Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Monday, July 7, 2008

Women in International Economic Law: Meeting in Geneva, July 15
Professor Tracey Epps sends along the following announcement about a new women's group for those teaching or researching in the field of international economic law:
Women in International Economic Law (WIEL), a new global organization in international law, will hold its organizational meeting from 1.30 to 3 pm on Tuesday 15 July, in conjunction with the inaugural meeting of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) in Geneva. Jennifer Hillman, Member of the WTO Appellate Body, will speak on the past, present and future of women in international economic law and the group will discuss its objectives for the future and how it can best serve the needs of its members.

The WIEL meeting will take place at the Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Developpement/Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 132 rue de Lausanne, in room AJF (above the coffee-bar in the park near the Villa Barton). All those interested in women in international economic law are welcome to attend, including those who are not registered for the SIEL conference. Please contact either Susan Franck (francks@wlu.edu) or Tracey Epps (tracey.epps@otago.ac.nz) for any further information.

Sunday, July 6, 2008

Americans Are Fat -- and So Is Almost Everyone Else
I notice it every time I'm in the States — Americans seem really, really fat. And so they are: according to recent Calorie Lab statistics, more than 50% of the people in every state in the Union are either clinically obese (BMI 30%+) or clinically overweight (BMI 25%+). Mississippians are the fattest, more than 66% of the population, while Coloradans (which include me) are the "slimmest," at "only" 55%.

Here's the map of obesity rates:


To be fair, being obese or overweight is an international problem. Worldwide, more than 1.6 billion adults are overweight and at least 400 million are obese. Europe is particularly fat: the obese or overweight rate is 60% in Scotland, 58% in England, 53% in Austria, 51% in Germany, 49% in Poland and Hungary, and 48% in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. The Swedes, Dutch, Italians, Belgians, and Romanians are the slimmest in Europe, all coming in at less than 39%. But those countries pale in comparison to China and Japan, whose obesity rates are less than 5%.

Here is a nice visual representation of obesity rates in OECD countries:


I have no profound point to make, other than to note that McDonalds, Burger King, KFC, and Pizza Hut are no less WMDs than anthrax and sarin. As the World Heart Federation notes with characteristic understatement, worldwide obesity rates have risen because "diets have moved from being plant-based to high-fat, energy-dense animal-based diets." Kudos to Mayor Bloomberg for banning trans fats in New York City!

I would, however, kill for a Taco Bell in Auckland...

P.S.: I was very surprised that 21% of Kiwis are obese, given how active and outdoorsy they tend to be. Sadly, I think it's very much a racial thing, reflecting the sizable (pun not intended) Pacific Islander population in New Zealand. The most obese nations in the world are in the Western Pacific: in Nauru, 80% of men and 79% of women are obese; in Tonga, it's 47% and 70%; and in Samoa, it's 33% and 63%.

Thursday, July 3, 2008

A Response to David Zaring
First, I would like to thank David Zaring again for his comments on my essay: Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution. I was deeply humbled to read David’s thoughts about both the utility of the essay and the direction of my current research. David’s comments, however, raise a variety of issues worthy of a bit deeper exploration.

I wholeheartedly agree that empirical work in international law is decidedly not déclassé. As a proud alumna of the University of Minnesota Law School, I had the privilege of taking classes with Bob Hudec. I have profound respect for Hudec’s empirical exploration of international trade dispute settlement system and have been grateful to see others continue the empirical exploration of international economic law in the trade context. Perhaps more selfishly, as my research has developed, I have found myself wishing that Hudec was still with us so that I could benefit from his methodological insights related to the analysis of international economic dispute resolution. I would nevertheless hope that Hudec would have been pleased the development of empirical methodologies to areas of international law outside of the trade context. The work of junior scholars such as Oona Hathaway, Elena Baylis, Bill Burke-White, and Melissa Waters spring immediately to mind although there are certainly others engaging in research. In the meantime, I will look forward to hearing the remarks of David Trubek and my co-panelist Juscelino Colares at the forthcoming Society of International Economic Law as they both have critical observations about Hudec’s legacy to empirical assessment of international economic law phenomena.

David also makes an interesting point about how research in international investment law might evolve in the future. I am sympathetic to the reference to Wright & Miller’s recent exploration of content analyses and the value of using rigorous social science methodology to study the content of judicial decisions. No doubt this literature, and its underlying methodological rigor, will aid the evolution of methodological approaches involving the analysis of investment treaty arbitration awards. As the essay also suggests, there are other critical methodological approaches that could be likewise as this area evolves. For example, provided that scholars are sufficiently transparent in the description and analysis of their quantitative research, meta-analysis may be possible. As discussed eloquently in Jeremy Blumenthal’s article Meta-Analysis: A Primer for Legal Scholars, meta-analysis can synthesize empirical analysis across studies in order to summarize the research and identify variables influencing the findings of particular research. These additional methodological approaches only scratch the surface of potential ways to develop international law empiricism. One might even imagine – much like social science counterparts – the development of research methodologists, who are dedicated to the exploration and improvement of empirical methodologies, as a type of international law sub-specialty. But my suspicion is these last two evolutionary advances may be years in the offing.

Finally, in providing the cautionary observation about the need for training, David observes that inter-disciplinary collaboration can help bridge the methodological divide by providing much needed skills in this regard. I decidedly agree with David about the value that collaboration brings on the methodological side and offer two counter-points.

First, there are also practical benefits to be garnered from collaboration beyond methodological insights. Chief among these benefits is: sleep. Empirical research, while rewarding, can take time. The development of datasets can be labor intensive – even with the help of able research assistants (and I have been profoundly blessed in that department with the assistance of Melanie Neely and Jenna Perkins). Working in collaboration with others means that some of the most laborious aspects of empirical research – namely data collection – can be shared. In other words, it means that you are less likely to be sleep deprived and able to work more effectively. (And yes, there is empirical literature in related contexts to back up this claim.) Sharing of such tasks may also mean, provided proper research protocols related to inter-coder reliability are followed, that the reliability of data collection may be enhanced. It also means that research methodology choices can be considered with a view to considering multiple perspectives; and as none of us is perfect, the use of group-think to develop research and analysis can be invaluable. Collaboration also creates research efficiencies. For example, those with an expertise in or aptitude for the creation of graphs, tables and charts can develop them readily. I may, however, say this given my own graduate coursework at the University of Nebraska Law and Psychology JD/PhD program with Cal Garbin on multivariate research design and data analysis (see here and here) and the learning curve I have experienced in the creation of graphs during my work for Cal this summer.

The second counterpoint suggests that there may be a gap to fill within legal education. More particularly, while there are benefits to collaborating in an inter-disciplinary manner, one wonders whether such collaboration may be even more fruitful if legal scholars had access – for example in law school – to methodological classes to provide basic training. There are certainly useful programs for professors such as the Northwestern/WashU “bootcamp” or programs for quantitative methods at the University of Michigan, University of Essex or the European Consortium for Political Research’s program at the University of Ljubljana. Nevertheless, the essay explores the unique benefit of systematically providing the next generation of research assistants, lawyers and law professors with training in the law school context. Some law schools, such as Berkeley, Cornell, Harvard, Illinois, Leiden University, Northwestern, Penn, Stanford, University of Chicago, Vanderbilt, Washington University, and Yale have classes related to the empirical methods and the law (and apologies for the lack of a complete list in this regard for other law schools with separate courses focused on empirical methods). A casebook with an accessible teacher’s manual, such as the one being developed by faculty at the University of Illinois, goes a long way to filling this particular gap in U.S. legal training. I understand Empirical Methods in Law (Aspen, forthcoming), written by Bob Lawless, Jennifer Robbennolt and Tom Ulen, should be available for Fall 2009; and based upon the draft chapters I have seen, I am looking forward to getting my copy.

Ultimately, if we are willing to take on the challenge, we are at the first step of a journey of empirical assessment of investment treaty dispute resolution. There are inevitably places where we can grow and develop in collaboration or consultation with others. And that, at least in my view, is certainly a worthy undertaking.
Empirical Research And International Economic Law: A Comment on Susan Franck’s Essay
[David Zaring is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania]

Susan Franck’s essay makes the case for more empirical research in international economic law; a project that she has pursued – I might venture to say that she owns an important part of the field, given the unique and comprehensive data on investment arbitrations that she has collected and continues to analyze – in her other work. It is worth noting both how precise and how important Susan’s recommendations are. First, when I think about empirical research in international economic relations more generally (and here I should clear my throat apologetically – I’m not an empirical scholar except in a rather mild sense, but primarily a reader of some of that work), I think of the big picture claims made by some applied economists – Andrew Rose’s claim that membership in the WTO doesn’t lead to growth, for example, and the endless debates over whether NAFTA or bilateral investment treaties have been good or bad for their signatories. Susan cites a number of examples of these in her essay.

What is underdeveloped is empirical research on the law part of international economic law, specifically the litigation part. There is so much we don’t know about what happens when investments disputes are subject to arbitrations, but that hasn’t stopped people like Bolivia’s president Evo Morales making consequential decisions based on their priors about what the process will mean.

So that’s why I say Susan’s empirical claims are precise – she thinks we need a new perspective on what happens in actual litigation, which is arguably both the signal offer of an investment or trade treaty and its most lawyerly manifestation. And it makes sense to recommend that assumptions like those of Morales be tested.

I will also commend her essay for giving us a bit of an intellectual history of the place of empiricism in international law ... which I think she would say comes largely from the increasing empiricism of international relations scholarship and the increasing popularity of ELS. She also offers outline of one way to pursue empirics in international legal research, which is all to the good.

This is already a long post, but I’d like to do three more things in it: 1. Note that there increasingly is empiricism in international legal scholarship, 2. Urge a bit of caution on the part of would-be empiricists, and 3. Speculate about some empirical research that might be particularly worth reading in the future.

1. The sort of work that Susan urges is, I agree, unnecessarily rare, but it is not déclassé. It has a worthy past and increasingly vibrant future. Robert Hudec, after all, kept track of WTO decisions, and Simon Lester and Kara Leitner continue to build on his work. John Yoo and Eric Posner have made empirical claims about effective international tribunals that occasioned a useful response by Anne-Marie Slaughter and Larry Helfer. And so on.

2. Cutting edge empirical work is technical – increasingly so – and takes training. Disciplinary barriers are often higher than you think. Pick up a copy of the American Political Science Review and Quarterly Journal of Economics and give them a casual read if you think you might disagree. I am, as I have said, no empiricist, but my sense is that legal scholars are often best-served by co-authoring if they feel the urge to do empirical work and by training themselves to read empirical papers (no easy task!) as a prelude to pursuing empirical work.

3. A couple of predictions about the future. Careful event studies might be useful evidence in determining whether and which international legal institutions matter. Ron Wright and Marc Miller have noted the growing prevalence of content analyses in legal research, and, done well, it seems to me that they are a natural complement to doctrinal work (it’s often hard getting enough observations to make that useful, though).
Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution
[Professor Susan Franck is Associate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. Please find her SSRN author page here.]

First, I want to take the opportunity to thank the editors of the Virginia Journal of International Law and Opinio Juris for an opportunity to discuss my recent essay, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution. I would also like to thank David Zaring in advance for commenting on the essay. I look forward to a thoughtful and provocative discussion.

This essay develops ideas implicit in the work of certain international law, international relations and empirical legal scholars - namely that there are areas of international law deserving of and ripe for empirical analysis. More particularly, the use of empirical methodologies can create new facts, offer different perspectives and promote a more nuanced analysis of international law phenomena.

The potential benefits of such an epistemological approach are easily understood in the context of international investment law and dispute resolution.

The President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, has suggested that the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is an international organization where no country, except perhaps the US, will ever win. The International Herald Tribune quotes Morales as saying “Governments in Latin America and I think all over the world never win the cases. The transnationals always win”. Although this assertion was used to justify Bolivia's withdrawal from ICSID, quantitative data flatly contradicts Morales’ allegation.

Meanwhile, a March 2008 story in the Financial Times, referred to investment treaty arbitration awards involving: (1) "hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation," (2) a claim by Mobil for "billions of dollars," and (3) Bolivia's "loss" in a case against Bechtel. Empirical information aids the contextualization of these claims. It is useful to consider that: (1) the average value of awards in one study was in the order of US$10 million, (2) the difference between amounts claimed and awarded was in the order of US$333 million, and (3) Bolivia's "loss" at the jurisdictional phase actually resulted in a settlement where the investors dropped their claims and were paid nothing. Meanwhile, issues related to international economic law – particularly trade and investment – are becoming a focal point for politicians and the public.

Against this backdrop, this essay does three things to consider the potential integration of empirical methodologies into the analysis of international investment law and dispute resolution.

First, it explores the historical relationship with international law and empirical methods. Acknowledging the re-integration of international relations and international law as well as the increased appreciation for empirical legal studies in domestic law contexts, the essay suggests that the mutual interest in empirical methodologies - broadly defined - could be developed further. For example, this might involve international lawyers drawing upon the methodological debates and insights from the empirical legal scholars and adapting them to analyze international law phenomenon; likewise, empirical legal scholars can gain new areas of research that may provide a useful counterpoint to study of domestic (whether in the U.S. or broad) legal phenomenon.

Second, the essay adopts Professor Korobkin's definition of empiricism and argues for a broad understanding of empirical methodologies in international investment law. The essay posits that quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods may all be usefully applied to the analysis of investment treaty dispute resolution and encourages debate on how different methodologies might be suitable for different research questions.

Third, the essay argues that the benefits of using empirical methodologies outweigh the costs and suggests five steps for developing an empirically infused research agenda in investment treaty dispute resolution. These steps may include, but not be limited to: (1) building research capacity, (2) obtaining data, (3) designing research methodology, (4) conducting research, analyzing the results, and contextualizing the findings properly, and (5) disseminating the results to stakeholders for consideration.

As befits an essay, it concludes on a note designed to spark conversation as much as it is to articulate a particular position. In particular, the essay argues that while empirical methodologies may not work for every research area or question, the use empirical methodologies can infuse international investment law with information to inform normative choices. Particularly for investment dispute resolution, systematically gathered and properly analyzed empirical data can correct misperceptions about existing dispute resolution processes, permit considered analysis of legal issues affecting the public, and could – for example – facilitate informed decisions about the negotiation and revision of investment treaties.

Particularly in the United States, Latin American countries such as Ecuador and even in Norway, there is a hot political dialogue about the proper terms of investment treaties. The issue is sufficiently compelling that the American Society of International Law’s International Economic Law Interest Group is going to be hosting a conference in November 2008 to discuss the intersection between the political dimensions of the debates about trade and investment. (A previous Opinio Juris post is here, and the call for papers is here.) Given this context, there is particular utility in examining what opportunities there might be to infuse scholarship with empirical methodologies to generate information that can form part of a dialogue to promote a more informed discourse on international investment law.

It is too early to know whether the approach I recommend will provide utility in the long run. There are inevitable challenges and practicalities that will be difficult to ignore that we might discuss here in greater detail. Nevertheless, I do believe that there is tangible, potentially useful research that can be done with relative inconvenience in the short term. These small, foundational projects can form the basis for replicating, developing and converging research in the hopes of ultimately creating a more dynamic and informed tapestry of international investment law. And after all, if we do not at least try, we will never know what might have been.

Sunday, June 29, 2008

There Will Be Blood
The NY Times Week in Review has an article written by Graham Bowley on the effect of recent attacks by Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure and the effects of these attacks on world oil prices. The piece begins:
When armed rebels from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta attacked an enormous oil facility 75 miles off the swampy West African coast on June 19, traveling hours by speedboat under cover of darkness and kidnapping an oil worker, their brazen assault underlined the perhaps underappreciated dependence of the United States — and the world — on oil from Nigeria.

Three days afterward, Nigerian officials said at a hastily arranged global energy summit in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, that recent attacks had cut Nigeria’s oil production to its lowest level in nearly two decades, giving oil markets the jitters and helping to send prices higher…

“We always focus on the Persian Gulf but this is one of the key oil security issues in the world today,” said Daniel Yergin, one of the nation’s best-known energy experts and chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, a consulting firm. “It’s tied up with Nigerian politics, regional and national battles for power, and criminality.” When Mr. Yergin spoke to lawmakers at a hearing in Congress last week, he was asked what would most help stabilize world markets. “Helping bring peace to the Niger Delta would be a major contribution,” he responded.
The Times article continues that responding to the situation in Nigeria will need both a sound development policy and a counter-insurgency strategy:
According to J. Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, the government led by Nigeria’s new president, Umaru Yar’Adua, must break with decades of neglect and pay attention to the troubles of the southern delta region by promoting development but also cracking down on the rebels and “demonstrating that these guys cannot operate with impunity.”

He’s not very optimistic, however. “When you look at the delta, the overwhelming picture is that the situation has very little promise of being fixed,” he said.
While development policy is always a complex issue, the “operate with impunity” part is also a problem, as MEND has started attacking not just oil pipelines, but offshore oil platforms, as well. MEND even issued a press release that states, "The location for today's attack was deliberately chosen to remove any notion that off-shore oil exploration is far from our reach." Jeff Vail of The Oil Drum explains that this is especially significant as 90% of Nigeria’s oil growth is expected to be via new offshore platforms. Which now seem vulnerable to attack.

John Robb, who writes extensively on guerilla-based “fourth generation warfare” is concerned that destabilization from infrastructure attacks will worsen:
So, given production limitations and strong/concentrated demand, even small disruptions by guerrilla groups on light sweet crude production is likely to have a direct influence on global oil pricing (in contrast, disruptions aimed at heavy crude production should have little impact on global pricing). Further, there are already active groups in many of the most critical production areas.

Fortunately, from the demonstrated behavior of these groups it doesn't appear that guerrilla/terrorist groups have fully grasped their potential market power with small attacks (despite aspirational pronouncements from al Qaeda and large scale attacks in 2005/2006). Once they do, as bad as disruption is today, it could get MUCH worse.

Why? A direct connection to scalable profits...

As we saw with e-mail spam/phishing, even the faintest whiff of profits can turn a loose collection of individuals/groups into a torrential crime-fueled marketplace generated billions and attracting tens of thousands of participants. Are we about to see the same occur with oil?
For example, consider Columbia. John Robb notes that
Disruption isn't limited to Nigeria. A remote control bomb by the FARC on Occidental Petroleum's pipeline in Colombia just knocked out 100,000 barrels a day. It's also interesting to note how irrelevant the US military/national security system has become in regards to global energy security. The entire paradigm of warfare has changed but the $1 Trillion behemoth has barely budged.
While I doubt that the end is nigh, the situation is obviously serious and it won’t be solved by a combination of a dithering domestic energy policy and a foreign policy of “assisted” regime-change. So, for now, only one thing is certain…

Friday, June 27, 2008

An Important Maori Land Settlement -- But Where's the Treaty Itself?
The BBC reports that the New Zealand government and seven Maori tribes have entered into an historic agreement concerning Maori ownership of a number of forests in the North Island, where I live:
The NZ$420m ($319m) agreement transfers ownership of nine forests - covering 435,000 acres (176,000 hectares) of land - in the central North Island.

Hundreds of Maori, some in traditional dress, thronged parliament to witness the signing of the accord.

"It's a historic journey we are on," Prime Minister Helen Clark said.

"We came into politics to address injustice and seek reconciliation. Thank you for walking that road with us on this historic day," she added, according to AP news agency.

The settlement - the largest single deal between the government and Maori tribes - seeks to address grievances dating back to the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi.

The treaty guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown. But land seizures and ownership breaches followed.

The forests signed over are mainly large commercial pine plantations, generating about NZ$13m a year in rents.

The settlement also hands over rents that have accumulated on the land since 1989.

Between them, the seven tribes or iwi include more than 100,000 members. They will manage the land collectively, setting up a holding company structure and forestry management structure.
The agreement, known as the "Treelords" deal — echoing the very controversial 1992 Sealords deal, which ultimately led the New Zealand Parliament to extinguish all Maori claims to commercial fishing rights — is indeed historic. I would take issue, though, with the article's claim that the Treaty of Waitangi "guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown." That interpretation is consistent with the English version of the Treaty — but not with the Maori version. (The two versions were drafted separately, and the English version is not a translation of the Maori, even though the Maori version was drafted first.)

Here is Article 1 of the Treaty in English:
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.
And here is Article 1 in Maori:
Ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu-te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.
I have bolded the operative terms. The problem is that kawanatanga does not mean "sovereignty"; it means "governance" — a much weaker term. Indeed, it is clear that the Maori did not intend to cede anything resembling sovereignty to the Queen, given that the Maori version of the Treaty does not use the Maori word for "sovereignty," kingitanga, or even the Maori word for "independence," rangatiritanga.

Just as important, the British had to have known that the Maori did not intend to cede sovereignty to the Queen. In 1835, the British and the Maori had signed the Declaration of Independence, in which the British guaranteed that the Maori chiefs would maintain sovereignty over their land. The Declaration made use of all three of the words that are at the heart of the dispute over the Treaty, with the British translating rangatiritanga as "independence," kingitanga as "sovereign power and authority," and kawanatanga as "functions of government." How then could the British have honestly believed a mere five years later — with many of the same British officials present at the signing of both documents — that Article 1's use of the term kawanatanga, as opposed to kingitanga, meant that the Maori were giving up their sovereignty?

Regardless, the question is now moot — New Zealand courts have long since given up trying to determine the "true" meaning of the Treaty. Now they — and the Waitangi Tribunal, which makes recommendations to the government concerning Maori grievances — simply apply the so-called "Treaty Principles":
The principle of government or the kawanatanga principle

Article 1 gives expression to the right of the Crown to make laws and its obligation to govern in accordance with constitutional process. This sovereignty is qualified by the promise to accord the Māori interests specified in article 2 an appropriate priority. This principle describes the balance between articles 1 and 2: the exchange of sovereignty by the Māori people for the protection of the Crown. It was emphasised in the context of this principle that ‘the Government has the right to govern and make laws’.

The principle of self-management (the rangatiratanga principle)

Article 2 guarantees to Māori hapū (tribes) the control and enjoyment of those resources and taonga that it is their wish to retain. The preservation of a resource base, restoration of tribal self-management, and the active protection of taonga, both material and cultural, are necessary elements of the Crown’s policy of recognising rangatiratanga. The Government also recognised the Court of Appeal’s description of active protection, but identified the key concept of this principle as a right for iwi to organise as iwi and, under the law, to control the resources they own.

The principle of equality

Article 3 constitutes a guarantee of legal equality between Māori and other citizens of New Zealand. This means that all New Zealand citizens are equal before the law. Furthermore, the common law system is selected by the Treaty as the basis for that equality, although human rights accepted under international law are also incorporated. Article 3 has an important social significance in the implicit assurance that social rights would be enjoyed equally by Māori with all New Zealand citizens of whatever origin. Special measures to attain that equal enjoyment of social benefits are allowed by international law.

The principle of reasonable cooperation

The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a fair basis for two peoples in one country. Duality and unity are both significant. Duality implies distinctive cultural development while unity implies common purpose and community. The relationship between community and distinctive development is governed by the requirement of cooperation, which is an obligation placed on both parties by the Treaty. Reasonable cooperation can only take place if there consultation on major issues of common concern and if good faith, balance, and common sense are shown on all sides. The outcome of reasonable cooperation will be partnership.

The principle of redress

The Crown accepts a responsibility to provide a process for the resolution of grievances arising from the Treaty. This process may involve courts, the Waitangi Tribunal, or direct negotiation. The provision of redress, where entitlement is established, must take account of its practical impact and of the need to avoid the creation of fresh injustice. If the Crown demonstrates commitment to this process of redress, it will expect reconciliation to result.
The Treaty Principles are important, and they do occasionally protect Maori interests. But their importance cannot obscure the fact that the Treaty itself still has no formal legal status in New Zealand, making Maori interests subject to the whims of Parliament. And that's no accident: taking the Treaty seriously would mean taking the Maori version of the Treaty seriously — and taking the Maori version seriously would mean that deals like Treelord would be the very tiny tip of a very large iceberg.

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

International Economic Law Interest Group Call for Papers
Susan Franck forwards the following call for papers for what looks to be an interesting and well-timed conference:
The ASIL's International Economic Law Interest Group will hold its biennial conference in Washington this year just after the U.S. Presidential election, on the timely theme of "The Politics of International Economic Law: The Next Four Years." The conference committee has just issued its Call for Papers here. Paper proposals are due by July 20. The Call supplies a wide range of suggested topics, but it is open for "politics-of" topics in any area of international economic law, not just trade. The conference will take place at George Washington University Law School in downtown Washington, on Friday and Saturday November 14-15, in a month when new vistas will open, no matter which candidate wins.

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Sue OPEC? Or Regulate NYMEX?
A recent op-ed published in the New York Times suggested that the states of the United States should do just that. Thomas W. Evans, who had been an adviser to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, argued that OPEC's actions violate U.S. antitrust law and artificially raises the prise of gasoline. However, he noted that the act of state doctrine may present a problem in terms of suing a foreign government:
Despite this illegal conduct, not everyone can sue OPEC and succeed. In 2002, a federal court dismissed a class-action lawsuit brought against OPEC by a gas station owner. An appeals court agreed, noting that “under the current state of our federal laws the individual member states of OPEC are afforded immunity from suit brought for damage caused by their commercial activities when they act through OPEC.”

The “current state of our federal laws” refers to the “act of state doctrine,” which was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1897 with the following words: “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”...

Fortunately, there is another way to sue OPEC. Even if actions by individual citizens fail, a seldom-used provision of Article III of the Constitution grants original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over lawsuits brought by states against “foreign states” and, as expanded by the United States Code, over “aliens.”

The attorneys general of the various states should sue OPEC as an alien or, pleading alternatively, as a foreign state.
He then argued that:
The states should contend that Article III of the Constitution outweighs the act of state doctrine. Respect for the sovereignty of a foreign government for acts “done within its own territory” does not, even if very liberally construed, protect decisions reached by a cartel based in Austria that directs 13 nations to sell their product at inflated prices to customers outside their boundaries.
Really? Because it seems like courts have been holding the other way. (He does suggest, however, presidential letters of support to make it more likely for courts to take jurisdicition.) I was under the impression that someone who was a Reagan and Bush adviser would be wary of asking courts to toss out accepted legal precedent so that they could then step into a poltical dispute between our country and one or more foreign countries. But then again, I guess we are addicted to oil and addicts can go to great lengths to get a fix...

Anyway, for a rejoinder to Evans' op-ed, see this post by Matt Stone at the Global Buzz explaining six reasons why suing OPEC is a bad idea. I will quote one reason:
As Thomas Walde, a professor at the University of Dundee, [has explained], OPEC is not a "cartel" in the legal sense of the word because it is a collection of governments, not private companies. A plausible defense could be that OPEC actions constitute a "joint resource conservation effort" and not market manipulation per se.
And, I would also add that if we want to focus on regulatory efforts, perhaps instead of diving into the contentious judicial power/ foriegn policy debate, we should start closer to home and look at smarter regulation of the (possible) effects of oil speculation in the New York Mercantile Exchange. The effects of oil speculation are still debated. However, to give a sense of their possible effects, I rememember back in the good old days when oil was just hitting $100 per barrel (what was that, April?), one research firm estimated that about a 20% of the price was due to speculation in oil-denominated securities by investment banks, hedge funds, and pension funds, not by foreign governments as Evans implied. But see also this piece, which is skeptical of whether increased oversight of the futures market would actually affect the price of oil.

I doubt the "sue OPEC" idea has much traction (or much of a chance of success). The market regulation angle seems to be getting at least some support from both sides of the aisle and from both candidates. But it remains to be seen if this would actually affect oil prices. Stay tuned (and off the roads...).




Tuesday, June 17, 2008

Opinio Juris Welcomes Guest Blogger Haider Hamoudi
We are pleased to welcome guest blogger Professor Haider Ala Hamoudi of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Professor Hamoudi is a prolific scholar on Islamic and comparative law and also has a blog, Islamic Law in Our Times.

Professor Hamoudi has also recently published Howling in Mesopotamia: an Iraqi-American Memoir, described on Amazon.com as
… a groundbreaking insider's story about America's war in Iraq. His unique perspective and fresh insight into the conflict that has divided our country were informed by living with relatives in an average residential neighborhood in Baghdad during the war. Many of his relatives were intimately involved in the unfolding political process, such as his uncle, who became chair of the Iraqi Constitutional Committee, and his cousin, Ahmed Chalabi, one of the most prominent Iraqi exiles to return after the fall of the previous regime.

Hamoudi saw firsthand the frustrations and fears that plagued Iraqi civilians during a crucial period of the war. As an American in Iraq working on a USAID-funded contract, he also interacted with American administrators regularly, and was able to see the developing situation from their point of view as well. Howling in Mesopotamia is a critical look at what went wrong in Iraq from a person who was there. Hamoudi's gripping memoir will shed light on the events, mistakes, and misunderstandings.
We look forward to Professor Hamoudi joining us this week for a conversation about his book, the fate of Iraq, Islamic law, and other related issues.

Thursday, June 5, 2008

What's Your Greenage?
Ever wonder how green you are? A new non-profit organization has just launched an initiative that helps you find out. It's sort of like calorie-counting for the environment. Creative Citizen helps you track your "greenage" based on five criteria: water, electricity, waste, emissions, and money. Greenage is determined by the creative solutions that you’ve implemented in your life or submitted to the community. The more you do, the more it grows. Some Creative Solutions have larger effects, so your Greenage increases more when you use them.

The genius behind this idea is that members of the Creative Citizen community share ideas about improving their green scores, like eating less meat, using canvas bags for grocery shopping, reusing water bottles, using LED light bulbs, etc. Here's a brief tutorial of Creative Citizen:



I encourage you to become a member today.


Tuesday, May 27, 2008

ICJ Issues Judgment in Malaysia/Singapore Case
On Friday, the ICJ issued its judgment in Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore). A summary sent by the ICJ stated that
it had found by 12 votes to four that Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh, a granite island in the Straits of Singapore on which a lighthouse stands, belongs to Singapore and has done so since at least 1980, when the dispute between the two countries crystallized.

In the case of Middle Rocks, which consist of a group of rocks that are permanently above water, the ICJ … ruled 15 to one that it belongs to Malaysia.

The court also noted that South Ledge, a nearby low-tide elevation, falls within the apparently overlapping territorial waters generated by Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh and by Middle Rocks. Given that the two countries have not asked the court to draw the line of delimitation, the judges said, by 15 to one, that sovereignty belongs to the State in the territorial waters of which it is located.
The press release, including a detailed summary of the opinion, is here and the full opinion available here.

Saturday, May 24, 2008

What Is Your Neighborhood's Walk Score?
I know it's not international law, but this site is too cool not to mention:


Just enter your address and it will calculate your "Walk Score" — how walkable your neighborhood is. It even maps all the interesting businesses that are nearby. I entered my old address in Athens, Georgia, and my walk score was 75, walkable enough not to own a car. That seems accurate to me.

Try it yourself!
Power Shifts, Old and New
Wednesday’s NY Times had a good essay by Thomas Friedman on the current evolution of the global distribution of power. He argues that there are actually three shifts taking place:

The first shift is due to our “oil addiction”:
Let’s start with the most profound one: More and more, I am convinced that the big foreign policy failure that will be pinned on this administration is not the failure to make Iraq work, as devastating as that has been. It will be one with much broader balance-of-power implications — the failure after 9/11 to put in place an effective energy policy…

The failure of Mr. Bush to fully mobilize the most powerful innovation engine in the world — the U.S. economy — to produce a scalable alternative to oil has helped to fuel the rise of a collection of petro-authoritarian states — from Russia to Venezuela to Iran — that are reshaping global politics in their own image.
The second main shift isn’t so much about our self-imposed weakness due to oil consumption, but the rise of other states due to the changes in their societies. Friedman cites to Fareed Zakaria’s new book, The Post-American World:
Mr. Zakaria’s central thesis is that while the U.S. still has many unique assets, “the rise of the rest” — the Chinas, the Indias, the Brazils and even smaller nonstate actors — is creating a world where many other countries are slowly moving up to America’s level of economic clout and self-assertion, in every realm…

For too long, argues Zakaria, America has taken its many natural assets — its research universities, free markets and diversity of human talent — and assumed that they will always compensate for our low savings rate or absence of a health care system or any strategic plan to improve our competitiveness.

“That was fine in a world when a lot of other countries were not performing,” argues Zakaria, but now the best of the rest are running fast, working hard, saving well and thinking long term. “They have adopted our lessons and are playing our game,” he said. If we don’t fix our political system and start thinking strategically about how to improve our competitiveness, he added, “the U.S. risks having its unique and advantageous position in the world erode as other countries rise.”
The third shift, described in David Rothkopf’s book Superclass (see Peter’s take on it here) describes the rise in power of
a small group of players — “the superclass” — a new global elite, who are much better suited to operating on the global stage and influencing global outcomes than the vast majority of national political leaders.

Some of this new elite “are from business and finance,” says Rothkopf. “Some are members of a kind of shadow elite — criminals and terrorists. Some are masters of new or traditional media; some are religious leaders, and a few are top officials of those governments that do have the ability to project their influence globally.”
None of this is especially new. Think of the fears of the rise of OPEC in the 1970's or the discussion of American relative decline in the 1980's (spurred, in part, by the publication of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and more generally by the economic rise of Japan) and even Friedman's own essays on "super-empowered individuals" in the 1990's.

Noting that these ideas are not new is not to criticize Friedman. To the contrary, he recognizes that simply because some issues fall in and out of vogue (oil dependency, for example) does not change the fact that they affect global power day in and day out. Each of these three trends played a role in the distribution of power in decades past and they continue to do so today. Besides looking for what is new in international politics, it is important to reiterate the fundamentals. Especially if they still have not been addressed in any meaningful sense by policymakers.
I'm Holding Out for a Subaru Sandinista...
My colleagues have often discussed the dangers of globalization in these pages. Nevertheless, I fear they have overlooked one of the most pernicious: embarrassing car names. There are 2,261 different written languages in the world, essentially guaranteeing that at least some car names will mean something untoward in one of them. Witness the Ford Pinto, Portuguese slang for "penis." The Opel Ascona, which refers to female genitalia in Northern Spain and parts of Portugal. The Buick LaCrosse, which refers to masturbation in Quebec. The Mitsibushi Pajero, which again refers to masturbation, this time in Spanish-speaking countries. The Mazda LaPuta, Spanish slang for "whore." The Toyota Fiera, an ugly old woman in Puerto Rico. And, of course, the Honda Fitta, since renamed simply the Fit, which is Swedish slang for the dreaded C-word.

It's not a sexual reference, but the embarrassing car name club has a new member: the Volkswagen Touareg, an SUV whose name comes from the French nickname for the Tuareg people of Northern Africa. From the New York Times:
Tuareg rebels attacked an army camp in northeastern Mali and 17 rebels and 15 soldiers were killed in one of the bloodiest clashes to date in a revolt by the desert insurgents, the government said on Thursday.

Military officers said the scale of the rebel attack late Tuesday and early Wednesday against the garrison at Abebara, 150 km (90 miles) from Kidal, was a worrying escalation of the Tuareg revolt that has hit Mali's northeast Saharan region.

"They were two, three times more numerous than on previous occasions. We think it's a coalition of all the rebel bands," said one officer, who asked not to be named.

He added it was also believed the attackers included nomadic fighters from neighboring Niger, where a Tuareg-led revolt over the last year has killed more than 70 government soldiers, mainly in attacks in Niger's northern uranium mining zone.

[snip]

Peace agreements after the 1990s rebellions aimed to grant Tuareg communities a greater degree of autonomy while at the same time integrating former fighters into the national army and promoting Tuareg politicians.

But since the start of last year, Tuaregs in Niger and Mali have taken up arms again, motivated by shared resentment against unsolved grievances and what they see as unwarranted interference in their traditional territories by government armies and foreign companies.

Keenan said many of the raids by the Malian rebels were in direct response to operations in the northeast Saharan zone by a Malian government army backed and trained by the United States as part of Washington's war on terror.

"The last thing the Niger and Mali governments can admit is that there is a genuine political revolt going on," said Keenan, who is about to publish a new book called "The Dark Sahara: America's war on terror in Africa."

Keenan said that rather than conceding political legitimacy to the Tuareg unrest, the Niger and Mali authorities preferred to portray it as falling under a wider campaign to fight terrorism and Islamic extremism in the Sahara, for which their militaries received U.S. training.
The Tuareg are the furthest thing from terrorists. Still, something tells me that "bloody insurgency" is the last image Volkswagen wants people to associate with their SUV...

Monday, May 19, 2008

Europe's Untouchables
They number at least 12,000,000, though a precise count is impossible because many governments refuse to consider them a legitimate category for census purposes. They suffer serious and widespread employment discrimination, especially their women, leading to unemployment rates often 6-8 times greater than the countries in which they live. They are sequestered in dangerous, environmentally-degraded slums, surviving in substandard housing that often lacks basic necessities like electricity, light, sanitation, heat, and potable water. Their children often receive no education, and those that do are normally placed in segregated — and vastly inferior — "remedial" schools. They receive substandard health care, if they receive any at all, and as a result have a high infant mortality rate and appallingly short average life expectancies. They often lack access to the basic personal documents they need to secure their rights, such as birth certificates, local residence permits, and passports.

They are the Roma, Europe's own underclass.

Most of the time they are simply ignored, even though the country in which their life is arguably the most difficult — newly-independent Kosovo — is only an hour by plane from Zurich. And when they aren't ignored, they often wish they were. Witness what recently took place in Italy:
SMOKE rose yesterday from the smouldering ruins of a Gypsy camp attacked by vigilantes in a run-down industrial suburb of Naples in the shadow of Mount Vesuvius.

The charred remains of the makeshift wooden shacks, mattresses and belongings at the site in Ponticelli crunched underfoot. Dogs scavenged through a pile of uncollected rubbish nearby.

Police guarded another squalid "nomad camp" beneath an overpass after the inhabitants fled during the night to avoid meeting a similar fate. Signs of their flight were everywhere, with doors to shacks left open and the ground strewn with clothing, shoes, bicycles, plastic bottles, pots and pans and children's toys.

[snip]

In Rome, where Gianni Alemanno, the new right-wing Mayor, has vowed to dismantle "nomad camps" to reduce street crime, police raided a Roma camp, taking the inhabitants by bus to detention centres. Mr Alemanno has promised to deport 20,000 illegal immigrants.

But in Naples local people pre-empted the crackdown and took the law into their own hands. Scores of youths on scooters and motorbikes wielded iron bars and threw Molotov cocktails at the Roma shanty towns. Their anger came to a head after a 17-year-old Roma girl entered a flat in Ponticelli and apparently tried to steal a six-month-old girl. The child's mother and neighbours gave chase and the teenager escaped being lynched only after police moved in.

Naples erupted in fury, with women leading the marches on the Roma camps to the chant of "Fuori, fuori" ("Out, out") and "Go home, dirty child stealers". Young men, allegedly on the orders of the Camorra, the Naples Mafia, set the sites ablaze, blocking attempts by the fire brigade to put out the fires. Exploding gas canisters completed the destruction. The women jeered at the firemen, shouting: "You put the fires out, we start them again."

Hundreds of Roma families fled for their lives, their belongings piled on to small pick-up trucks or handcarts. Some have been taken under police protection. Others have found refuge at Roma camps elsewhere in the Campania region, while a few have been taken in by Naples residents shocked at the outbreak of xenophobia.

The arson attacks come from festering anger over rising crime and urban degradation, much of it blamed on Roma gypsies and the estimated half a million Romanians who have emigrated to Italy since Romania joined the European Union. The Roma rights group Opera Nomadi says there are 2500 Roma in Naples, 1000 from Romania and 1500 from Balkan areas.
It's an old story: demonize the victims — accusations of baby stealing? In 2008? — and then blame them for their own mistreatment. Unfortunately, it's a story that is all too common: not only do 68% of Italians want all of the Roma expelled from their country, 79% of Czechs and even 68% of Germans feel the same way about their own Roma populations. Percentages in many other European countries would no doubt be similar.

On the bright side, the world community has not completely ignored the events in Rome and Naples. Spain criticized Italy's crackdown on the Roma in no uncertain terms, stating that it "rejects violence, racism, and xenophobia." Similarly, the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights quickly issued a press release that "called on the Italian authorities to ensure the protection of the Roma population and urged politicians and the media to refrain from anti-Roma rhetoric."

It is also worth noting that Roma recently won an important legal victory at the European Court of Human Rights. In D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, eighteen Roma children from Ostrava brought a complaint against the Czech Republic alleging that their segregation in "special" schools for students deemed "mentally deficient" constituted degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR and represented a racially-discriminatory denial of their rights to education, in violation of Article 14 and Article 2 of Protocol 1. In a landmark decision, the Court held in favor of the Roma children:
On 13 November 2007 the Grand Chamber held by 13 votes to four that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to education). The decision's cornerstone finding was that the prejudicial impact of the special school system on the Roma children applicants was unlawful discrimination in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Convention. However, perhaps the most groundbreaking element of the Court's decision was that it explicitly embraced the principle of indirect discrimination, upholding the principle that a prima facie allegation of discrimination shifts the burden to the defendant state to prove that any difference in treatment is not discriminatory. This ruling places interpretation of the European Convention in consonance with the standards set out in the European Union's Directives on burden of proof in cases involving sex and race discrimination and discrimination in employment on diverse grounds.
The complaint in D.H. and Others was brought by a superb NGO, the European Roma Rights Centre. I urge all of our readers to consider getting involved with the ERRC, or with Roma issues generally. The existence of a European underclass is bad enough. Not doing anything to improve its existence is simply unacceptable.

For a heartbreaking, and all too typical, video of Roma refugees living on the municipal dump in Belgrade, unable to return safely to their homes in Kosovo, see here.

HAT-TIP: Una Hardester, an Outreach Coordinator with the Trafficking Victim Services Program at the remarkable US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants.

Sunday, May 18, 2008

In Second Life, a Virtual Darfur is Patrolled by a Virtual Green Lantern Corps

Having grown up on Green Lantern comics (and having one friend quip that she thinks that explains my becoming an international lawyer), I was nonetheless somewhat stunned to come across the following on Wagner James Au’s New World Notes blog, which covers the evolution of Second Life, the online “virtual world”:
Second Life has a Darfur, so it’s sad (though not surprising) that it has its own janjaweed, too.

Activists recently built a virtual world information site on a private island called Better World, to raise awareness of the ongoing ethnic cleansing in Sudan. Called “Camp Darfur”, it features the recreation of a refugee tent city with a tiny campfire, and large display photos of the real thing, where the tents seem to go on for miles.

Shortly after it was unveiled, however, the place was hit by griefers [vandals and hackers]. The first marauder found an exploit in the Camp’s building method, and used that to raze the place to the ground, strewing tents and images of refugees everywhere. According to Zeke Poutine, officer in the "Not on our watch" Darfur activist group, he shouted racial slurs while he trashed it. The Camp was rebuilt, but copycat attacks by others followed.

But if Camp Darfur has its janjaweed, it has its guardians, too. For shortly after the raids began, a Better World visitor who’d learned a lot about Sudan’s genocide from the Camp called a group of his to the island, to offer their protection.

And that’s why Camp Darfur is now under the vigilant eye of the Green Lantern Core [sic — they have chosen to be “core” rather than “corps”], a band of superheroes who patrol Second Life with masks, tights, and magic lamps.

Au interviewed some members of the Green Lanterns as well as the folks who put together the Darfur site.
Zeke Poutine isn’t sure the attacks on their websites and their Second Life site are related, or if they’re politically motivated. “Who knows? Some people just do stuff because they can,” she muses. “'Cause they have issues? ‘Cause they don't like Africans?”

"It doesn't sound like they just did it for fun," Matador observes. “It's a hate crime.”

When the attacks first began, the Green Lantern Core helped them secure the Camp. Their lead officer Jeff Beckenbauer built a security script that scans the identity of avatars who visit, and showed the Better World owners how to read it. Jeremy patrols the island in the morning, and Matador at other times, as do other Core members.

In the beginning, they tell me, the GLC was founded by Cid Jacobs as a way to show off devices and builds inspired by the Green Lantern comic. From there it evolved into a roleplaying group, with members pretending to “patrol” sectors of Second Life. This began as fun, but lately it’s started to involve monitoring actual violations of Community Standards and Terms of Service-- the live and let live rules of conduct that Linden Lab [the company that runs Second Life] has its subscribers agree to, when they get an account.

“It's unfortunately turned into a lot of watching for CS/TOS violations,” KallfuNahuel Matador acknowledges. “The roleplay aspect kinda fell to the wayside. Certainly it started as a group of fans of a comic book, but it's grown and growing into something more.”

In this, one sees trend for the future of Second Life-- as the world grows ever larger, the sheer population size will make it impossible for Linden staff to meaningfully regulate it. Into this gap will rise neighborhood watch groups and private security forces, acting as the first line of defense while citizens wait for the Lindens to arrive.
[Emphases added]
This story is interesting on multiple levels. First, it is another example of how Second Life is used as a means of organizing activism, in this case the work of Darfur activists. (But see this follow-up post concerning “cyberutopianism.")

The rise of the Second Life Green Lanterns also points out how communities begin to generate similar structures in response to common problems. Here, online vandals/ maurauders are destroying the hard work of the activists, so the Second Life community has organized its own police force—one that uses the symbols of science fiction but enforce very real contractual obligations (the Terms of Service agreements of Second Life users). And yes, I also find it interesting that when virtual Darfur needed help the symbol of choice was not Blue Helmets but Green Lanterns.

And, along those lines, there are also some interesting implications on the “law and literature” side, especially as one blogger put it, concerning science fiction as the literature of the refugee.

I highly recommend reading the rest of Au’s post.

If only the real Darfur had such a simple solution. And, no, I don’t mean the Green Lantern Theory of Geopolitics. (Matthew Yglesias should know better—George Bush is no Hal Jordan. Guy Gardner, maybe.)

Hat Tip: io9

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Is It Time to Invade Burma? (Is It Time to Invade Georgia?)
The first part of this post's title is also the title of a new article at Time.com. (Note: on CNN.com, they title the article "Time to Invade Myanmar?")

And so begins the latest iteration of the humanitarian intervention debate. After a recap of the situation in Myanmar, the article notes:
...it's hard to imagine a regime this insular and paranoid accepting robust aid from the US military, let alone agreeing to the presence of US Marines on Burmese soil — as Thailand and Indonesia did after the tsunami. The trouble is that the Burmese haven't shown the ability or willingness to deploy the kind of assets needed to deal with a calamity of this scale — and the longer Burma resists offers of help, the more likely it is that the disaster will devolve beyond anyone's control. "We're in 2008, not 1908," says Jan Egeland, the former U.N. emergency relief coordinator. "A lot is at stake here. If we let them get away with murder we may set a very dangerous precedent."

That's why it's time to consider a more serious option: invading Burma. Some observers, including former USAID director Andrew Natsios, have called on the US to unilaterally begin air drops to the Burmese people regardless of what the junta says. The Bush Administration has so far rejected the idea — "I can't imagine us going in without the permission of the Myanmar government," Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday — but it's not without precedent: as Natsios pointed out to the Wall Street Journal, the US has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid without the host government's consent in places like Bosnia and Sudan.
The article concludes that, if current attempts at assistance fail,
"It's important for the rulers to know the world has other options," [Jan Egeland, a former UN emergency reloief coordinator] says. "If there were, say, the threat of a cholera epidemic that could claim hundreds of thousands of lives and the government was incapable of preventing it, then maybe yes — you would intervene unilaterally." But by then, it could be too late. The cold truth is that states rarely undertake military action unless their national interests are at stake; and the world has yet to reach a consensus about when, and under what circumstances, coercive interventions in the name of averting humanitarian disasters are permissible. As the response to the 2004 tsunami proved, the world's capacity for mercy is limitless. But we still haven't figured out when to give war a chance.
I am of two minds when it comes to humanitarian intervention. Cases such as Myanmar may be the less difficult cases--situations where there is a threat of widepread disease or famine (let alone the physical injuries and other forms of suffering caused by the storm) and a government is either incapable or uninterested in actually doing what needs to happen to save its own citizens. I'm not saying that that is an easy case for humanitarian intervention, just that it is not as hard as other examples that are more politically ambiguous, such as intervening because of civil strife or sectarian violence.

Turning such a political decision into a legal rule is fraught with dangers. What do we do if the Russian intervene militarily in Georgia, on the pretext that they are protecting Russian passport holders? What of Turkey's intervention in Northern Cyprus in the 1970's on the argument that it was protecting Turkish Cypriots from violence? As I've written regarding Kosovo, the law of unintended consequences is a mighty force to reckon with.

The people of Myanmar desperately need help and they need it now. Perhaps intervening without the consent of their government will be the necessary and moral thing to do. I don't know enough about the facts on the ground to judge that. But, even if various states do undertake such an action, they should think very carefully about proclaiming the existence of a legal principle favoring humanitarian intervention.




Thursday, May 8, 2008

How Do You Interpret the Last-in-Time Rule?
Boring tax case, interesting international law issue. That's how I would summarize Jamieson v. CIR. The issue in Jamieson is what happens if a treaty says one thing, a subsequent statute conflicts with that treaty, and then there is a subsequent treaty change to the conflicting treaty provision, but that amendment does not remove the conflict. Under the last-in-time rule which provision prevails? Here is what the U.S. Tax Court ruled:


In 1986, while the U.S.-Canada Convention was in force, Congress amended the AMT imposed on noncorporate taxpayers by section 55 and added section 59 to the Code.... [Thereafter] the U.S.-Canada Convention was amended.... The revised Protocol Amending the Convention... made changes to Article XXIV affecting credits for Social Security tax, corporate tax exemptions, and the tax treatment of dividends, interest, and royalties,... but did not alter the general rule found in article XXIV, paragraph 1. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Protocol references section 59 [the earlier conflicting statutory provision].

It is well established that, where a statute and a treaty pertain to the same subject matter, they must be read so as to give effect to both if at all possible.... If, however, the statute and the treaty conflict, the last-in-time rule requires that “the last expression of the sovereign will ... [controls].”...

Applying the last-in-time rule, we hold that section 59(a)(2) is the last expression of the sovereign will and that it takes precedence over the U.S.-Canada Convention to the extent there is a conflict between them. [The statute] makes it very clear that Congress intended the limitation of section 59(a)(2) to supersede existing treaty provisions prohibiting double taxation. The U.S.-Canada Convention was one of those treaties. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Protocol contains any provision clearly indicating that Congress's intention to ensure that taxpayers with sufficient means should contribute a minimum amount of tax to the United States had been superseded.

So a treaty provision conflicts with a statute, and then that treaty provision is amended without fixing the conflict. Under the last-in-time rule, although the amended treaty provision came later, the failure to address the conflict means that the earlier conflicting statute controls? That logic seems more than a little curious to me. I wonder what others think.

Tuesday, May 6, 2008

How Do You Chip out of a Mortar Hole?
I'm sorry, I just can't let this one go:
Picture, if you will, a tree-lined plaza in Baghdad's International Village, flanked by fashion boutiques, swanky cafes, and shiny glass office towers. Nearby a golf course nestles agreeably, where a chip over the water to the final green is but a prelude to cocktails in the club house and a soothing massage in a luxury hotel, which would not look out of place in Sydney harbour. Then, as twilight falls, a pre-prandial stroll, perhaps, amid the cool of the Tigris Riverfront Park, where the peace is broken only by the soulful cries of egrets fishing.

Improbable though it all may seem, this is how some imaginative types in the US military are envisaging the future of Baghdad's Green Zone, the much-pummelled redoubt of the Iraqi capital where a bunker shot has until now had very different connotations.

A $5bn (£2.5bn) tourism and development scheme for the Green Zone being hatched by the Pentagon and an international investment consortium would give the heavily fortified area on the banks of the Tigris a "dream" makeover that will become a magnet for Iraqis, tourists, business people and investors. About half of the area is now occupied by coalition forces, the US state department or private foreign companies.

The US military released the first tentative artists' impression yesterday. An army source said the barbed wire, concrete blast barriers and checkpoints that currently disfigure the 5 sq mile area would be replaced by shopping malls, hotels, elegant apartment blocks and leisure parks. "This is at the end of the day an Iraqi-owned area and we will give it back to them with added value," said the source, who requested anonymity.

Potential investors are being encouraged to take a punt that years ahead, Baghdad's fortunes may mirror former war-torn cities such as Sarajevo and Beirut that have risen from the ashes.

Marriott International has already signed a deal to build a hotel in the Green Zone, according to Navy Captain Thomas Karnowski, the chief US liaison. Also in the pipeline is a possible $1bn investment from MBI International, a hotel and resorts specialist led by Saudi sheikh, Mohamed Bin Issa Al Jaber.

One Los Angeles-based firm, C3, has said it wants to build an amusement park on the Green Zone's outskirts. As part of the first phase, a skateboard park is due to open this summer.
The best thing about the "artist's rendering" is the complete absence of background. Wonder why that is?