Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Friday, June 27, 2008

An Important Maori Land Settlement -- But Where's the Treaty Itself?
The BBC reports that the New Zealand government and seven Maori tribes have entered into an historic agreement concerning Maori ownership of a number of forests in the North Island, where I live:
The NZ$420m ($319m) agreement transfers ownership of nine forests - covering 435,000 acres (176,000 hectares) of land - in the central North Island.

Hundreds of Maori, some in traditional dress, thronged parliament to witness the signing of the accord.

"It's a historic journey we are on," Prime Minister Helen Clark said.

"We came into politics to address injustice and seek reconciliation. Thank you for walking that road with us on this historic day," she added, according to AP news agency.

The settlement - the largest single deal between the government and Maori tribes - seeks to address grievances dating back to the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi.

The treaty guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown. But land seizures and ownership breaches followed.

The forests signed over are mainly large commercial pine plantations, generating about NZ$13m a year in rents.

The settlement also hands over rents that have accumulated on the land since 1989.

Between them, the seven tribes or iwi include more than 100,000 members. They will manage the land collectively, setting up a holding company structure and forestry management structure.
The agreement, known as the "Treelords" deal — echoing the very controversial 1992 Sealords deal, which ultimately led the New Zealand Parliament to extinguish all Maori claims to commercial fishing rights — is indeed historic. I would take issue, though, with the article's claim that the Treaty of Waitangi "guaranteed the indigenous Maori people use of their land and resources in return for ceding sovereignty to the British crown." That interpretation is consistent with the English version of the Treaty — but not with the Maori version. (The two versions were drafted separately, and the English version is not a translation of the Maori, even though the Maori version was drafted first.)

Here is Article 1 of the Treaty in English:
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.
And here is Article 1 in Maori:
Ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu-te Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.
I have bolded the operative terms. The problem is that kawanatanga does not mean "sovereignty"; it means "governance" — a much weaker term. Indeed, it is clear that the Maori did not intend to cede anything resembling sovereignty to the Queen, given that the Maori version of the Treaty does not use the Maori word for "sovereignty," kingitanga, or even the Maori word for "independence," rangatiritanga.

Just as important, the British had to have known that the Maori did not intend to cede sovereignty to the Queen. In 1835, the British and the Maori had signed the Declaration of Independence, in which the British guaranteed that the Maori chiefs would maintain sovereignty over their land. The Declaration made use of all three of the words that are at the heart of the dispute over the Treaty, with the British translating rangatiritanga as "independence," kingitanga as "sovereign power and authority," and kawanatanga as "functions of government." How then could the British have honestly believed a mere five years later — with many of the same British officials present at the signing of both documents — that Article 1's use of the term kawanatanga, as opposed to kingitanga, meant that the Maori were giving up their sovereignty?

Regardless, the question is now moot — New Zealand courts have long since given up trying to determine the "true" meaning of the Treaty. Now they — and the Waitangi Tribunal, which makes recommendations to the government concerning Maori grievances — simply apply the so-called "Treaty Principles":
The principle of government or the kawanatanga principle

Article 1 gives expression to the right of the Crown to make laws and its obligation to govern in accordance with constitutional process. This sovereignty is qualified by the promise to accord the Māori interests specified in article 2 an appropriate priority. This principle describes the balance between articles 1 and 2: the exchange of sovereignty by the Māori people for the protection of the Crown. It was emphasised in the context of this principle that ‘the Government has the right to govern and make laws’.

The principle of self-management (the rangatiratanga principle)

Article 2 guarantees to Māori hapū (tribes) the control and enjoyment of those resources and taonga that it is their wish to retain. The preservation of a resource base, restoration of tribal self-management, and the active protection of taonga, both material and cultural, are necessary elements of the Crown’s policy of recognising rangatiratanga. The Government also recognised the Court of Appeal’s description of active protection, but identified the key concept of this principle as a right for iwi to organise as iwi and, under the law, to control the resources they own.

The principle of equality

Article 3 constitutes a guarantee of legal equality between Māori and other citizens of New Zealand. This means that all New Zealand citizens are equal before the law. Furthermore, the common law system is selected by the Treaty as the basis for that equality, although human rights accepted under international law are also incorporated. Article 3 has an important social significance in the implicit assurance that social rights would be enjoyed equally by Māori with all New Zealand citizens of whatever origin. Special measures to attain that equal enjoyment of social benefits are allowed by international law.

The principle of reasonable cooperation

The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a fair basis for two peoples in one country. Duality and unity are both significant. Duality implies distinctive cultural development while unity implies common purpose and community. The relationship between community and distinctive development is governed by the requirement of cooperation, which is an obligation placed on both parties by the Treaty. Reasonable cooperation can only take place if there consultation on major issues of common concern and if good faith, balance, and common sense are shown on all sides. The outcome of reasonable cooperation will be partnership.

The principle of redress

The Crown accepts a responsibility to provide a process for the resolution of grievances arising from the Treaty. This process may involve courts, the Waitangi Tribunal, or direct negotiation. The provision of redress, where entitlement is established, must take account of its practical impact and of the need to avoid the creation of fresh injustice. If the Crown demonstrates commitment to this process of redress, it will expect reconciliation to result.
The Treaty Principles are important, and they do occasionally protect Maori interests. But their importance cannot obscure the fact that the Treaty itself still has no formal legal status in New Zealand, making Maori interests subject to the whims of Parliament. And that's no accident: taking the Treaty seriously would mean taking the Maori version of the Treaty seriously — and taking the Maori version seriously would mean that deals like Treelord would be the very tiny tip of a very large iceberg.

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

International Economic Law Interest Group Call for Papers
Susan Franck forwards the following call for papers for what looks to be an interesting and well-timed conference:
The ASIL's International Economic Law Interest Group will hold its biennial conference in Washington this year just after the U.S. Presidential election, on the timely theme of "The Politics of International Economic Law: The Next Four Years." The conference committee has just issued its Call for Papers here. Paper proposals are due by July 20. The Call supplies a wide range of suggested topics, but it is open for "politics-of" topics in any area of international economic law, not just trade. The conference will take place at George Washington University Law School in downtown Washington, on Friday and Saturday November 14-15, in a month when new vistas will open, no matter which candidate wins.

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Sue OPEC? Or Regulate NYMEX?
A recent op-ed published in the New York Times suggested that the states of the United States should do just that. Thomas W. Evans, who had been an adviser to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, argued that OPEC's actions violate U.S. antitrust law and artificially raises the prise of gasoline. However, he noted that the act of state doctrine may present a problem in terms of suing a foreign government:
Despite this illegal conduct, not everyone can sue OPEC and succeed. In 2002, a federal court dismissed a class-action lawsuit brought against OPEC by a gas station owner. An appeals court agreed, noting that “under the current state of our federal laws the individual member states of OPEC are afforded immunity from suit brought for damage caused by their commercial activities when they act through OPEC.”

The “current state of our federal laws” refers to the “act of state doctrine,” which was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1897 with the following words: “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”...

Fortunately, there is another way to sue OPEC. Even if actions by individual citizens fail, a seldom-used provision of Article III of the Constitution grants original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over lawsuits brought by states against “foreign states” and, as expanded by the United States Code, over “aliens.”

The attorneys general of the various states should sue OPEC as an alien or, pleading alternatively, as a foreign state.
He then argued that:
The states should contend that Article III of the Constitution outweighs the act of state doctrine. Respect for the sovereignty of a foreign government for acts “done within its own territory” does not, even if very liberally construed, protect decisions reached by a cartel based in Austria that directs 13 nations to sell their product at inflated prices to customers outside their boundaries.
Really? Because it seems like courts have been holding the other way. (He does suggest, however, presidential letters of support to make it more likely for courts to take jurisdicition.) I was under the impression that someone who was a Reagan and Bush adviser would be wary of asking courts to toss out accepted legal precedent so that they could then step into a poltical dispute between our country and one or more foreign countries. But then again, I guess we are addicted to oil and addicts can go to great lengths to get a fix...

Anyway, for a rejoinder to Evans' op-ed, see this post by Matt Stone at the Global Buzz explaining six reasons why suing OPEC is a bad idea. I will quote one reason:
As Thomas Walde, a professor at the University of Dundee, [has explained], OPEC is not a "cartel" in the legal sense of the word because it is a collection of governments, not private companies. A plausible defense could be that OPEC actions constitute a "joint resource conservation effort" and not market manipulation per se.
And, I would also add that if we want to focus on regulatory efforts, perhaps instead of diving into the contentious judicial power/ foriegn policy debate, we should start closer to home and look at smarter regulation of the (possible) effects of oil speculation in the New York Mercantile Exchange. The effects of oil speculation are still debated. However, to give a sense of their possible effects, I rememember back in the good old days when oil was just hitting $100 per barrel (what was that, April?), one research firm estimated that about a 20% of the price was due to speculation in oil-denominated securities by investment banks, hedge funds, and pension funds, not by foreign governments as Evans implied. But see also this piece, which is skeptical of whether increased oversight of the futures market would actually affect the price of oil.

I doubt the "sue OPEC" idea has much traction (or much of a chance of success). The market regulation angle seems to be getting at least some support from both sides of the aisle and from both candidates. But it remains to be seen if this would actually affect oil prices. Stay tuned (and off the roads...).