Opinio Juris

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Sovereign Accountability for Human Rights Abuses
One of the unintended consequences of the movement to hold corporations liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses is that doing so may prove to be the most effective way of holding sovereigns accountable. That is the surprising conclusion of my latest article just published in the Notre Dame Law Review. Here is an excerpt:


One has a nagging suspicion that human rights litigation against corporations is a proxy fight in which the accomplice is pursued while the principal evades punishment. Indeed, if a corporation is accused of "aiding and abetting" human rights abuses, this is all but a concession that the corporate actor is not the principal wrongdoer. It is of course possible that this controversial trend toward corporate responsibility may reflect a genuine concern about corporate abuse of power. But more likely it reflects an abiding frustration that the primary perpetrators-sovereigns-are beyond the reach of most victims. If victims cannot pursue claims against the principal, they will resign themselves to pursue claims against those who aid and abet.

How have we come to this state of affairs, in which the corporation is pursued while the sovereign evades punishment? Why should the corporate accomplice alone be found liable if the sovereign is the primary malfeasor? For the first time in scholarly literature, this Article suggests an alternative approach, a solution to this conundrum. It suggests that corporations have existing tools to remedy the situation, drawing on principles derived from human rights, contract law, and arbitration. The essential idea is that if a corporation is found liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuse, it may invoke contractual provisions in the agreement with the sovereign to arbitrate the question of shared responsibility. While the victims may not pursue the sovereign, there is no impediment for a corporation that is found liable to pursue the sovereign in arbitration to secure its share of liability, either in the form of contribution or indemnification. In short, human rights litigation against the corporation could lead to "who pays" arbitration against the sovereign….

The purpose of this Article is not to affirm or disaffirm this trend of holding corporations liable under international law. Rather its purpose is to recognize an observable trend in human rights litigation patterns and consider its ramifications. If corporations increasingly are subject to international responsibility, then this portends new avenues for holding sovereigns responsible for their share of the liability….

Human rights litigation followed by "who pays" arbitration is a two-step process that overcomes the traditional immunity that sovereigns enjoy in human rights litigation. Thus far, human rights litigants have attempted to scale an impregnable wall of sovereign immunity by relying on awkward FSIA tools such as commercial activity or implied waivers. But corporations have no such difficulties. They can invoke provisions in their contracts that were specifically drafted to fulfill the relatively straightforward FSIA exceptions of express waiver and arbitration. Corporations typically cannot implead and crossclaim against the sovereign in the underlying litigation. But they can do the next best thing by arbitrating the question of who pays for the human rights abuses. Effectively, the arbitration procedure operates as a second-tier cross-claim by one malfeasor against the other.

What is particularly important about this paradigm shift is that heretofore human rights abuse has been a relatively cost-free enterprise for perpetrators, particularly sovereigns…. But with corporate liability that equation changes dramatically. To use Guido Calabresi's scheme of cost avoidance, monetary incentives are placed on corporations to change their conduct so as to reduce the number and severity of human rights violations…. And by imposing a cost on corporations that aid and abet sovereign abuse, those corporations will become cost avoiders…. Holding corporations liable and then arbitrating who pays is a mechanism of imposing costs and then spreading the costs, resulting in the corporation and the sovereign becoming cost avoiders. By imposing and spreading costs to the secondary and primary perpetrators, greater fairness between the malfeasors is achieved and deterrence from human rights abuse is enhanced. Contractual arbitration between the corporation and the sovereign over who pays transfers costs imposed on the corporation and creates shared incentives to implement and enforce human rights obligations.

04.23.2008 at 11:28am
Benjamin Davis (mail):
Very interesting! My wonder is whether the type of person who sits as an arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration is a person who can meaningfully analyze a human rights claim? Or whether the typical international commercial arbitration lawyer can effectively argue the "who pays" human rights claim? Started also thinking about whether those who make the "odious debts" with which the sovereign would pay could be seen as a third step attack on the sovereign. If the sovereign can be the efficient tortfeasor and get financing for its human rights pay outs to corporations it seems a kind of human rights abuse financial mechanism is put in place. Not sure where this idea is going but these are some that struck me from the post.
Best,
Ben
4.23.2008 1:58pm
Tobias Thienel (www):
Prof. Alford,

I've been wondering: why is it that corporations sued for aiding and abetting violations of international law by a State are not, as you say, immune from suit?

I have a feeling the only answer for present purposes may be in the FSIA, and the view that FSIA is not only the only way of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign State, but also the only accepted source of sovereign immunity. Nonetheless, the question of international law remains.

As we all know, the inherent justification of immunity ratione materiae, that is to say, the immunity of (any serving or former State organ for his or her) official acts is par in parem non habet imperium: one State does not have (judicial) authority over the acts of another sovereign, and hence cannot arrogate such to itself.
That being so, could it not be said that, if a State finds a private corporation liable for aiding and abetting the wrongful acts of a foreign State, it lays claim to jurisdiction over the latter acts as surely as if it had sued or indicted the official who in fact carried them out? The difference, if any, would seem to lie (only?) in the fact that, in the aiding and abetting scenario, the acts of aiding and abetting directly subjected to the jurisdiction of the forum State are not the same as the acts of the foreign State in which the defendant has provided assistance. The unlawfulness of the latter is a prerequisite of a successful claim on the former, but the court's order - as distinct from its reasoning, if any - will not relate to the foreign acts of State (for instance by way of an injunction). Is that enough to absolve the forum State from considerations of sovereign immunity (ratione materiae)? In other words, does such immunity bind only the order of the court, or does it also limit what the court can say either in its reasoning, or as a necessary step to its disposition of the claims before it?

Since we're talking about civil liability, and not about the criminal law, there may be another way of looking at it: it might be said that a civil action against a person that has carried out an unlawful act of State indirectly impleads the State itself. The State cannot be criminally responsible, so criminal sanctions against one of its servants for his or her official acts cannot imply the same culpability on the part of the State. Civil judgments in similar matters do; suit against the servant then appears as an attempt to circumvent the immunity of the State itself. [For all of these points, see Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC 270, paras. 10, 31; only for the latter part see Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir., 1990), and its progeny, as discussed in part by John Bellinger here.]
Beyond that form of 'moral' indirect impleading, if you will, there may be a more practical argument: a State agent held liable for his or her official acts may seek and be entitled to recover any sums he pays in damages from his (possibly erstwhile) employer. [Transposed to the case of corporations not committing, but aiding and abetting, the State's unlawful acts - which may be subject to the considerations above - that appears to be our argument.] The State is therefore, now in practical terms, indirectly impleaded, because its liability is consequent on and subsequent to that of its servant (or accomplice, again perhaps subject to my doubts as to the different substance of the decision). This very point has been made in Pinochet (No. 3) [2000] 1 AC 147, at 286, where Lord Phillips said (my emphasis):

There would seem to be two explanations for immunity ratione materiae. The first is that to sue an individual in respect of the conduct of the state's business is, indirectly, to sue the state. The state would be obliged to meet any award of damage made against the individual. This reasoning has no application to criminal proceedings. The second explanation for the immunity is the principle that it is contrary to international law for one state to adjudicate upon the internal affairs of another state.

Lord Hutton similarly said, at 254:

It has also been decided that where an action for damages in tort is brought against officials of a foreign state for actions carried out by them in ostensible exercise of their governmental functions, they can claim state immunity, notwithstanding that their actions were illegal. The state itself, if sued directly for damages in respect of their actions would be entitled to immunity and this immunity would be impaired if damages were awarded against the officials and then the state was obliged to indemnify them. In Jaffe v. Miller [1993] I.L.R. 446, government officials were sued in tort for laying false criminal charges and for conspiracy for kidnap, and it was held that they were entitled to claim immunity. Finlayson J.A., delivering the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, stated at pp. 458-459: "I also agree with the reasoning on this issue put forward by counsel for the respondents. Counsel submitted that to confer immunity on a government department of a foreign state but to deny immunity to the functionaries, who in the course of their duties performed the acts, would render the State Immunity Act ineffective. To avoid having its action dismissed on the ground of state immunity, a plaintiff would have only to sue the functionaries who performed the acts. In the event that the plaintiff recovered judgment, the foreign state would have to respond to it by indemnifying its functionaries, thus, through this indirect route, losing the immunity conferred on it by the Act. Counsel submitted that when functionaries are acting within the scope of their official duties, as in the present case, they come within the definition of 'foreign state'."

Lord Phillips later resiled from his statements on the 'indirectly impleaded' part when sitting in the Court of Appeal in Jones ([2004] EWCA Civ 1394, [2005] QB 699, para. 128; see also paras. 74-6), but his earlier views were reinstated when that case reached the House of Lords (judgment cited above).

Now, I'm not sure if this 'indirectly impleaded' argument is really part of the basis of immunity ratione materiae, as distinct from simply being a consequence of the par in parem explanation. But many have said that it is, so the problem is there.

But as I said, I'm not at all sure that the aiding and abetting scenario is comparable to that of suing the person having committed the wrongful act of State. I would be grateful for any thoughts on this.
4.23.2008 2:45pm
Tobias Thienel (www):
In the next square brackets after my citation of Jones, Chuidian and Bellinger, that should, of course, have been 'your argument', not 'our argument'. My apologies.
4.23.2008 3:12pm
Tor Hershman (mail) (www):
Blind Justice is simply a whore and whomsoever can put the most of what that harlot desires.....wins, and that is, ‘twas and t’will be the totality of The Law.

Stay on groovin' safari,
Tor Hershman
4.24.2008 9:32am
Matthew Gross (mail):
I wish any company attempting to work out such "who pays" arbitration the best of luck.

Given that Shell and Exxon can't even get Nigeria to pay their share of their joint venture obligations I'm rather doubtful a company would see anything.

One has a nagging suspicion that human rights litigation against corporations is a proxy fight in which the accomplice is pursued while the principal evades punishment.

"A nagging suspicion" is a rather sublime understatement. I would consider it a case of who the money can actually be bludgeoned out of.
4.24.2008 5:15pm

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