Opinio Juris

A weblog dedicated to reports, commentary, and debate on current developments and scholarship
in the fields of international law and politics

Saturday, May 24, 2008

Power Shifts, Old and New
Wednesday’s NY Times had a good essay by Thomas Friedman on the current evolution of the global distribution of power. He argues that there are actually three shifts taking place:

The first shift is due to our “oil addiction”:
Let’s start with the most profound one: More and more, I am convinced that the big foreign policy failure that will be pinned on this administration is not the failure to make Iraq work, as devastating as that has been. It will be one with much broader balance-of-power implications — the failure after 9/11 to put in place an effective energy policy…

The failure of Mr. Bush to fully mobilize the most powerful innovation engine in the world — the U.S. economy — to produce a scalable alternative to oil has helped to fuel the rise of a collection of petro-authoritarian states — from Russia to Venezuela to Iran — that are reshaping global politics in their own image.
The second main shift isn’t so much about our self-imposed weakness due to oil consumption, but the rise of other states due to the changes in their societies. Friedman cites to Fareed Zakaria’s new book, The Post-American World:
Mr. Zakaria’s central thesis is that while the U.S. still has many unique assets, “the rise of the rest” — the Chinas, the Indias, the Brazils and even smaller nonstate actors — is creating a world where many other countries are slowly moving up to America’s level of economic clout and self-assertion, in every realm…

For too long, argues Zakaria, America has taken its many natural assets — its research universities, free markets and diversity of human talent — and assumed that they will always compensate for our low savings rate or absence of a health care system or any strategic plan to improve our competitiveness.

“That was fine in a world when a lot of other countries were not performing,” argues Zakaria, but now the best of the rest are running fast, working hard, saving well and thinking long term. “They have adopted our lessons and are playing our game,” he said. If we don’t fix our political system and start thinking strategically about how to improve our competitiveness, he added, “the U.S. risks having its unique and advantageous position in the world erode as other countries rise.”
The third shift, described in David Rothkopf’s book Superclass (see Peter’s take on it here) describes the rise in power of
a small group of players — “the superclass” — a new global elite, who are much better suited to operating on the global stage and influencing global outcomes than the vast majority of national political leaders.

Some of this new elite “are from business and finance,” says Rothkopf. “Some are members of a kind of shadow elite — criminals and terrorists. Some are masters of new or traditional media; some are religious leaders, and a few are top officials of those governments that do have the ability to project their influence globally.”
None of this is especially new. Think of the fears of the rise of OPEC in the 1970's or the discussion of American relative decline in the 1980's (spurred, in part, by the publication of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and more generally by the economic rise of Japan) and even Friedman's own essays on "super-empowered individuals" in the 1990's.

Noting that these ideas are not new is not to criticize Friedman. To the contrary, he recognizes that simply because some issues fall in and out of vogue (oil dependency, for example) does not change the fact that they affect global power day in and day out. Each of these three trends played a role in the distribution of power in decades past and they continue to do so today. Besides looking for what is new in international politics, it is important to reiterate the fundamentals. Especially if they still have not been addressed in any meaningful sense by policymakers.

Tuesday, May 20, 2008

Dave Glazier on the Wall Street Journal on Gitmo Defense Attorneys
Over at National Security Advisors, our colleague Dave Glazier has a superb post on whether the Gitmo defense attorneys are responsible for the ills of the military commissions, as the Wall Street Journal's far-right editorial page seems to believe. Here's the intro:
The Wall Street Journal published a scathing editorial today blasting the military and civilian defense attorneys it portrays as unreasonably obstructing the capital military commission prosecutions of high value terrorists, including alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). It is not surprising that a paper noted for its politically conservative editorial stance should defend the government's general approach to the so-called "War on Terror." But it is disappointing to see the editors of a paper that is generally well regarded for the basic quality of its journalism get so many points of law, history, and fact wrong, as well as to question the integrity of so many career military lawyers and judges. It is also ironic to see how far the editors have shifted their views on the role of law and justice since the time of the trial they hold up as a prototype.
The post includes a fascinating discussion of the events underlying Ex parte Quirin — and the Journal's rather different take on that case in 1942. Check it out!
The Rehabilitation of John Yoo?
The June 2008 issue of Esquire magazine has a feature piece on John Yoo by John H. Richardson, plus an on-line transcript of part of Richardson's interview and an autobiographical sketch by Yoo himself. Although framed as a cautionary tale, the article clearly seeks to humanize Yoo. The reader gets a view of Yoo the professor, questioning students on what "war" is in an elegant blue suit offset by a shiny tie (sorry, unlike many Esquire articles there's no brand name given or price tag). We learn about his personal interests, including classical music, bands like the Who and U2, and the anime Ghost in the Shell. Among the piece's stranger quotes, Yoo explains his affinity for Berkeley, "Liberals from the sixties do a great job of creating all the comforts of life--gourmet food, speciality jams, the best environmentally conscious waters." More substantively, Yoo describes how his parents thought Truman saved Korea by going in without Congressional backing, a point that Richardson uses to explain the origins of Yoo's views on Presidential Power. Of course, Lincoln is also brought up in Yoo's defense (e.g., the Emancipation Proclamation and suspension of habeas).

In terms of what Yoo's become famous for--his work on the Geneva Conventions and torture--the article offers some balance; noting the overwhelmingly negative reaction it's received and the subsequent hostility to Yoo and his opinions. But, on the whole, the piece tries to explain (and to some extent defend) Yoo through multiple lenses.

First, the article explains Yoo's memos as a function of the time and circumstances, whether in the aftermath of 9/11 with the Pentagon still in flames or in capturing Abu Zubadaydah who was said to have "details of attack plans that could include nuclear weapons" but who "was an expert in interrogation and how to resist interrogation." Richardson even invokes the ticking time bomb for Zubadaydah--"If it wasn't exactly the famous "ticking bomb scenario come to life . . . it was close enough." I'm not persuaded by these arguments, however, particularly where the on-line interview makes clear Yoo's memos weren't turned around in a day or two, but were the product of weeks of work (i.e., the Geneva Conventions debate occurred in January and February 2002, months after 9/11 and the "Torture Memo" came out in August 2002, months after Zubadahdah's March 2002 capture).

Second, Yoo is allowed to explain how the scope of his opinions was not as broad as many assume. For starters, he was only writing legal opinions, not policy ones. And so, he says on the Geneva Conventions:

Whether it was a war or not, the question of whether Geneva Conventions applied to al Qaeda was a straightforward question, at least to me. The policy question is much more difficult, whether they should apply to them as a matter of policy. . . . There’s a balance. Is this going to degrade military discipline? Is it going to give us a bad image versus does it produce gains in security? Is it part of the message that terrorists are not going to be given the same status as people who follow the rules? It’s a very difficult trade off. And then it’s harder and harder because there’s the question that if you don’t give them full Geneva Convention protection, what are you going to give them? That’s a hard question, too. I think the legal questions are much easier than those fine hard-grained policy issues. I think those are very hard questions. It’s not my job to say what they should do.

In the article though Yoo is reported to have admitted his arguments about Afghanistan as a failed state so as to exclude the Geneva Conventions may have "been pushing it" (a retreat I'm happy to hear, since that issue was something I worked on for the State Department during my time there). Moreover, I take issue with how the article--it's not clear if it's Richardson or Yoo's characterization--portrays Bush's decision on the Geneva Conventions, denying their application to Al-Qaeda but extending them to the Taliban. Although literally true, this version ignores the President's decision that none of the Taliban qualified for protection under the Geneva Convention because they were illegal combatants, which put them functionally in the same boat as Al Qaeda in the end.

On torture, moreover, Yoo emphasizes his distaste for the use of his memo beyond CIA circles, and in the process the article suggests he should get credit for trying to draw some lines:

Yoo . . . says he thought he was writing a memo for exceptional cases, for the highly trained specialists of the CIA. "I never thought it would be a good idea for the Army to do it, to put it into the hands of eighteen-year old kids. But it would be inappropriate if I had that worry and it changed the way I interpreted the law." So he buckled down to one of the world's most thankless jobs, defining the limits of acceptable pain. He knew it would be easy to draw a vague standard that sounded good and then give the CIA a meaningful wink. But that wouldn't be fair to the officers in the field. He wanted to draw a clear line.

Third, the article's humanization theme culminates around the idea that readers shouldn't dehumanize John Yoo unless they can say what they would have done. Thus, the only critic who gets featured prominently in the article--Padilla's lawyer Jonathan Freiman--gets knocked for refusing to draw the torture line, despite Richardson asking him to do so three times. Yoo's on-line interview takes a swing at Jack Goldsmith on the same point, given Goldsmith's critique of Yoo's memo:

I think that’s unfair, first because Goldsmith never issued an opinion of his own. He’s certainly free to criticize. It goes back to unless you’ve actually made the hard decision yourself, then you don’t really know how you think it through, what you would do. So he says “slapdash opinion,” but we have no idea what he would have done, because he left. Second thing is, it went through the normal process opinions go through in the Justice Department. It was primarily worked on by career staff people, and then went through a process of editing and review by different offices within the department, no different than any other.

The article closes by saying we can't think of Yoo as a "monster" because "that just means we don't have to think about why he did what he did. Grant him his good intentions, entertain the possibility that he did it to save lives, recognize the honor in his refusal to hide, and his story becomes a cautionary tale about the incremental steps that can lead a nation to disaster."

On the whole, the article is a further testament to how much government lawyering has become part of our popular culture, with John Yoo as the face of the current Administration's efforts. In the end, I'm not sure I agree that Yoo's as deserving of a defense as Richardson gives him. But I do agree that the questions he asks--Why did John Yoo do what he did and what would you have done differently if you were him--are entirely fair game. I know where I stood on the Geneva Conventions at the time, and would like to think I'd have answered the torture question differently than Yoo if I'd been asked about it while at State (so far as I know though, State was never asked for its views). What about you?

Update: Esquire let me know that it has now put up on-line the complete transcript from Richardson's interview of John Yoo. Richardson's questions, however, do not appear, so one has to make a few inferences to read it coherently. Still, it's 10 web-pages of material, so I'm sure some will find it of great interest.