Opinio Juris

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Israeli High Court Finds "Targeted Killings" Can Be Legal Under Customary International Law
Israel's High Court of Justice has issued a ruling finding that Israeli military forces may engage in "targeted killings" of Palestinian terrorists consistent with the customary international law of war. A useful discussion of the background of this case can be found here. An English version of the decision can be found here.

The decision is a long and complicated one. Here is the key graf:

The examination of the "targeted killing" – and in our terms, the preventative strike causing the deaths of terrorists, and at times also of innocent civilians – has shown that the question of the legality of the preventative strike according to customary international law is complex (for an analysis of the Israeli policy, . . .[snip]The result of that examination is not that such strikes are always permissible or that they are always forbidden. The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians "for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities" (§51(3) of The First Protocol). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no other means which harms them less, and on the condition that innocent civilians nearby are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportional. That proportionality is determined according to a values based test, intended to balance between the military advantage and the civilian damage. As we have seen, we cannot determine that a preventative strike is always legal, just as we cannot determine that it is always illegal. All depends upon the question whether the standards of customary international law regarding international armed conflict allow that preventative strike or not.

One interesting move made by the High Court of Justice: it recognized and incorporated principles from Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, even though Israel has neither signed Protocol I nor has it enacted any legislation implementing the Protocol. Nonetheless, the High Court recognized that Protocol I is part of customary international law, especially Article 51(3): "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities."

The High Court, as far as I can tell, basically said that this provision does not prohibit all targeted killings of Palestinian terrorists, but that it might prohibit some such killings. It also spilled much ink defending the right of the Israeli Courts to review actions by the Israeli military in these cases.

So even though the decision might seem to give a blank check to more targeted killings, it does seem to keep the courts involved in reviewing the legality of such killings. A very interesting and difficult case and one well worth thinking more about.

Related Posts (on one page):

  1. Israeli High Court Finds "Targeted Killings" Can Be Legal Under Customary International Law
  2. Israel Defends Legality of Targeted Assassinations
12.15.2006 at 1:32am
Marko Milanovic (mail):
Ah, this judgment is in many ways what Hamdan v. Rumsfeld should have been.

Firstly, the Court says explicitly what kind of an armed conflict it is talking about - an international armed conflict occuring in the relevant area, which is under Israel's belligerent occupation (paras. 16-21).

Secondly, the Court is also explicit about the source of law it is applying - customary international humanitarian law, coupled, when needed, with international human rights law. It doesn't, like the Supreme Court did in Hamdan, just pluck Common Article 3 out of thin air, without giving any reasoning as to why and how it is applicable (paras. 22 &23).

Thirdly, when it comes to the status of unlawful combatants, the Court has this to say (para. 25)

"Needless to say, unlawful combatants are not beyond the law. They are not "outlaws". God created them as well in his image; their human dignity as well is to be honored; they as well enjoy and are entitled to protection, even if most minimal, by customary international law."

Fourthly, the Court rules that 'unlawful combatants', though they might be a good descriptive category, are legally speaking civilians, falling under the protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention. As the ICRC, and unlike the US government, the Court considers that there is no gap between the Third and the Fourth Conventions.

Fifthly, the Court rules that Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I is reflective of customary law in entirety, relying on the recent ICRC study on customary law, the jurisprudence of the ICTY, military manuals and scholarly work (para. 30).

Finally, the Court applies the law it identified and holds that targeted killings may be lawful if they are indeed proportionate. Yet, Justice Barak says in para. 61 that:

" The State of Israel is fighting against severe terrorism, which plagues it from the area. The means at Israel's disposal are limited. The State determined that preventative strikes upon terrorists in the area which cause their deaths are a necessary means from the military standpoint. These strikes at times cause harm and even death to innocent civilians. These preventative strikes, with all the military importance they entail, must be made within the framework of the law. The saying "when the cannons roar, the muses are silent" is well known. A similar idea was expressed by Cicero, who said: "during war, the laws are silent" (silent enim legis inter arma). Those sayings are regrettable. They reflect neither the existing law nor the desirable law (see Re. Application Under s.83.28 of the Criminal Code [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, 260). It is when the cannons roar that we especially need the laws (see HCJ 168/91 Murkus v. The Minister of Defense, 45(1) PD 467, 470, hereinafter Murkus). Every struggle of the state – against terrorism or any other enemy – is conducted according to rules and law. There is always law which the state must comply with. There are no "black holes" (see JOHAN STEYN, DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW: SELECTED SPEECHES AND JUDGMENTS 195 (2004)). In this case, the law was determined by customary international law regarding conflicts of international character. Indeed, the state's struggle against terrorism is not conducted "outside" of the law. It is conducted "inside" the law, with tools that the law places at the disposal of democratic states.

...

Indeed, in the State's fight against international terrorism, it must act according to the rules of international law."


Here, here.
12.15.2006 9:42am
Greg McNeal (mail) (www):
As FYI,

My colleague Amos Guiora, a former Israeli Defense Forces JAG officer was cited in the opinion.

The cited piece, entilted Terrorism on Trial: Targeted Killing As Active Self-Defense appears in 36 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT'L L. 319 available for download HERE.
12.15.2006 2:59pm
Anthony Dworkin (mail) (www):
One key aspect of the Court's ruling is what appears to be its use of human rights law to supplement IHL. Its finding that targeted strikes should only be used if arrest is not possible, and that they should be followed by an independent investigation, is not based on IHL but on an importation of human rights principles into a laws of war framework. This could be an extremely important precedent, but in this area the Court's analysis is very cursory and it is not clear what general principle they are basing it on or in what circumstances it would apply. For my more detailed analysis, see my article on the Crimes of War website http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-highcourt.html.
12.16.2006 4:38am
Tobias Thienel (www):
How interesting. The passage Marko cites from para 61 of the judgment has a very neatly hidden reference to Guantanamo Bay in it. Johan (a/k/a Lord) Steyn, at the time a judge in the House of Lords, used the phrase 'a legal black hole' to describe the position of the 'unlawful combatants' in Camp Delta.

Has the Supreme Court of Israel now ratified this assessment? Its explanation of the concept of 'unlawful combatants' may suggest as much.

It is, of course, understandable that the judges did not in terms condemn U.S. policy, but it is surely not a cause for delight in the White House that Israel, of all States probably the one with the greatest experience of a 'war on terror', has now refused to adopt a position the U.S. seems to regard as indispensible in that 'war'.
12.16.2006 11:49am