pitiful and weak rogue, lacking the gall to live up to his commitment to avenge his father's murder. He makes plans to test whether his revenge is justified, but his actions do not help him achieve his desired end. He finds himself a miserable, melancholy knave.

This scene from Hamlet came to mind yesterday when I attended a fascinating conference at UCLA on the topic of "rogue states." After listening to the discussion, I could not help but pity (and fear) the poor rogue state. They are full to the brim with self-pity, and self-doubt, utterly consumed by their weakness.

Exhibit One was North Korea. The former Thai Foreign Minister, Kantathi Suphamongkhon, presented a wonderful series of vignettes of his visits to North Korea that underscore the pitiful position of poor Pyongyang. The North Koreans display a room full of gifts to the deceased Kim Il-sung to show foreign dignitaries that a nation without friends has so many friends. It is poor and desperately isolated. It treats every issue as an insult, and every diplomatic overture is a potential provocation. If one focused on this abiding sense of insecurity, it is clear that labeling it a member of the "axis of evil" was a profound mistake. It only fortified their sense of weakness and vulnerability. For North Korea, the lesson of Iraq is "We are next, unless we appear strong." Nuclear weapons mollified their insecurities.

Exhibit Two was Iran. Dalia Kaye of RAND emphasized that Iran does not pose a significant conventional military threat to its neighbors, although its assymetric capabilities (such as ballistic missile development) are a concern. Iran is not the former Soviet Union. It is a weak nation attempting to exert political and ideological influence in the region. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration eliminated two of Iran's greatest enemies with its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. And yet Iran still has precious few allies abroad and remains hugely unpopular at home. Therefore, we should move away from the rhetoric of regime change and unilaterally tone down our rhetoric on Iran. After all, democracy promotion is not the same thing as regime change. Our goals should be to promote democratic ideals and the rule of law from within.

Pakistan, by all accounts, is a special case. Former Pakistan Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan described his country as a deeply troubled one. National survival has been at the core of its mission for its entire existence. It may not be a rogue state, but it is a distrusted and sanctioned ally. It is not an enemy, but an enigmatic and disenchanted ally. When Pakistan cracks down on democracy and liberalism, it feels it must do so because it thinks the very survival of the state is at issue. It generally acts out of weakness and fear. It cannot be both popular and tough, so it opts for the latter when expediency so requires, and garners worldwide condemnation. Frequent terrorist attacks and disputed borders only add to its sense of insecurity.

What was the take-away message for the next administration? Don't feed the insecurities of rogue states. Stop calling them names. The label "rogue state" mistakes the essence of the state for its actions. These nations are in a troubled and precarious state of mind. They are full of self-doubt, prone to rash action, and easily insulted.

If there is one thing worse than a rogue state, it is a failed state. We know how the tragedy of Hamlet ended. When the mad Hamlet's doubts were eventually confirmed, he achieved his revenge and died in the process. Our goal should be to change the ending.

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

Dershowitz and the "Ticking Time-Bomb" Fantasy
Slate is publishing a set of dispatches this week about Israel's newest tourism innovation: the "Ultimate Counter-Terrorism Mission," which is "packed full of visits to military bases, security briefings from members of Mossad and Shin Bet, and stops for fine dining." The dispatches are fascinating and well worth reading in themselves, but I was particularly struck by an anecdote in today's dispatch, involving a guest lecture that Haim Ben Ami, a former head of interrogations at Shin Bet, gave to one of Alan Dershowitz's Harvard Law School classes about the infamous "ticking time-bomb" scenario. As most readers probably know, Dershowitz used the scenario to defend torture in an editorial in the L.A. Times:
"But what if (torture) were limited to the rare "ticking bomb" case--the situation in which a captured terrorist who knows of an imminent large-scale threat refuses to disclose it?

Would torturing one guilty terrorist to prevent the deaths of a thousand innocent civilians shock the conscience of all decent people.

To prove that it would not, consider a situation in which a kidnapped child had been buried in a box with two hours of oxygen. The kidnapper refuses to disclose its location. Should we not consider torture in that situation?"
Dershowitz answered that question it in the affirmative in a later interview with the San Francisco Chronicle:
"Everybody says they're opposed to torture. But everyone would do it personally if they knew it could save the life of a kidnapped child who had only two hours of oxygen left before death. And it would be the right thing to do."
To his credit, Dershowitz acknowledges that "the argument for allowing torture as an approved technique, even in a narrowly specified range of cases, is very troubling." He thus insists that the use of torture be conducted openly, with judicial authorization — his notorious "torture warrant":
I have no doubt that if an actual ticking bomb situation were to arise, our law enforcement authorities would torture. The real debate is whether such torture should take place outside of our legal system or within it. The answer to this seems clear: If we are to have torture, it should be authorized by the law.

Judges should have to issue a "torture warrant" in each case. Thus we would not be winking an eye of quiet approval at torture while publicly condemning it.

Democracy requires accountability and transparency, especially when extraordinary steps are taken. Most important, it requires compliance with the rule of law. And such compliance is impossible when an extraordinary technique, such as torture, operates outside of the law.
Here's where the Slate anecdote about Ben Ami becomes interesting. Commentators on both the left and the right have criticized the ticking time-bomb scenario as being wildly implausible. You would think, therefore, that someone who believes that torture should be accompanied by accountability and transparency would be concerned with separating fantasy from reality — with not making the ticking-time bomb scenario seem far more likely, and thus the right to torture far more necessary, than it really is. But no:
Like a good TV show, it was often hard to tell where Ben Ami's stories crossed over into fiction. In his own version of a "ripped from the headlines" story, he recalled giving a lecture to law students at Harvard at the invitation of well-known professor Alan Dershowitz. He recounted to the students Shin Bet's involvement in delivering a suspected terrorist to the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon in 1983. The Israelis, Ben Ami said, had knowledge of a planned attack on the United States, but they knew no details. As Ben Ami recalled, the Israelis told the Americans: "Take him, make an interrogation, and we wish you success."

Except the suspect wouldn't talk. "He said: 'Look, I wish to talk, but I'm very tired. I'd like to fall asleep for at least two hours.' " The suspect was taken, at his request, to a nearby apartment to sleep. The next day, the embassy was destroyed.

The story is a powerful argument in favor of torture—or at least enhanced interrogations—except for one problem: Like Ben Ami's other story of the drowned terrorists (and most stories involving a "ticking time bomb"), it's apocryphal. It never happened. Real life is never that clean-cut. Ben Ami, however, forgot to reveal that to the Harvard law students.

Realizing his mistake later that day, Ben Ami panicked. "I called Alan Dershowitz and said, 'It's wrong.'" As Ben Ami recalled, Dershowitz told him not to worry: "He said, 'No, it's a good story, leave it.'"
I think Dershowitz has made the critics' point. Accountability and transparency for torture indeed!
Pentagon: No Ties Between Saddam and Al Qaeda (Updated)
Whatever will Fox News do now? Not even the Pentagon still believes that Saddam had operational ties to al Qaeda:
An exhaustive review of more than 600,000 Iraqi documents that were captured after the 2003 U.S. invasion has found no evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime had any operational links with Osama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist network.

The Pentagon-sponsored study, scheduled for release later this week, did confirm that Saddam's regime provided some support to other terrorist groups, particularly in the Middle East, U.S. officials told McClatchy. However, his security services were directed primarily against Iraqi exiles, Shiite Muslims, Kurds and others he considered enemies of his regime.

The new study of the Iraqi regime's archives found no documents indicating a "direct operational link" between Hussein's Iraq and al Qaida before the invasion, according to a U.S. official familiar with the report.

He and others spoke to McClatchy on condition of anonymity because the study isn't due to be shared with Congress and released before Wednesday.

President Bush and his aides used Saddam's alleged relationship with al Qaida, along with Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction, as arguments for invading Iraq after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld claimed in September 2002 that the United States had "bulletproof" evidence of cooperation between the radical Islamist terror group and Saddam's secular dictatorship.

Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell cited multiple linkages between Saddam and al Qaida in a watershed February 2003 speech to the United Nations Security Council to build international support for the invasion. Almost every one of the examples Powell cited turned out to be based on bogus or misinterpreted intelligence.

As recently as last July, Bush tried to tie al Qaida to the ongoing violence in Iraq. "The same people that attacked us on September the 11th is a crowd that is now bombing people, killing innocent men, women and children, many of whom are Muslims," he said.

The new study, entitled "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents", was essentially completed last year and has been undergoing what one U.S. intelligence official described as a "painful" declassification review.
The only surprising thing about the report is that the Bush administration didn't manage to bury it until, say... November 5th. That must be painful indeed.

P.S. McClatchy is truly a national treasure. You have to love a news organization whose motto is "truth to power." (What a radical idea!) Pray that the company's well-known financial problems — its newspapers have lost more than $1.5 billion over the past two years — don't lead to its collapse.

UPDATE: How embarrassing is the report to the Bush Administration? Consider the lengths it's going to ensure it gets read by as few people -- especially journalists -- as possible:
The Bush Administration apparently does not want a U.S. military study that found no direct connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda to get any attention. This morning, the Pentagon cancelled plans to send out a press release announcing the report's release and will no longer make the report available online.

The report was to be posted on the Joint Forces Command website this afternoon, followed by a background briefing with the authors. No more. The report will be made available only to those who ask for it, and it will be sent via U.S. mail from Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia.

It won't be emailed to reporters and it won't be posted online.